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NOTES 
The Sale of Human Body Parts 
The limited but encouraging success of clinical organ and tissue 
transplants--the implanting in a human of an organ or tissue from 
another area of the recipient's body, from another human, or from 
an animal-indicates the potential for using such procedures as rou-
tine medical treatment. However, the scarcity of organs and tissues 
impedes progress in the area. Suggested solutions to the problem of 
providing body parts have included schemes based on donation, com-
pulsory cadaver appropriation, and presumed consent. An alterna-
tive that is often either overlook~d or summarily rejected is a market 
in which individuals could sell body parts of themselves or others. 
Section I of this Note briefly surveys the state of the transplant 
art; section II outlines the inadequacy of the present human parts 
supply system; section III discusses some of the alternatives advanced 
as solutions to the shortage; section IV discusses the market system 
alternative; section V considers existing legal doctrines that may im-
pede the establishment of such a system; and section VI reviews tort 
and tax law problems associated with the market concept. 
I. THE TRANSPLANT ART 
Human body parts are useful in many contexts. Traditionally, 
cadavers serve instructional purposes in medical schools and are 
sought by museums for display.1 More recently, human body parts 
have become essential for medical research.2 Organ and tissue trans-
plants, however, present the most recent and most dramatic need for 
human body parts. 
The progress that is being made in allotransplantation-trans-
plantation involving a donor and a recipient that are genetically 
dissimilar but of the same species3-indicates the breadth of the 
I. See N.Y. Times, May 28, 1972, § IA (Brooklyn, Queens, Long Island Magazine), 
at 4, col 4 (late city ed.). 
2. See text accompanying note 13 infra. 
3. The terminology of tissue transplantation has been the subject of some debate, 
There is a well-supported movement to alter the terminology to make it etymologically 
correct and consistent with established immunological terms. See Medawar, Opening 
Remarks, in CIBA FOUNDATION SYMPOSIUM ON TMNSPLANTATION I, 2 (G. Wolsten• 
holme & M. Carmeron ed. 1962); Snell, Terminology of Tissue Transplantation, 2 
TRANSPLANTATION 655 (1964). However, the older terminology continues to appear in 
current literature. See, e.g., Wasmuth & Stewart, Medical and Legal Aspects of Httman 
Organ Transplantation, 14 Cr.Ev.-MAR. L. REv. 442, 443 (1965), The transplantation of 
body parts or substances can be attempted when the donor is also the recipient; this 
is presently called autotransplantation or autograft (the old terminology is identical). 
P. RUSSELL & A. MONACO, THE BIOLOGY OF TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION 4 (1965). Trans-· 
plantation can also be attempted between individuals identical in histocompatibility 
antigens (that is, identical twins)-isotransplantation or isograft (the old terminolog)' 
[1182] 
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transplantation science. Transplants of the cornea, 4 the kidney, 6 and 
the heart0 have become well accepted. Allografts of the liver,7 the 
lung,8 bone marrow,9 the pancreas,10 the endocrine glands,11 and 
is identical). Id. Histocompatibility antigens attach to cells and are capable of provok-
ing an immune response, if recognized as foreign. Id. at 113. For a definition of antigen 
and immune i:esponse, see text accompanying notes 149-50 infra. Finally, transplanta-
tion can be attempted between genetically dissimilar members of the same species 
(for e.xample, between two unrelated individuals)-allotransplantation or allograft 
(homotransplantation or homograft in the old terminology)-and between species-
xenotransplantation or xenograft (heterotransplantation or heterograft in the old 
terminology). P. RUSSELL&: A. MONACO, supra, at 4. 
4. The· first successful corneal graft in man that remained clear is attributed to 
Dr. F. Zirm, who in 1905 grafted the cornea of a boy into a man whose eyes had 
sustained lime burns, P. TREVOR-ROPER, CORNEAL GRAFI'ING 5 (1972). 
5, The kidney was transplanted with limited success in 1947, when a kidney was 
attached to a patient's arm and functioned well enough to enable her to recover from 
a reversible form of severe kidney failure, Dunphy, The Story of Organ Transplanta-
tion, 21 HAsr1Ncs L.J. 67, 68-69 (1969), and in 1954, when the first successful isotrans-· 
plantation was accomplished at Peter Bent Brigham Hospital in Boston. Id. The 
development of more sophisticated immunosuppressive drug-s led to a continuing 
expansion of kidney transplant procedure, and the operation has evolved into a 
widely practiced form of corrective surgery. The 11th Report of the Human Renal 
Transplant Registry, 226 J.A.M.A. 1197 (1973), includes reports of 12,389 renal trans-
plants from 1951 through 1972. Follow-up information on 10,357 of the cases reported 
indicated that, of the patients that received a renal graft, 47.6 per cent were alive 
with graft function, 18.2 per cent were alive without graft function, and 34-2 per cent 
were deceased. Id. at 1197. ' 
6, The first modern human heart transplant was undertaken in January of 1964; 
Griepp, Stinson &: Shumway, Heart, in TRANSPLANTATION 531, 535 a. Najarian &: R. 
Simmons ed. 1972). The recipient was a 68-year-old man with severe heart disease; 
the donor was an adult cltjmpanzee. Attempts at resuscitation were discontinued one 
hour after the removal of the bypass catheters. Id. By January 1, 1973, 202 human 
heart transplants had been undertaken globally; 26 recipients were still alive. ACS/NIH 
Organ Transplant Registry: Third Scientific Report, 226 J.A.M.A. 1211, 1213 (table 
1) (1973) [hereinafter Report]. The difficulty of performing a successful heart trans-
plant has dampened enthusiasm for the procedure. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1971, 
§ 4, at 7, coL I (late city ed.). 
7. Six liver transplants were attempted in 1963, but none was successful. F. MooRE, 
TRANSPLANTS: THE GIVE AND TAKE OF TISSUE TRANSPLANTS 249 (1972). By January 1, 
1973, transplantation of the liver had been attempted 182 times. Of these, one pa-
tient was alive more than four years after allotransplantation, and two patients were 
alive over three. years after the operation. Fourteen patients had lived for more than 
one year; six for more than two; four for more than three; and one for more than 
four. Report, supra note 6, at 1214-15. Transplantation can be performed to alleviate 
the systems of at least three diseases: cancer of the liver, cirrhosis of the liver, and 
congenital absence of the bile ducts. See F. MooRE, supra, at 241. 
8. The first allotransplantation of the human lung was performed by Dr. J. Hardy 
and his associates in 1963. Hardy, Webb, Dalton&: Walker, Lung Romotransplantation 
in Man, 186 J.A.M.A. 1065 (1963). Thirty-one other lung transplants had been per-
formed by January 1, 1973. Only three recipients had survived for more than thirty 
days with the graft functioning. The longest survival had been for ten months. 
Report, supra note 6, at 1215. 
9. Bone marrow grafts have been performed in a number of research centers in 
the past few years. Between January 1, 1968 and April I, 1973, 27 transplant teams 
reported on 181 bone marrow allografts, Repo1·t, supra note 6, at 1212-14; 37 of 
the patients were living as of April 1, 1973. Id. The median survival time for the 
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bits of small intestine12 are being experimentally tested in human 
recipients. Research with animal subjects and scattered human sub-
je.s;ts is also being undertaken on the allotransplantation of the pitu• 
itary glands, the thyroid gland, the parathyroid gland, the gonads, 
and most other major body tissues.13 Furthermore, the use of trans• 
plant procedures is expanding rapidly; the most significant advances 
in human allografts have come within the past fifteen years.14 Vir-
tually every part of the human body is now, or will soon be, reusable. 
II. THE PRESENT SUPPLY SYSTEM 
A. The Cadaver Source 
Vital organs, such as the heart, the liver, and the lungs, can be 
obtained only from cadavers; any attempt to procure them from liv-
ing sources would run afoul of state and federal suicide and homicide 
Iaws.15 The removal of nonvital parts--one kidney, small pieces of 
skin, and bone marrow, for example-may give rise to questions of 
coerced consent and criminal mayhem,1° apart from a risk that the 
health of the donor will be seriously impaired.17 Thus, the cadaver 
source is clearly preferable, and of great importance. For example, 
cadavers were the source of kidneys for 63.4 per cent of the renal 
grafts reported to the Human Renal Transplant Registry for the 
period between 1951 and 1972,18 and recently there has been a de-
crease in the proportion of living donors.19 
The common law provided no irrevocable procedure for do~at-
ing cadavers for medical use. 20 Anatomical gifts in wills were not 
181 patients was 70 to 75 days. Id. at 1215 (table 4). Optimistic forecasts are supple• 
mented by the increasing frequency and success of the procedure. Id, at 1212-14. 
10. Thirty-two pancreas transplants have been attempted. As of December 3, 1973, 
one patient had survived 14 months and another 20 months after the grafting. Report, 
supra note 6, at 1216. 
II. Allotransplants of the endocrine glands have met with little success. Gittcs, 
Endocrine Tissues, in TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 6, at 698. 
12. There were five reported intestinal allotransplantations as of 1972. Ruiz, Uchiclrt 
8: Lillehei, Intestine, in TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 6, at 646, 651. Graft survival 
periods of up to two months were noted. Id. at _653. 
13. See F. MOORE, supra note 7, at 290-306. See generally HUMAN ORGAN SUl'l'ORT 
AND REPLACEMENT 0• Hardy ed. 1971); HUMAN TRANSPLANTATION (F. Rapaport &: 
J. Dausset ed. 1968); TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 6. 
14. F. MooRE, supra note 7, at 130-35. 
15. See text accompanying notes 365-67 infra. 
16. See text accompanying notes 371-90 infra. 
17. See note 73 infra. 
18. The 11th Report of the Human Renal Transplant Registry, supra note 5, at 
1198-99. 
19. See id. at 1198-99; The Tenth Report of the Human Renal Transplant Registry, 
221 J.A.l\f.A. 1495, 1498 (1972); The Ninth Report of the Ruman Renal Transplant 
Registry, 220 J.A.M.A. 253, 256 (1972). 
20. See text accompanying notes 435, 439-40, 461-76 infra. 
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considered to be final testamentary dispositions and, in some circum: 
stances, could be defeated by the surviving spouse or a close relative. 
Donations by the next of kin, who have the right to bury the body, 
were undoubtedly inhibited by legal uncertainty.21 
The increasing need for human tissues and body parts22 for trans-
plantation, experimentation, and education, coupled with a demon-
strated public willingness to donate cadaver parts,23 led many state 
legislatures to enact donation statutes in the 1950's and early 1960's. 
By 1968, a great majority of American jurisdictions had promulgated 
anatomical donation legislation.24 Although these statutes were a 
major advance from the common law, they varied in content and 
coverage.25 The statutes were often inadequately drafted26 and state-
to-state variations27 created uncertainty regarding gift authorizations 
21. For the common law of cadaver dispositions and the -rights of the next of 
kin, see text accompanying notes 391-430, 461-68 infra. See generally, Comment, The 
Law of Dead Bodies-Impeding Medical Progress, 19 Omo ST. L.J. 455 (1958); Note, 
The Law of Testamentary Disposition-A Legal Barrier to Medical Advance!, 30 
TElln>LE L.Q. 40 (1956); Note, Donation of Dead Bodies and Parts Thereof for Medical 
Use, 21 U. P1TI. L. REv. 523 (1960). 
22. See section !IC infra. 
23. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1968, § 1, at 18, col. 4 (late city ed.). A Gallup poll 
indicated that 70 per cent of those surveyed would be willing to donate their bodies. 
24. E.g., Law of May 1, 1947, ch. 125, § 1, [1947] Cal. Stat. 646, amended by Law 
of Aug. 1, 1966, ch. 926, § 1, [1968] Cal. Stat. 1759; Law of Sept. 11, 1957, ch. 933, § 1, 
[1957] Cal. Stat. 2144 (both repealed 1968); Law of July 10, 1959, §§ 1-2, [1959] Ill. 
Laws 799 (repealed 1969); No. 82, [1958] Mich. Acts 89 (repealed 1969); Law of April 
28, 1960, ch. 916, §§ 1-2, [1960] N.Y. Laws 2306 (repealed 1970); Act No. 591, §§ 1-3, 
[1959] Pa. Laws 1617 (repealed 1969). 
25. See generally Louisell, The Procurement of Organs for Transplantation, 64 
Nw. U. L. R.Ev. 607 (1970); Richards, Medical-Legal Problems of Organ Transplanta-
tion, 21 HAsrINGS L.J. 77 (1969); Sideman &: Rosenfeld, Legal Aspects of Tissue Dona-
tions from Cadavers, 21 SYRACUSE L. REv. 825 (1970); Stason, The Uniform Anatomical 
Gift Act, 23 Bus. LAW. 919 (1968). 
26. The gift must be finalized immediately after the death of the organ donor, 
see section IVB infra, and thus the formality and the rigidity of testamentary disposition 
must be sacrificed in favor of convenience and swiftness. Dukeminier, Supplying 
Organs for Transplantation, 68 Mica, L. R.Ev. 811, 825 (1970). Most of the statutes 
failed to recognize these compl~ities; they had one or more of the following short-
comings: failure to deal adequately with conflicts between surviving relatives, e.g., Act 
No. 37, §§ 1-3, [1949] Ala. Acts 61 (repealed 1969); Act No. 283, §§ 1-3 [1949] Ark. Acts 
849 (repealed 1969); Law of March 21, 1949, ch. 160, § 1, [1949] Minn. Laws 326 · 
(repealed 1969); inadequate protection of a physician operating under an apparently 
valid gift instrument, e.g., Law of March 24, 1955, ch. 99, § 8, [1955] Iowa Acts 
[56 G.A.] 118 (repealed 1969); Law of May 14, 1965, ch. 97, § 1, [1965] R.I. Acts 358 
(repealed 1969); Law of March 31, 1964, ch. 582, §§ 1-2, [1964] Va. Acts 856 (repealed 
1970); cumbersome filing and delivery requirements, Act No. 37, §§ 1-!I, [1949] Ala. 
Acts 61 (repealed 1969); Act No. 283, §§ 1-3, [1949] Ark. Acts (repealed 1969); Act No. 
96, [1963) S.C. Acts 92 (repealed 1969). 
27. Their provisions differed as to: competency of the persons authorized to con:-
scnt to an organ or tissue donation, compare, e.g., No. 37, § 1, [1949] Ala. Acts 61 (re-
pealed 1969), with Law of Feb. 27, 1954, ch. 6, § 1, [1954] Ariz. Laws 7 (repealed 1970); 
right of survivors to make a gift of organs from a dead body in their possession, 
compare, e.g., Law of March 8, 1961, ch. 90, § 3, [1961] Wash. Laws 1562 (repealed 
1969) with Law of Feb. 27, 1954, ch. 6 [1954] Ariz. Laws 7-9 (repealed 1970); permissible 
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executed in other states.28 As a result, this framework proved inade-
quate to encourage and provide guidelines for anatomical donations.20 
Responding to the continuing ne~d, a subcommittee of the Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws30 drafted a model act designed to 
provide a favorable legal setting for the donation and use of human 
cadaver parts.81 Under the Uniform Act "any individual of sound 
mind and 18 years of age or more"82 may donate all or part of his 
cadaver to any hospital, surgeon, physician, accredited medical or 
dental school, college or university, organ bank or storage facility, or 
specified individual33 for use in education, research, the advancement 
of medical or dental science, therapy, or transplantation.84 
donees, compare, e.g., No. 37, § I, [1949] Ala. Acts 61 (repealed 1969), with No. 96, 
§ I, [1963] S.C. Acts 92 (repealed 1969); purposes for which the gifts could be 
made, compare, e.g., No. 37, § I, [1949] Ala. Acts 61 (repealed 1969), with Law of 
March 8, 1961, ch. 90, §§ 2, 4, [1961] Wash. Laws 1561-63 (repealed 1969); the degree 
of formality required to validate consent, compare, e.g., No. 96, § 2, [1963] S.C. Acts 92 
(repealed 1969), with Law of Feb. 27, 1954, ch. 6, § 1, [1954] Ariz. Laws 7 (repealed 
1970); requirements for filing and/ or delivery of the gift instrument, compare, e.g., 
No. 37, § 1, [1949] Ala. Acts 61 (repealed 1969), with Law of March 8, 1961, ch. 90, § 2, 
[1961] Wash. Laws 1561-62 (repealed 1969); requirements for revocation, compare, e.g., 
No. 37, § 2, [1949] Ala. Acts 61 (repealed 1969), with Law of March 8, 1961, ch. 90, § 2, 
[1961] Wash. Laws 1562 (repealed 1969); and protection afforded physicians acting in 
good faith under an invalid gift instrument, compare, e.g., Law of Feb. 27, 1954, ch. 6, 
§ 5, [1954] Ariz. Laws 8 (repealed 1970), with Law-of March 8, 1961, ch. 90, § 5, (1961] 
Wash. Laws 1563 (repealed 1969). 
28. There was an unresolved question of which state law would apply to determine 
control of the body when the gift is validly executeµ in one state but the donor dies 
in a state with different execution requirements. Also, a gift in one state may not pro• 
tect a surgeon from civil and criminal liability for the mishandling of a dead body in 
another state. See generally Comment, Legal Problems in Donations of Human Tissues 
·to Medical Science, 21 VAND. L. REv. 353, 366-68 (1969). 
29. See, e.g., Holland v. Metalious, 105 N.H. 290, 293, 198 A.2d 654, 656 (1964) ("[E]X· 
isling 'anatomical' statutes .•• are inadequate, and the need for appropriate statutory ' 
provision to implement the desires of the dying to aid the living is increasingly Ul'• 
gent."); HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATf. 
LAws 183 (1968) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. 
30. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMIS1>10NERS ON UNirOltM S·rATJ: 
LAws 111 (1965) (subcommittee appointed to "study and report on the subject matter 
of a Uniform Gifts of Human Tissue Act'). 
31. Predictably, the Commissioners found "both the common law and the prcscent 
[sic] statutory picture ••• one of confusion, diversity, and inadequacy," HANDnooK, 
supra note 29, at 183, and formulated the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. Id. at 185-93. 
The Act was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws in July of 1968, id. at 116-17, and was promptly endorsed by the American 
:Bar Association and the Medical-Legal Liason Committee of the American Medical 
Association. Richards, supra note 25, at 94. 
32. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT Acr § 2(a). 
33. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT Acr § 3. 
34. UNIFORM ANATOJ\nCAL GIFT Acr § 3. The purposes allowed depend on the 
classification of the donee. For example, an accredited medical school cannot be the 
donee of an organ intended for transplant. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT Acr § 3. 
If the donor fails to specify a donee, or if the specified donee is unavailable to 
accept the gift, a physician attending at the donor's death may accept the gift if the 
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The gift may be made by will, in which case it becomes effective 
upon the death of the donor and is not subject to probate,35 or by a 
·written document signed by the donor and attested by two witnes-
ses.86 No delivery or filing of the document is necessary.37 However, 
if the gift instrument has been delivered to the donee, the donor can 
revoke the gift only by (1) a signed statement of revocation delivered 
to the donee,88 (2) an oral statement of revocation made before two 
witnesses and communicated to the donee, 89 (3) a deathbed statement 
made to an attending physician and communicated to the donee,40 
or (4) a signed revocation found on the donor's person or among his 
effects.41 If delivery has not been made to the specified donee, the 
donor may also revoke by "destruction, cancellation, or mutilation 
of the document and all its copies."42 A gift by will can be revoked 
in the manner provided by probate law, in addition to the proce-
dures outlined above. 
In the absence of "actual notice of contrary indications by the 
decedent," certain other individuals can donate all or any part of 
the decedent's body for the purposes and to the donees specified in 
the Act.43 A priority ranking is established among the next of kin 
to determine who has the right to donate.44 
The Act includes devices that protect dortees afting under a gift 
instrument by allowing them to act promptly on their actual knowl-
edge of the circumstances at the time of the death of the donor.45 
donor has complied with all of the Act's consent requirements and has not ex-
pressly indicated wishes to the contrary. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFI' ACT § 4(c). The 
donee physician may not be a member of the transplanting team of doctors. UNIFORM 
ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 4(c). 
35. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 4(a). 
36. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 4(b). The comments to· the section urge 
that the document be in the form of a card carried on the person of the donor. A 
sample card is printed in UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT § 4, comment. 
37. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFI' ACT § 4(b). 
38. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT § 6(a)(l). 
39. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 6(a)(2). 
40. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT Acr § 6(a}(3). 
41. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 6(a)(4). 
42. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 6(b). 
43. UNIFORM ANATO?\nCAL GIFT ACT § 2(b). 
44. First priority is given the spouse; second an adult son or daughter; third 
either parent; fourth an adult brother or sister; fifth a guardian of the decedent at the 
time of his death; sixth "any other person authorized or under obligation to dispose 
of the body." UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT Ar::r § 2(b). 
45. A surviving relative may donate the decedent's parts if he has no actual notice 
of the contrary indications of the decedent or a relative in his priority ranking or 
higher and no member of a prior class is available at the time of death. UNIFORM 
ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(b). A physician may accept the gift if the specified donor is 
unavailable, or if there is no specified donor, in the absence of any expressed indica-
tion that the donor desired otherwise. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFI' ACT § 4(c). Revoca-
tion of a delivered gift instrument is only effective if "communicated" or delivered to 
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Thus, any hesitancy that may have been caused by the strict require-
ments of the older statutes46 is eliillinated. Also, section 7(c) provides 
a blanket protection: "A person who acts in good faith in accord with 
the terms of this Act or with the anatomical gift laws of another 
state ( or a foreign country) is not liable for damages in any civil 
action or subject to prosecution in any criminal proceeding for his 
act." 
The Uniform Act met with immediate acceptartce.47 Three 
states adopted the second tentative draft in 1968,48 thus acting even 
before the final draft had been approved by the National Conference. 
Within fourteen months of its approval in July 1968, twenty-four 
states had adopted some form of the Act or had passed legislation 
clearly reflecting its influence.49 At present, all fifty states and the 
District of Columbia have substantially adopted the Uniform Act.00 
the donee, or found on the decedent or in his personal effects at death. UNIFOkM 
A.NATOZ>nCAL GIFr Acr § 6(a). A donee may accept any gift unless he has actual notice 
of the decedent's objection (or the objection of a surviving relative on a ranking 
higher C?E.- equal to the donor). UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT Acr § 2(c). If the gift is 
made by will, it is effective immediately upon the death of the decedent, even if the 
will is invalidated by probate, "to the e.xtent that (the gift] has been acted upon fn 
good faith •••• " UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT Acr § 4(a). 
46. See Louisell, supra note 25, at 610-19. 
47. However, critics have argued that it is overly protective of physicians and 
donees and abrogates the donor's right to a decent burial, See Groll &: Kerwin, The 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act: Is the Right to a Decent Burial Obsolete?, 2 LOYOLA 
U. L.J. 275 (1971); Lear, A Realistic Look at Heart Transplants, SATURDAY REV,, Feb, 
3, 1968, at 53, 58-59. 
48. Law of Aug. I, 1968, ch. 926, § 4, (1968] Cal. Stat. 1759 (repealed 1970 by 
adoption of the final draft); Law of March IO, 1968, ch. 63, (1968] Kan. Laws 150 (re-
pealed 1969 by adoption of the final draft); Law of May 7, 1968, ch. 467, (1968] Md. 
Laws 850 (amended 1969 by adoption of the final draft). For a discussion of the first 
California statute, see Comment, California's Response to the Problems of Procuring 
Human Remains for Transplantation, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 671 (1969). See also Smith & 
Smith, Kansas and the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 19 KANSAs L. REv. 569 (1971). 
49. See Louisell, supra note 25, at 625. 
50. ALA. CODE tit 22, §§ 184(4)-(11) (Supp. 1971); AI.As. STAT. §§ 13.50.010-.090 (1972); 
Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36--841 to -848 (Supp. 1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-410.4 to 
--410.13 (Supp. 1973); CAL. HEALTH &: SAFETY CoDE §§ 7150-58 (West 1970); CoLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 91-9-1 to -9-9 (1969); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ I9-139c to -139j (Supp. 
1973); D.EL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 1780-89 (Supp. 1970); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-271 to 
-278 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 736.20-.30 (Supp. 1973); GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 48-401 to -409 
(Supp. 1973); HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ .327-1 to -9 (Supp. 1973); IDAHO Coo£ §§ 39-3401 to 
-3411 (Supp. 1973); Iu.. REv. STAT. ch • .3, §§ 551-61 (1973); IND. ANN, STAT, §§ 29-2-16--1 
to -16--9 (1969); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 142A.l-.10 (1969); KAN. STAT, ANN. §§ 65--3209 to 
-3217 (1969); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.165-.235 (1970); LA. REv. STAT. ANN, §§ 7:2351• 
:2359 (Supp. 1974); ME. REv. STAT, ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2901-09 (Supp. 1973); Mo. ANN. 
CoDE art. 43, §§ 140-49B (1971); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 113, §§ 7-13 (Supp. 1973); Micu, 
CoMP. LAws ANN, §§ 328.261-.270 (Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN, §§ 525,921-.93 (Supp, 
1974); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 278.3-01 to -09 (Supp. 1972); Mo. ANN, STAT. §§ 194,210-,290 
(1969); MONT, REv. CooES ANN. §§ 69.2315-.2323 (1969); NEB, REv, STAT. §§ 71-4801 to 
--4812 (1971); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 451.500-.585 (1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN, §§ 291-A:l to 
-A:9 (Supp. 1972); N.J. STAT, ANN. §§ 26.6--57 to -65 (Supp. 1973); N.M. STAT, ANN, 
§§ 12-11-6 to -ll-14 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW §§ 4300-07 (McKinney 1970); 
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Despite its wide acceptance, the Act is not completely satisfactory. 
N.C. GEN, STAT. §§ 90-220.1 to -220.8 (Supp. 1973); N.D. Cmr. CODE §§ 23-06.1-01 to 
-09 (1969); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2108.01-.52 (Page Supp. 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
63, §§ 2201-09 (1969); ORE. R.Ev. STAT.§§ 97.250-.295 (1969); PA, STAT, ANN, tit. 35, § 6104 
(1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 8601-07 (Special Supp. 1972); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. 
§§ 23-47-1 to -7 (Supp. 1972); s.c. CODE ANN. §§ 32.711-.720 (Supp. 1973); S.D. Co.MP. 
LA.ws ANN. §§ 34.-26-20 to -41 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 53-4201 to -4209 (Supp. 
1973); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590-2 (Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-26-1 
to -8 (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5231-37 (Supp. 1973); VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 32-364.3 to -364.11 (1970); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN.§§ 68.08.50 to .610 (1969); W. VA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 16-19-1 to -9 (Supp. 1970); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.06 (Supp. 1973); WYo. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 35-221.1 to -221.9 (Supp. 1973). Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, 
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming adopted the Act verbatim or without 
significant change. Others adopted it with minor changes. Fourteen states modified· 
section 2(a), which regulates the competency of a donor to make a gift of his body. Alaska 
and Iowa set the minimum -age at 19. AI.As. STAT. § 13.50.10 (1972); IowA CODE ANN. 
§ 142A.2 (Supp. 1973). Nebraska requires a sound mind and 20 years of age. NEB. REv. STAT. 
§ 71-4802 (1971). Pennsylvania and Rhode Island set the minimum age at 21 years. 
PA. STAT, ANN. tit. 20, § 8602(a) (Special Supp. 1972); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 23-47-2 
(Supp. 1972). Maryland and Mississippi require an age of 21 and the competency to 
execute a will. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 142(a) (1971); MISS. CODE ANN. § 278.3-01 (Supp. 
1972). Maine requires that the donor be "of legal age," ME. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2902(1) 
(Supp. 1973); Vermont, of "the age of majority." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5232(a) (Supp. 
1973), Oklahoma specifies merely that the person be an adult. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
63, § 2203(a) (1973). Wisconsin allows the parent of an unmarried decedent under 18 
to revoke the decedent's gift, if of the entire body. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.06(2)(a) (Supp. 
1973). Connecticut prohibits the gift if death occurred from specifiec;l diseases. CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-139d (Supp. 1973). North Dakota adds that any person under 18 
with written consent of one parent or guardian may execute a valid gift. N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 23-06.1-02(1) (1970). Pennsylvania also disallows a gift of the whole body "&nless 
made in writing 15 days before death. PA. STAT. ANN. § 8602(a) (Special Supp. 1972). 
Two states modified the surviving parties' right to donate under section 2(b) by 
providing that, in the case of a donor who is a member of a religion that believes in 
healing solely by prayer or believes that it is wrong to mutilate or remove parts from 
the body for transplantation, only the organ donor has the authority to donate. CAL, 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 7151.7 (West 1970), as amended, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 7151.7 (West Supp. 1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-47-2(b) (Supp. 1972). 
Alaska, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, New Hampshire, and North 
Carolina omitted section 4(c), and thus allow the donee _physician to be on the trans• 
plant team. Two states omit section 4(c) for eyes only. IowA CoDE ANN. §§ 142A.4(3), 
.7(2) (1969); w. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-19-4(c) (Supp. 1970). 
Several states changed the witness requirements of section 4(b). Illinois requires 
that the witnesses certify that the dono):' was of "sound mind and memory and free 
from any undue influence and kn[ew] _the objects of his bounty and affection." !LL. 
REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 555(b) (1973). Missouri gives an alternative to the requirement of 
tw_o witnesses: The donor may sign before a notary or other authorized official. Mo. 
ANN. STAT. § 194.240(2) (1969). Some jurisdictions require substantial conformance to 
the form of the document outlined in the comment to the original Uniform Act, 
UNIFORM ANATO:r.nCAL GIFr Am: § 4, comment. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-274 (1973); FLA. 
STAT, ANN. § 736.25(2)(b) (Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CoDE art. 43, § 144 (1971), as amended, 
MD, ANN, CoDE art. 43, § 144 (Supp. 1973); · MICH. CoMP, LAws ANN. § 328.265(2) 
(Supp. 1973); MISs. CODE ANN. § 278.3-04(b) (Supp. 1972). 
Illinois eliminates oral statements as revocations under sections 6(a)(2) and (3). 
ILL, REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 557 (1973). Texas omits "d_uring terminal illness or injury" 
from section 6(a)(3), allowing, oral revocation to be made to an attending physician. 
TE:X, REv. Cxv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590:-2, § 7(a)(3) (Supp. 1974). - _ , 
'Connecticut reci,uires death t(? b~ determined_ by tw~. at~end~ng or ~rtifyiug 
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Certain areas, such as inter vivos gifts of human body parts, ni post-
mortem autopsies, 52 and the delivery and disposition of unclaimed 
bodies53 may have been left untouched because the Commissioners 
thought they had been settled. Hotly 'debated ethical questions were 
also left unresolved. For example, except for a provision prohibiting 
a physician on the transplant team from determining the time of 
death, 54 the Act provides no guidance for deciding when death has 
occurred. 55 The question of payment for anatomical gifts was also 
physicians who "shall use generally recognized and accepted scientific and clinical 
means to determine such time of death." CoNN. GEN. STAT, ANN. § 19-139:(b) (Supp, 
1973). 
Rhode Island and Texas state that, if the entire body is accepted by the donce, the 
spouse or next of kin may embalm the body for use in funeral services before the 
body is given. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN, § 23--47-7(a} (Supp. 1972); TEX, REV. CIV. STAT, 
ANN. art. 4590-2, § 8(a) (Supp. 1974). 
Delaware prohibits remuneration for gifts. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 24, § 1783(£) (Supp, 
1970). Rhode Island allows gifts only to nonprofit organ banks, R.I. GEN, L\WS ANN, 
§ 23--47-3(3) (Supp. 1972). Connecticut, Iowa, and Minnesota specify that any gift is 
considered for all purposes a service and not a sale. CONN, GEN. STAT, ANN, § 19-139c 
(Supp. 1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 142A.8 (1969); MINN, STAT, ANN. § 525.928 (Supp. 
1974). Massachusetts expressly includes an inter vivos gift of a kidney in the Act's 
coverage. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 113, § 8(a) (Supp. 1973). Arizona, Maryland, and Missis• 
sippi protect people (usually funeral directors and embalmers) who make the body 
unusable for transplantation if they did not have actual notice of the intended gift. 
Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-847E (Supp. 1973); Mn. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 147(b) (1971); 
Miss. CODE ANN. § 278.3-06(b) (Supp. 1972). 
Utah allowed the Uniform Act to influence significantly the drafting of its own 
anatomical gift act. The major differences are as follows: A person under 21 can make 
gifts if legally married or if consent of parents is given, UTAH CODE ANN, § 26-26-1 
(Supp. 1973); one attesting witness is required for the written document, UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 26-26-1 (Supp. 1971!): the donee is given 24 hours to remove the organ if the 
gift is of a part, UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-26-4 (Supp. 1973); revocation by written instru• 
ment must be '"executed in the same manner as the gift," UTAH CODE ANN, § 26-26-1 
(Supp. 1973); registration of the document is not necessary, but if the document is 
registered it is valid until a revocation is registered, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-26-1, -26-6 
(Supp. 1973); and the Act expressly states that it is to be liberally construed. UTAH 
CoDE ANN. § 26-26-8 (Supp. 1973). 
51. One state modified the Uniform Act to expressly includ,e coverage of inter 
vivos gifts of kidneys. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 113, § 8(a) (Supp. 1973). The Uniform Act 
definitions imply that inter vivos gifts were not meant to be covered. See UNIFORM 
ANATOMICAL GIFr Acr §§ 2(a), (b) •. 
The Commissioners apparently believed that the problem of inter vivos gifts was 
fairly well resolved: "Transplantation may be effected within narrow limits from one 
living person to another living person. In such case, all that is required is an appropri• 
ate 'informed consent' authorizing the surgical removal on the one hand, and the 
implantation on the other." HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 182, However, the issue was 
too quickly accepted as settled. See section IIB infra. 
52. See section IIIC infra. 
53. Cf. Vestal, Taber Sc Shoemaker, Medico-Legal Aspects of Tissue Homotransplat1• 
tation, 18 U. DET. L.J. 271, 283-84 (1955). 
54. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFr Acr § 7b. 
55. See text accompanying notes 60-72 infra. The Commissioners felt that defining 
death was best left to the judgment and integrity of the medical profession: 
This point is not subject to clear cut definition and medical authorities are 
CU1Tently working toward a consensus on the matter. Modern methods of cardiac 
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left for future resolution.56 Finally, the Act provides no criteria for 
determining who should receive available organs in times of scarcity .51 
Although it has troubled some commentators, 58 the narrow scope 
of the Act does have a political virtue: The Act's similarity to pre-
existing donation statutes undoubtedly facilitated its acceptance by 
the states. With few exceptions, 59 state versions of the ·Act also fail 
to address the controversial issues of death criteria, compensation, 
and donee selection. Despite its omissions, the universal state ac-
ceptance of the Act provides a uniform base from which a more 
comprehensive assault on the scarcity of human body parts can be 
launched. 
However, the issues ignored by the Act-in particular, the defini-
tion of death-must be resolved before organ transfers can be freely -
made and the optimum supply of human body parts achieved. The 
classic legal definition of death is usually stated to be the cessation 
of heartbeat and respiration.60 However, in practice, most doctors 
pacing, artificial respiration, artificial blood circulation and cardiac stimulation 
can continue certain bodily systems and metabolism far beyond spontaneous 
limits. The real question is when have irreversible changes taken place that pre-
clude 1·eturn to normal brain activity and self sustaining bodily functions. No 
reasonable statutory definition is possible. The answer depends upon many 
variables, differing from case to case. Reliance must be placed upon the 
judgment of the physician in attendance. 
UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT Ac:r § 7, note. E. Blythe Stason, the chairman of the 
committee, agreed: "The Uniform Act does not attempt to channel medical judgment 
in this complex area .... " Stason, supra note 25, at 928. 
56. E. Blythe Stason was not against payment but felt that it was perhaps too early 
to advance the idea seriously: 
It is possible, of course, that abuses may occur if payment should customarily 
be demanded; but every payment is not necessarily unethical •••. On the other 
hand drafting a statutory provision to preclude payment will not be easy. Until 
the matter of payment becomes a problem of some dimensions, the matter 
should be left to the decency of intelligent human beings. 
Stason, supra note 25, at 928. As a result, the Act neither encourages nor prohibits 
the practice. 
57. Stason, and presumably the .Commissioners, had no solution for this problem: 
"It is most unlikely that legal standards could make much sense in this complex area 
of scientific development." Id. at 929. 
58. See Dukeminier, supra note 26, at 817-31; Louisell, supra note 25, at 621; 
Richards, supra note 25, at 99-100. 
59. Connecticut provides that the time of death shall be determined by two 
physicians through the use of "generally recognized and accepted scientific and 
clinical means." CONN. GEN. STAT, ANN. § 19-139:(b) (Supp. 1973). Delaware provides 
that a donor may not receive remuneration for a gift of his body. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 
24, § 1783(£) (Supp. 1970). 
60. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 579, 586, 317 S.W.2d 275, 279 (1958); In re 
Estate of Schmidt, 21 Cal. App. 2d 262, 273, 67 Cal. Rptr. 847, 854 (1968); Thomas 
v. Anderson, 96 Cal. App. 2d 371, 376, 215 P.2d 478, 481 (1950); Vaegemast v. Hess, 
203 Minn. 207, 280 N.W. 641 (1938); Schmidt v. Pierce, 344 S.W.2d 120, 133 (Mo. 1961); 
White v. Taylor, 155 Tex. 392, 28 S.W.2d 925 (1956); Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins. 
Co., 374 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Collins, Limit of Medical Responsibility in 
Prolonging Life, 206 J.A.M.A. 389 (1968); Hannah, The Signs of Death: Historical 
Review, 28 N.C. MED. J. 457 (1967); Comment, The Criteria for Determining Death in 
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now define death as the cessation of brain activity, 01 because the 
development of shock treatment, cardiac pacemakers, and resuscita-
tors enables doctors to maintain heartbeat and respiration after the 
brain has ceased to direct regular body functions.62 Two states have 
statutes that allow the brain death criterion, 03 and a third has 
modified its Anatomical Gift Act to authorize medical discretion in 
setting death standards. 64 However, at least one court has expressly 
refused to use the cessation of brain activity as the criterion of death. oil 
The pressure to define death in terms of brain activity is particu-
larly acute when a transplant is contemplated, for a successful trans-
plant requires a fresh organ, undeteriorated by lack of oxygen. 00 
Optimal transplant conditions require that the organ be removed 
when the donor's circulation is still intact,67 an operation that would 
be impermissible under traditional definitions. If courts follow the 
common law precedents, transplant surgeons may be technically 
liable for homicide68 and vulnerable to wrongful death actions. 00 
Doctors who employ a brain cessation definition of death ap-
parently assume-perhaps unjustifiably-that the traditional defini-
Vital Organ Transplants-A Medical-Legal Dilemma, 38 U. Mo. L. REv. 220 (1973); 
Comment, Medical Jurisprudence-Determining the Time of Death of the Heart 
Transplant Donor, 51 N.C. L. REv. 172 (1972). See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
488 (4th ed. rev. 1968). 
Only two cases have been found in which the jury was allowed to use the cessation 
of brain function as a possible definition of death. Uury] Instruction No, 7, Tucker's 
Admin. v. Lower, Civ. No. 2831 (Richmond [Va.] Ct. Law &: Eq., May 25, 1972) (It 
should be noted that the court had changed its mind from the time of its Memorandum 
Opinion of May 23, 1972); State v. Lyons (Alameda County [Cal.] Super, Ct., May 2, 
1974), in National Observer, June 1, 1974, at 5, col. 1. 
61. See Cooley, Minutes of the Capetown Meeting, MED. WORLD NE'IVS, Aug, 9, 1968, 
at 21, 22; Note, Human Organ Transplantation: Some Medical-Legal Pitfalls for Trans-
plant Surgeons, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 134, 149-50 (1970). 
62. See F. MooRE, supra note 7, at 211-12; Largiader &: Senning, The Donor, in 
ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 75, 82-83 (R. Largiader ed. 1970): Voight, The Criteria of 
Death, Particularly in Relation to Transplant Surgery, 14 WORLD MED. J, 143 (1967); 
Wasmuth, The Medical, Legal, and Ethical Considerations of Human Organ Trans• 
plantations, 11 WM. &: MARY L. REv. 636, 648 (1970). 
63. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 54F (Supp. 
1973). Brain death is an alternative in both statutes. 
64. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-139 (Supp. 1973). 
65. Gray v. Sawyer, 247 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. App. 1952). 
66. See Largiader &: Senning, supra note 62, at 89-90. 
67. See the comments of T. Starzl in Discussion, in ETHICS IN MEDICAL PROGRESS: 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TRANSPLANTATION 65, 67 (G. Wolstenholme &: M, O'Connor 
ed. 1966) [hereinafter ETHICS], 
68. Transplant operations have been used to establish a causation defense for ac• 
cused murderers. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1973, § 1, at 5, col. I (late city ed.); id., May 8, 
1968, § 1, at 23, col. I (late city ed.); State v. Lyons, (Alameda County [Cal.] Super. Ct., 
May 2, 1974), in National Observer, June 1, 1974, at 5, col. I. See generally Comment, 
38 U. Mo. L. REv. 220, supra note 60, at 231-33. 
69. Cf. Tucker's Admin. v. Lower, Civ. No. 2831 (Richmond (Va.] Ct. Law &: Eq., 
May 25, 1972). 
May 1974] Notes 1193 
tion will be relaxed in deference to medical discretion.70 The doctors' 
dilemma calls for the setting of death criteria through legislation. 
Statutory guidelines would limit flexibility,71 but they could provide 
a certainty that would protect physicians and possibly assuage the 
fears of surviving relatives.72 The establishment of a definition of 
death is not an exclusively medical problem; it includes a number 
of important social decisions that do not require medical exper~ise 
and that should be debated in a public forum. 
B. The Living- Source 
Under the common law an adult, if fully informed of the risks 
and consequences, can donate his nonvital organs73 for use in trans-
70. See UNIFORM .ANATOMICAL GIFI' Acr § 7, comment; Kennedy, The Kansas Statute 
on Death-An Appraisal, 285 NEW ENG. J. MEo., Oct. 21, 1971, at 946; Sadler, Sadler 
&: Stason, The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act-A Model for Reform, 206 J.A.M.A. 2501, 
2504 (1968); Stason, supra note 25, at 928; Note, supra note 61, at 136 n.15. 
There is some evidence that the commissioners mistakenly assumed that the courts 
had deferred and would continue to defer to the doctor's decision on death criteria on 
a case-by-case basis. See Comment, Suggested Revisions To Clarify the Uncertain Im-
pact of Section 7 of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act on Determinations of Death, 11 
Aruz. L. R.Ev. 749, 755 (1969). 
71. See Organ-Transplant Ethics: Let M.D:s Decide!, 45 MED. EcoN., May 13, 1968, 
at 215, 215-22; Who Defines Death-Law or Medicine?, 9 MED. WoRLD NEWS, July 19, 
1968, at 14, 14-15. 
72. See Capron &: Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Determining Hu-
man Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 87 (1972); Wecht & Aranson, 
Medical-Legal Ramifications of Human Tissue Transplantation, 18 DEPAUL L. R.Ev. 
48!!, 499-500 (1969); Comment, Medico-Legal Problems with the Question of Death, 5 
CALIF. W. L. R.Ev. 110, 122 (1968); Note, Gifts-The Anatomical Gifts Act of North 
Carolina, 6 WAKE FOREST INTRA. L. R.Ev. 155, 161-63 (1969). 
73. One kidney, the spleen, bone marrow, three to six feet of small bowel, small 
pieces of skin, part of the thyroid, one parathyroid, one adrenal gland, and one gonad 
are normally considered nonvital. (This list is not intended to be exclusive.) See F. 
MooRE, supra note 7, at 97, 290-312. Technically, the eyes are nonvital, but, since their 
removal will severely incapacitate a living source, they are not ordinarily considered ap-
propriate objects for removal. See, e.g., Daube, Transplantation Acceptability of Pro-
cedures and the Required Legal Sanctions, in ETHICS, supra note 67, at 188, 195-96. 
The removal of any part of the donor's body may to some extent be incapacitative, 
however. For example, the removal of one kidney may affect the donor's future ability 
to recover from kidney disease. In addition, there is a risk that something will go wrong 
in the actual donation operation itself: · 
The immediate operative risk of unilateral nephrectomy [removal of one kidney] 
in a healthy subject has been calculated as approximately 0.05 per cent. The long-
term risk is more difficult ~ estimate, since the. various types of renal disease ao 
not appear to be more frequent or more severe in individuals with solitary kid-
neys than in normal subjects. On_ the other hand, the development of surgical 
problems, trauma, or neoplasms, with the possible necessity of nephrectomy, do 
increase the long-term risks in living donors; the long-term risk, on this basis, has 
been estimated at 0.07 per cent .•.• These data must, however, be considered in 
the light of statistical life expectancy which, in a healthy 35-year-old adult, goes 
from 99.3 per cent to 99.1 per cent during the next five succeeding years; this is 
an increase in risk equal to that incurred by driving a car for 16 miles every work-
ing day • • • • . 
Hamburger &: Crosnier, Moral and Ethical Problems in Transplantation, in HUMAN 
TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 13, at 37, 37-38. _See also P. RUSSELL &: A. MONACO, supra 
note 3, at 160; Discussion, in ETHICS, supra note 67, at 14, 19-20; N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 
1194 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 72:1182 
plants.14 Thus, although there has been a minor trend away from 
living sources in the past three years, 76 they were used in thirty-five 
/ per cent of all kidney allografts in the United States in 1972.76 A 
living source is medically preferred because he or she is typically a 
sibling or parent of the donee. Tissue matching is therefore likely to 
be more successful than if an unrelated cadaver source is used. 77 
Advances in immunology and tissue typing78 have increased the 
success rate/ with cadaver sources, 79 but that rate is not yet com-
parable to the success ;rate achieved with related donors.80 Despite 
the higher .success rate, some physicians refuse to use living sources81 
because of the danger to the health of the source. 82 
The law imposes greater restrictions on the donation of nonvital 
organs when the source is a minor or an incompetent. Consent of a 
parent, guardian, or a committee is required even for ordinary surgi-
cal treatment if the surgeon is to proceed without risk of civil 
liability.83 A well-established common law doctrine permits a court 
1973, § I, at 34-, col. 3 (late city ed.). Life insurance companies accept a pe1·so11 with 
only one kidney as a normal risk. General Discussion, in ETHICS, supra, at 154, 163 (re-
marks of Dr. Murray). However, accurate empirical data have yet to be gathered that 
fully back up any theory on the donor's health after the loss of one kidney. Sanders 8: 
Dukeminier, Medical Advance and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis and Kidney Transplanta-
tion, 15 UCLA L. REv. 357, 389 (1968). 
74. Louisell, Transplantation: Existing Legal Constraints, in ETHICS, supra note 67, 
at 78, 80; Vestal, Taber 8: Shoemaker, supra note 53, at 283; Wasmuth & Stewart, sufm1 
note 3, at 446; Note, Human Organ Transplantation: The Medical .Miracle and the 
Legal Maze, 20 S.C. L R.Ev. 419, 422 (1968). 
75. The 11th Report of the Human Renal Transplant Regist1-y, supra note 5, at 
1198-99; The Tenth Report of the Human Renal Transplant Registry, supra note 19, 
at 1498-99; The Ninth Report of the Human Renal Transplant Registry, supra note 
19, at 256. 
76. The 11th Report of the Human Renal Tra11splant Registry, supra note 5, at 
1199. Totaling all kidney allografts made from 1951 to 1972, 46.4 per cent of the graft~ 
in the United States came from living donors, while only 21.2 per cent in Europe aml 
1.7 per cent in Australia came from living donors. Id. at 1198. 
77. From 1951 to 1966, 88.5 per cent of the 243 recipients of sibling allografts were 
alive at the end of one year and 56.4 per cent were alive with the graft functioning, 
In comparison, only 42.0 per cent of the 683 recipients of cadaver donor allografts 
were alive at the end of one year and only 35.6 per cent were alive with graft func• 
tioning. Id. at 1202 (table 3). 
78. See text accompanying notes 149-65 infra. 
79. In 1972, 71.8 per cent of the 669 recipients of allotransplants from a cadaver 
donor were alive at the end of one year; 45.4 per cent were alive with the graft func-
tioning. The 11th Report of the Human Renal Transplant Registry, siipra note 5, at 
1202 (table 8). 
80. In 1972, 87.4 per cent of the 202 recipients of sibling allografts were alive at the 
end of one year and 74.0 per cent were alive with the graft functioning. For 155 cases 
of allograft from a parent, 91.7 per cent were alive at the end of one year, and '16.4 
per cent were alive with the graft functioning. Id. 
81. F. MooRE, supra note 7, at 313-14. 
82. See note 73 supra. 
83. See Zoski v. Gaines, 271 Mich. I, 260 N.W. 99 (1935); Rogers v. Sells, 178 Okla. 
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to overrule parental judgment when it is judged that the parent_ is 
not acting in the child's best interest,84 but considerable deference 
is normally given to parental decisions.85 
The transplant situation is unusual because the_ operation does 
not increase the physical well-being of the source but actually presents 
a health risk.86 In Bonner v. Morgan,81 a fifteen-year-old boy con-
sented to the removal of a large piece of his skin in order to supply 
his cousin with a skin graft. The donor suffered great pain and dis-
figurement and was hospitalized for two months, and the physician 
was held liable for acting on the child's consent alone. The -court 
implied that parental consent was necessary but did not discuss 
whether the consent could be overruled because it was not in the 
interest of the child. 
The uncertainty regarding the sufficiency of parental consent led 
doctors at Peter _Bent Brigham Hospital to refuse to proceed with 
three transplant operations that involved minor identical twins until 
a: court ruled on the legality of the procedures.88 The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court allowed the transplants on the grounds that 
each source had consented, the parents of the sources and recipients 
had consented, and, most significantly, the sources would be psy-
chologically benefitted by the continued companionship of their 
siblings.89 The decisions relied heavily on psychiatric testimony that 
the healthy twin might suffer "grave emotional impact" were the 
103, 61 P.2d 1018 (1936); Moss v. Rishworth, 222 S.W. 225 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920). 
Minors approaching maturity have been held to be capable of giving their own consent 
in a few cases. See Bishop v. Shurly, 237 Mich. 76, 211 N.W. 75 (1926); Bakker v. Welsh, 
144 Mich. 632, 108 N.W. 94 (1906); Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956). 
Accord, REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 59(1) (1965). 
84. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944). 
85. See, e.g., Odell v. Lutz, 78 Cal. App. 2d 104, 106, 177 P.2d 628, 629 (1947); 
Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 133, 131 A. 198, 199 (1925). The Supreme Court has 
stated in dictum that a parent's right to control the education and rearing of his child 
is constitutionally protected against unwarranted state infringement. Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1924); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923). 
86. See note 73 supra. 
87. 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941). 
88. These cases are discussed and reported in Curran, A Problem of Consent: Kid-
ney Transplantation in Minors, 34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 891 (1959). 
89. Foster v. Harrison, No. 68674 Eq._ (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Nov. 20, 1957); Huskey v. 
Harrison, No. 68666 Eq. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Aug. 30, 1957); Masden v. Harrison, No. 
68651 Eq. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., June 12, 1957). 
The doctrine applied in these cases is best stated by Schreiner, Problems of Ethics 
in Relation to Haemodialysis and Transplantation, in ETmcs, supra note 67, at 126, 
130-31: 
Man obviously has the right to maim himself; he can amputate his leg or cut 
off an infected area if it is for the good of his whole organism. If giving a kidney 
is for his spiritual or psychiatric good, and is recognized as part of the total per-
son, it seems to me that the particular mutilation becomes quite permissible under 
the extension of the principle of physical totality to the totality of a spiritual per• 
son. 
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donation not allowed.90 Since the donor would receive some benefit,01 
albeit emotional rather than physical, the court felt it could bring 
the transplant· situation within the traditional rules of consent for 
ordinary medical treatment, and hence deferred to parental 
judgment. 
The analysis of the Massachusetts court is troublesome. In effect, 
the "psychological benefit" doctrine can be used as a rationale for 
always deferring to parental consent in transplantations concerning 
minors. However, the unique character of the transplant situation 
makes the propriety of deferring to parental consent questionable. 
The parent is presented with a serious conflict of interests when the 
donor and donee are siblings. When consenting to a conventional 
medical operation, the parent must consider the welfare of only one 
child and can act exclusively in that child's best interests. In the 
transplant situation, twn children are involved; the parent, inevitably 
concerned with the welfare of both, will tend to balance their 
interests. When one child faces death, the well-being of the other-
the source-may be easily outweighed. 
The rationale behind allowing one person to consent for another 
should be that the former is better able to take into account all of 
the interests of the latter, because the latter is incapable of making 
an educated and rational choice. The decision-maker is to "step into 
the shoes" of the protected person.92 However, the protective func-
tion is subverted when the decision-maker has conflicting interests 
in the decision. The Massachusetts court's concern for the benefit to 
the source child was not misplaced, but the court ignored the critical 
question of whether the parents could objectively assess that benefit. 
The problems that can arise when the psychological benefit doc-
trine is used to defer automatically. to a parent's consent are dra-
matically illustrated by the Kentucky case of Strunk v. Strunk, 93 in 
which the court, upon the petition of the mother, permitted a 
kidney allograft from a mentally retarded son to his normal brother. 
The tendency of a mother to favor the life of a normal son, in this 
case recently married, over the health of a retarded son is undoubtedly 
strong. One wonders whether minors and incompetents should 
90. Finding, Rulings, and Order for Decree at 3, Foster v. Harrison, No. 68674 Eq. 
(Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Nov. 20, 1957); Findings, Rulings, and Order for Decree at 2, 
Huskey v. Harrison, No. 68666 Eq. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Aug. 30, 1957); Findings, Rul-
ings, and Order for Decree at 2, Masden v. Harrison, No. 68651 Eq. (Mass. Sup. Jud. 
Ct., June 12, 1957). 
91. These findings are contestable in light of later research. See text accompanying 
notes 108-23 infra. See also Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 150 (Ky. 1969) (Steinfeld, 
J., dissenting): "It is common knowledge beyond dispute that the loss of a close rela• 
tive or a friend to a six-year-old child is not of major impact." 
92. See Crippen v. Pulliam, 61 Wash. 2d '125, 380 P.2d 475 (1963). 
93. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969). 
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function as suppliers of spare p~ without the benefit of a proce-
dure that more adequately safeguards their interests. . 
Some courts are beginning to reevaluate the psychological benefit 
doctrine in cases involving minor siblings. In Hart v. Brown,94 for 
example, a· Connecticut court observed that the psychiatric testimony 
relied on in the Massachusetts cases was "of limited value •.. 
because of the ages of the minors.''95 The court appeared to recog-
nize that the parents in such cases would inevitably balance the 
interests of the two children and indicated that the motivation and 
reasoning behind the parental decision should be closely examined 
in every case. 86 The court then balanced the relevant factors and 
found t_hat the decision to proceed with the transplant in the case 
before it was sound. A recent Louisiana court of appeals decision 
also failed to accept the psychological benefit approach. The court, 
analogizing from a Louisiana law that prohibits a minor or his parent 
from transferring his private property, refused to allow the transplant 
of a kidney from an incompetent minor to his normal sibling.97 The 
difficulties encountered when parents and guardians make these 
decisions has led many doctors to decide that, even with full and 
knowledgeable parental consent, minors should not be involved in 
experiments or other operations that are not undertaken exclusively 
for their benefit.98 _ 
The concern that the courts and the medical profession have 
shown over the adequacy of consent in cases involving minors should 
not be relaxed when the source is a living adult. Whatever the age 
or competency of the source, the operation will not have any physical 
benefit to him and may prove to be a serious threat to his future well-
being. However, no distinction between the consent requirements 
for removal of nonvital organs for donation and the consent require-
ments for more typical surgery has been made for the legally compe-
tent adult donor.99 The lack of a distinction probably stems from 
the Anglo-American principle that, where the maintenance of social 
order is not threatened, an individual should be allowed to control 
his destiny, even to his detriment.100 However, that principle has 
94. 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972). 
95. 29 Conn. Supp. at -, 289 A.2d at 390. 
96. 29 Conn. Supp. at -, 289 A.2d at 390-91. 
97. In re Richardson, 284 S.2d 185, 187 (La. Cir. Ct. App. 1973): "In Louisiana our 
law is designed to protect and promote the ultimate best interest of a minor. • • • [I]t 
is inconceivable to us that it affords less protection to a minor's right to be free in his 
person from bodily intrusion to the extent of loss of an organ unless such loss be in 
the best interest of the minor." 
98. Dunphy, supra note 5, at 71. See also M. GROSS, THE DocroRS 312 (1966); Daube, 
supra note 73, at 198-99. 
99. See note 74 supra and accompanying text. 
100. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 101 (4th ed. 1971). 
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been qualified_ where free consent by a normally competent indi-
vidual is unlikely.101 A transfer of body parts by a living source may 
present such a case. 
Some physicians may fear that the decision to serve as a source 
is not always made freely. There appears to be a bias against the use 
of living sources,102 perhaps because of a feeling that it is wrong to 
mutilate the body of a healthy person if he receives no benefit from 
the act,103 or perhaps because the source's motivations are dis-
trusted.104 Most physicians require that a living source be submitted 
to a rigorous psychological screening,105 which eliminates a significant 
portion of willing donors.106 Many medical centers refuse to use 
nonrelated living sources.107 
101. Duress is an important defense to charges of criminal action in the criminal 
laws of most states. See Newman &: Weitzer, Duress, Free Will and the Criminal Law, 
SO S. CAL. L. REv. ll13 (1957). In tort law, coercive pressures may be held to invalidate 
consent, even if overtly given, permitting the plaintiff to bring a successful action. See, 
e.g., Meints v. Huntington, 276 F. 245 (8th Cir. 1921) (threat of physical force); Miller 
v. Balthasser, 78 Ill. ll02 (1875) (threat of physical violence). In contract law, unusual 
pressures on one of the contracting parties may justify rescission. See, e.g., Chandler 
v. Sanger, 114 Mass. 364 (1874); Wise v. Midtown Motors, Inc., 231 Minn. 46, 42 N.W.2d 
404 (1950). 
It is also recognized that in certain instances an active manifestation of consent on 
the part of the injured party may not obviate the seriousness of the defendant's con• 
duct. One cannot consent to his own murder and exonerate the murderer, for example. 
See, e.g., State v. West, 157 Mo. ll09, 57 S.W. 1071 (1900). 
102. See Sadler, Davison, Carroll &: Kountz, The Living, Genetically Unrelated, Kid• 
ney Donor, in PSYCHIATRIC ASPECTS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 86 (Castelnuovo-Tedesco 
ed.1971); Nakamato, Straffon &: Kolff, Human Renal Homo-Transplantation with Cadaver 
Kidneys, 192 J.A.M.A. 302 (1965); Fellner &: Marshall, Kidney Donors-The Myth oJ 
Informed Consent, 126 AM. J. PSYCHOLOGY 1245 (1970). 
103. Sadler, Davison, Carroll &: Kountz, supra note 102, at 86-87. See also Fellner &: 
Schwartz, Altruism in Disrepute-Medical 'Versus Public Attitudes Toward the Living 
Organ Donor, 284 NEW ENG. J. MED. 582 (1971); Hamburger &: Crosnier, supra note 78, 
at 38-ll9. 
104. Hamburger &: Crosnier, supra note 73, at 37-44. 
105. Of 22 prospective kidney donors interviewed by two doctors, 11 were in the 
most favorable psychological category. Id. at 38. Some centers have routinized the selec• 
tion procedure and have institutionalized psychiatric review boards to reject any pros• 
pective donors whose ambivalence or anxiety appear too great, or whose decision is 
considered more the result of family pressure than individual desire. Other hospitals 
and centers use very informal procedures. See Kemph, Psychotheray [sic] with Donors 
and Recipients of Kidney Transplants, in PSYCHIATRIC ASPEcrS OF ORGAN TRANSP.LANTA• 
TION, supra note 102, at 145; Discussion, in ETHICS, supra note 67, at 14, 14 (remarks of 
Dr. Hamburger}; Hayes &: Gunnells, Selection of Recipients and Donors for Renal 
Transplantation, 123 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 521 (1969). 
106. For example, two out of every five "volunteers" are eliminated in investigation 
by the Renal Unit of Hospital Necker in Paris. Discussion, supra note 105, at 14 (re• 
marks of Dr. Hamburger). Hayes &: Gunnells, supra note 105, at 522, discuss the 
screening of 380 parents and siblings of 79 transplant candidates. Of these, 62 potential 
donors were judged to be completely acceptable; only 20 were in fact used. 
107. In a worldwide survey of 54 transplant centers, it was found that the donation 
of a kidney to an unrelated person is viewed by many physicians as " 'impulsive,' " 
" 'not to be trµsteq,' " and " 'inflµenced by subliminal fortes.' " Sadler, Davison, Carroll 
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The screening procedure may appear to be an adequate guarantee 
that donor consent is freely given. However, even those sources ,vho 
pass screening may have been subjected to coercive pressures. For 
example, there is evidence that family pressures are a factor in 
deciding to become a source in a significant number of kidney trans-
plant cases.108 Frequently, the source is the "black sheep" of the 
family, or a member who feels some guilt because of past behavior.100 
Severe conflicts within and between individual family members have 
been a by-product of the choice of the donor. 110 Bitterness on the 
part of the recipient and his spouse toward reluctant family members 
has also been noted;m Nevertheless, many intrafamily transplants 
have been accomplished relatively smoothly;112 conflicts that existed 
prior to the transplant have sometimes been resolved by the suc-
cessful completion of the operation.113 
The frequent failure of the screening process to protect sources 
can best be explained by examining the dynamics of the decision 
to act as a source. While the data are somewhat conflicting, certain 
conclusions can be drawn. For example, the decision to become a 
source is usually made immediately upon notification of the need,114 
often before the source l}as consulted his or her spouse.115 Such 
decisions have. been described as "emotional" or "impulsive" and 
&: Kountz, supra note 102, at 96. Only 11 of those centers continue to use the unrelated 
donor. Id. at 95. 
108. Eisendrath, Guttmann &: Murray, Psychologic Considerations in the Selection of 
Kidney Transplant Donors, 129 SURG. GYNEC. &: 0BsrET. 243, 244 (1969); Kemph, supra 
note 105, at 152-53; Simmons, Hickey, Kjellsu-and &: Simmons, Donors and Non-Donors: 
The Role of the Family and the Physician in Kidney Transplantation, in PSYCHIATRIC 
A.sPECTS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 102, at 102. But see Fellner, Selection 
of Living Kidney Donors and the Problem of Informed Consent, in id. at 79, 80-81; 
Fellner &: Marshall, Twelve Kidney Donors, 206 J.A.M.A. 2703 (1968). "Donors who 
volunteer because they have been requested to do so by the recipient or th!! family are 
often found to be unwilling after closer study." Hamburger &: Crosnier, supra note 73, 
at 40. 
109. See Eisendrath, Guttmann &: Murray, supra note 108, at 246; Kemph, Berman &: 
Coppobillo, Kidney Transplant and Shift in Family Dynamics, 125 AM. J. PSYCHOLOGY 
1485, 1489 (1969); Simmons, Hickey, Kjellstrand &: Simmons, supra note 108, at 111; 
Wilson, Stickel, Hayes &: Harris, Psychiatric Considerations of Renal Transplantation, 
122 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 502, 505 (1968). 
110. Simmons, Hickey, Kjellstrand &: Simmons, supra note 108, at 110-11. 
111. Id. at 108-11. 
112. See Fellner &: Marshall, supra note 108, at 2705; Simmons, Hickey, Kjellstrand 
&: Simmons, supra note 108, at 112. 
113. Fellner &: Marshall, supra note 108, at 2705; Simmons, Hickey, Kjellstrand &: 
Simmons, supra note 108, at 112. 
114. Fellner, supra note 108, at 80; Sadler, Davison, Carroll &: Kountz, supra note 
102, at 88. The decision is then defended and maintained in long waiting periods and 
during psychiatric evaluations. The donors' defense mechanisms reduce dissonance by 
1-ationalization. Fellner, supra, at 83; Fellner &: Marshall, supra note 108, at 2706. 
115. Fellner &: Marshall, supra note 108, at 2704. 
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"symptomatic of psychopathology";116 they have been said to demon-
strate an irrationality of decision-making that makes "informed 
consent" an empty concept.117 Most sources have been classified by 
experienced analysts as "stable, self-supporting, middle-class citi-
zens."118 However, the subjects have uniformly indicated that the 
decision to become a source was made in an abnormal situation not 
conducive to ordinary decision-making.119 Apparently, then, even 
· if the screening ·process is fair!y successful in detecting mentally 
abnormal donors, it may not detect the fact that normal sources are 
in abnormal situations, where they may be responding to highly 
coercive pressures. 
The majority of the sources interviewed did receive considerable 
pleasure in witnessing the recipient's improvement, as well as a 
significant long-term increase in self-esteem.120 However, a period 
of depression, often requiring some psychotherapy, occasionally 
occurred-immediately after the operation.121 The fact that many 
sources say that they "would do it again" may only mean that, given 
the same coercive pressures, they would make the same decision. 
The medical profession usually does not use prisoners122 and chil-
dren123 as sources because, as a result of their coercive environment, 
116. Fellner & Schwartz, supra note 103, at 584. 
117. Fellner & Marshall, supra note 102, at 1250; Sadler, Davison, Carroll &: Kountz, 
supra note 102, at 100. 
118. Sadler, Davison, Carroll &: Kountz, supra note 102, at 94. There have been 
isolated reports of extremely disturbed people volunteering to donate, but such people 
are usually screened out. See Moral Problem on the Use of Borrowed Organs, Artificial 
and Transplanted, 60 A:M. INTERNAL MED. 309 (1964). 
119. Fellner, supra note 108, at 80. 
120. Eisendrath, Guttmann &: Murray, supra note 108, at 246 ("Replies [of 65 donors] 
were quite consistent, irrespective of the results of the transplant. There was almost 
complete unanimity of belief that the donor would do it again, and that each bad de• 
rived some sense of worthwhile accomplishment or helping to save a life. Sometimes, 
the answers were moving."): Fellner, supra note 108, at 83 ("[W]e were impressed by 
reports from all our donors that the act bad turned out to be the most meaningful 
experience of their lives, of substantial impact in that it had brought about changes 
within themselves that they felt were beneficial."). In addition, see Sadler, Davison, 
Carroll &: Kountz, supra note 102, at 88. 
121. After surgery the donor feels more keenly the loss of an organ and he is 
often painfully aware that be has made a great sacrifice, He bears considerable 
underlying resentment toward the recipient and those who suggested the trans• 
plant .••• If the psychiatrist visits the donor daily for a week after surgery he sees 
him go through transient, mild to moderately severe feelings of depression .••• It 
is related to the mourning for the loss of part of bis body and to the underlying 
resentment previously described .••• Although it is likely that the great majority 
of donors would recover without psychotherapy, their recovery is speeded and 
their attitude much improved by giving them an opportunity to achieve catharsis 
of underlying feelings. · 
Kemph, supra note 105, at 3. See also Cramond, Renal Homotransplantation-Some 
Ooservations on Redpients and Donors, 113 BRiT. J. PsYCHIATRY 1223 (1967). 
122. See Daube, supra note 73, at 197; Discussion, supra note 67, at 74-77, 
123. Daube, supra note 73, at 198; Kilbrandon, Cl/airman's Closin/J Remarlis, in 
~THICS, supra note 671 at 2121 214, 
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they are presumed unable to give knowing consent. Yet, the pressure 
brought to bear on free adult sources by family or acquaintances 
may be as great, or even greater. 
Those who defend the use· of the living source can point to the 
higher success rate when allografts from related living sources, rather 
than cadavers, are used.124 They may feel that an adult should have 
the right to give his or her relative the best chance of survival. 
However, that right, if it exists, must be balanced against the right 
to be free from impermissibly coercive pres_sures. So long as the 
screening process fails to distinguish bet\veen coerced and non-
coerced actors the right to become a source cannot be allowed with-
out running. the risk that an actor is being forced to donate. There 
are three possible solutions. The first is the present system, which, 
under the guise of finding a psychological benefit to the source, allows 
the need for sources to out\veigh the right to be free from coercive 
pressures.125 It apparently assumes that the most egregious cases are 
screened out by present medical procedures. Second, the present 
screening procedures could be made more effective. Perhaps a inore 
formal procedure, involving specialists in source psychology and 
required by statute in all cases, would more adequately distinguish 
bet\veen coerced and noncoerced sources. Third, if adequate screen-
ing procedures are impossible, the use of living sources may be dis-
couraged or prohibited in order to protect unwilling sources.126 
The third option may overcome medical objections because the 
rate of success with cadaver organs has significantly increased in 
recent years.127 Donations from living relatives have been more suc-
cessful in the past because they minimize genetic differences between 
the source and the recipient. If the pool of cadaver sources becomes 
large enough, and if tissue matching reaches its expected sophistica-
tion, 128 allografts of cadaver organs could achieve success rates com-
parable to those presently achieved with living sources, and the use 
of the living source could become unnecessary. 
C. The Scarcity 
Current methods of obtaining organs and tissues have not pro-
vided an adequate supply of parts for use in transplantation, research, 
and education. Not even the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act has 
alleviated the crisis. For example, there was a serious shortage of 
124. See notes 77-80 supra and accompanying te.xt. 
125. See text accompanying notes 108-09 supra. 
126. France prohibits transplants from living donors by prohibiting all surgical 
operations not for the benefit of the patient. Dukeminier, supra note 26, at 849: South 
Africa requires two medical practitioners to certify that the removal of the specified 
tissue will not prejudice the donor in any way. Id. at 849-50. 
127. Compare note 77 with note 79 supra. 
128. See text accompanying notes 149-65 infr~. 
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viable kidneys before the approval of the Act in 1968. A 1967 Report 
to the Surgeon General estimated that, in the United States, 8,000 
patients per year suffered from chronic kidney failure and were 
ideally suited for transplantation.129 Yet, only 300 were being treated 
through dialysis or transplantation. Two studies estimated the nurn-
qer of candidates for kidney transplantation in 1968 at 8,000130 and 
7,000.131 respectively. Approximately 450 were actually served that 
year.1s2 
Despite the widespread adoption of the Uniform Act, the short-
age persists. Doctor Samuel L. Kountz, of the University of Cali-
fornia Medical Center, asserts that the number of kidney transplants 
presently performed represents only one-tenth of the number that 
could be undertaken if the facilities and organs were available.138 
The effect of the Uniform Act is minimal; Dr. Kountz claims that 
only 10 million potential donors are carrying donor cards, while 
at least 100 million card carriers are needed to satisfy the demand 
for kidney transplants alone.134 Dr. Kountz also noted that even with 
present facilities 10,000 transplants could be. performed in the United 
States annually, four times the present number.13G , 
A patient suffering from end-stage kidney failure who cannot 
find an organ for transplant has only nvo alternatives. One alterna-
tive is dialysis,136 a process that is often unavailable,137 always expen-
sive,138 and likely to create serious emotional problems.130 Moreover, 
129. U.S. PUBUC HEALm SERVICE, DEPT. OF HEAI.m, EDUCATION, &: 'WELFARE, KIDNEY 
DISEASE PROGRAM ANALYSIS: A REPORT TO THE SURGEON GENERAL 170 (1967). 
130. D. LESoURD, M. FOGEL&: D. JoHNSfON, BENEFIT-Cosr ANALYSIS OF KIDNEY DISEASE 
PROGRAMS 37 (Public Health Service Pub. No. 1941, 1968). 
131. U.S. BUREAU OF THE -BUDGET, REPORT OF THE COM:MITTEE ON CHRONIC KIDNEY 
DISEASE 5 (C. Gottschalk ed. 1967). 
132. Id. 
133. N.Y. Times, March I, 1972, § I, at 11, col. 1 (late city eel.). 
134.,Id. 
135. Id., Sept. 27, 1972, § 1, at 21, col. 2 (late city ed.). 
136. Dialysis, or hemodialysis, is the filtration of the blood by circulation through 
an external artificial kidney. The artificial kidney removes blood waste products such 
as urea and creatinine, regulates the salt and water balance of the patient, and rids the 
body of excess fluid. See generally F. MOORE, supra note 7, at 79-87; N.Y. Times, Sept, 
19, 1971, § E, at 9, coL 1 (late city ed.). 
137. N.Y. Times, supra note 136. 
138. The cost per year at a hospital dialysis center is 10,000 to 15,000 dollars; home 
dialysis costs 5,000 to 7,000 dollars per year. Richards, supra note 25, at 85 n.39. 
139. The treatment is usually required once to twice a week, and the patient's 
,physical state-especially immediately before treatment-is impaired. Family and pa• 
tient stress over the patient's dependence on the machine has been noted, and patient 
suicide rates have led to intensive screening for psychological adjustment. Cramond, 
Renal Transplantations-Experiences with Recipients and Donors, in PSYCHIATRIC 
ASP.ECrS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 102, at 116, 119-23. See Simmons &: 
Simmons, Sociological and Psychological Aspects of Transplantation, in TRANSPLANTA• 
TION, supra note 6, at 361, 376: 
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dialysis is considered to be a temporary treatment allowing. the 
patient to wait for a suitable organ.140 The other alternative is 
death.141 
I 
Unfortunately, the scarcity is not limited to kidneys. A 1970, 
federal panel estimated a potential need of 12,000 heart allografts 
per year, a sharp contrast to the less than 100 per year actually per-
formed.142 The panel gave the lack of donor organs as one of the 
major reasons for the disparity.143 The present high mortality rate 
in burn cases-forty per cent of the victims of extensive third degree 
burns-"could be reduced drastically if enough human skin were 
routinely available."144 The need may well become more critical 
as the success rate of organ transplants increases.1415 
The shortage extends to the number of cadavers available for 
medical education.140 It has been estimated that at least 5,000 bodies 
are needed each year to train this country's doctors and nurses.141 
Recently, a serious shortage of cadavers has hampered the teaching 
of anatomy. Financially pressed schools have had to spend large sums 
to import bodies.148 
The deleterious effects of the scarcity of human body parts 
extend beyond shortages of materials for transplants, research, and 
medical study. First, the scarcity affects those transplants that are 
actually performed, because it hinders tissue matching; second, it 
creates difficult ethical problems with regard to the allocation of 
available parts. 
The first problem arises from the immune response, or the body's 
tendency to destroy implanted tissue that it recognizes to be foreign.149 
Some centers, like Seattle and the Mayo Clinic, report high levels of coping. In 
others, like Georgetown, the story is relatively grim; 2 out of 9 patients have h~d 
schizophrenic-like episodes, I had a psychotic depression, and 5 had neurotic depres-
sive episodes. Some dialysis units report that 90 per cent of their patients are 
engaged in full-time occupational or housewife activities; others indicate that only 
25 per cent are this well rehabilitated. 
140. See R. CAI.NE, A GIFr OF LIFE 61-63 (1970); Simmons & Simmons, supra note 
139, at 369. 
141. "When both of a person's kidneys cease to function, the body cannot cleanse 
the blood of certain toxic elements, and death will follow in about 3 weeks." Note, 
Scarce Medical Resources, 69 CoLUM. L. REv. 621, 636 (1969). 
142. N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1970, § 1, at 32, col. 2 (late city ed.). 
143. Id. 
144. L.A. Times, Sept. 24, 1967, § C, at 1, col. 4 (city ed.). 
. 145. Cardiac· and Other Organ Transplantation in the Setting of Transplant 
Science as a National Effort, 22 AM. J. CAru>roL. 896 (1968). 
146. N.Y. Times, June 25, 1972, § 1, at 1, col. 2 (late city ed.). 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. See R. CALNE, supra note 140, at 15; F. Mooim, supra note 7, at 43. The impor-
tance of the immune reaction is demonstrated in rare conditions in which it is im-
paired. Patients unable to mount an immune response are liable to repeated and 
serious infections from bacteria and viruses that do not trouble the normal individual. 
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The process has two major actors-the· antigen, a protein substance 
that excites au immune response, and the antibody, a protein that, 
in combination with a complement enzyme, binds, precipitates, or 
inactivates the invading antigen and prepares it for removal.160 The 
tempo and intensity of the immune response to transplant antigens 
are a function of the genetic differences between the donor and the 
recipient.151 Also, an animal may be sensitized by previous grafts or 
injections of cell extracts from the source; residual antibodies then 
make rejection immediate.152 Accordingly, it is crucial in organ and 
tissue grafting to know whether the recipient has had prior exposure 
to antigens similar to those of the source.1G3 The host's acquired or 
genetic antagonism to the donor's tissues must be overcome. In some 
cases the problem of cross-reacting antibodies requires a long search 
to find an acceptable source...:_particularly in the case of a patient 
who has been on an artificial kidney machine, or who has received 
multiple transfusions, or who has had several pregnancies.164 Careful 
histocompatibility165 typing of potential sources and recipients, lead-
ing to the selection of combinations that possess the fewest detectable 
antigenic differences, is necessary.156 
The defense mechanism unfortunately is unable· to distinguish between dangerous 
infective viruses and lifesaving grafts. Id. 
150. F. MooRE, supra note 7, at 47. 
151. :Bach & Bach, Principles of Immunogenetics, in TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 
6, at 40; P. RUSSELL & A. MONACO, supra note 3, at 113. 
152. F. MooRE, supra note 7, at 176. See also P. RUSSELL &: A. MONACO, supra note 3, 
at 16-25. When a kidney transplant patient has been hypcrsensitized, the transplanted 
kidney may swell and cease to function before the eyes of the operating team, who 
are powerless to prevent the reaction. Id. 
153. It has been found essential to perform crossmatch tests before grafting-just 
as one would do a crossmatch test before a blood transfusion. The scrum of the 
recipient is mixed with white blood cells from the donor in a small well on a 
plastic plate. If there is a clumping or killing of the cells under the microscope, pre• 
formed antibodies are presumed to be present and a graft should not be done. 
F. MooRE, supra note 7, at 183. 
, 154. Id. If one tests serum from patients who have been on repeated dialysis against 
white blood cells from a random group of donors, about 40 per cent of these patients 
will demonstrate a reaction to at least one of the donors. Id. 
155. Histocompatibility antigens are antigens attached to cells that enable one 
individual to recognize the cells of another as foreign. R. CALNE, supra note 140, at 
102. The correlation between antigenic disparity and intensity of allograft reactivity 
can be seen in the early reports of kidney graft survival in man, Monozygotic twins 
accept grafts indefinitely, blood relatives accept them frequently, and unrelated donors 
accept them rarely. Albert & Terasaki, Histocompatibility Testing: Serology and 
Genetics of the HL-A System, in TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 6, at 388, 
156. An irreducible residue of antigenic differences usually remains even after the 
most compatible donor and recipient have been selected. Lawrence, Immunological 
Considerations in Transplantation, in HUMAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 13, at 11. 
Threatening immunological adversity is thus almost always encountered, Until re• 
cently, immunosuppressive drugs were the only available weapons. Id. at 12. These 
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· The .first requirement of histocompatibility matching is the selec-
tion of compatible blood groups.157 A "group" is composed of cells 
containing protein antigens that can be "typed" in categories by 
the use of specific antisera158 containing antibodies against a single 
type of antigen.159 There are two principal antigens in red blood 
cells;160 blood cells can have one (A or B), both (AB), or neither 
(0).161 There are also many minor red blood cell antigens. The best 
known is the Rh antigen, which is responsible for serious reactions 
in certain blood diseases.162 Blood-group matching is easy in most 
cases because the variations are relatively limited. 
Tissue compatibility is also a major determinant of success. At 
least fifteen distinct antigens have been identified in tissue cells,163 
and the search continues for others.164 Perfect compatibility is much 
less common with tissue cells than with blood cells; thus, tissue 
typing seeks at best only the similarity of donor-recipient antigens.165 
A nationwide pool of donors may ease the compatibility problem: 
Future employment of tissue typing must be for cadaver donors, 
and must be done on a large nation-wide scale, for the variety of 
tissue types among man would give only a small chance of compati-
bility. As refined typing becomes commonly available and as organ 
storage methods improve, national exchange of organs should be 
drugs could not achieve selective suppression of tissue antigens, however. Richards, 
supra note 25, at 83. They left the body unable to defend itself against bacterial, viral, 
and fungal infections. Lawrence, supra, at 11; Richards, supra, at 83-84 n.31. Other 
serious side effects were also frequent, including suppression of growth in young 
children, suppression of production of bone marrow, skeletal lesions with softening 
of the bones, hypertension, high blood pressure, weight gain, diabetes, and cancer. 
R. CAI.NE, supra note 140, at 34. 
Destruction of lymphocytes with X-irradiation has also been attempted. Id. at 31. 
Unfortunately, the dose of X-rays required to prevent allograft rejection destroys the 
bone marrow and damages the intestines. Id. Other researchers are experimenting 
with removal of the thymus, and/or draining of lymphocytes. F. MOORE, supra note 7, 
at 186-89. 
Perhaps the most promising development is "immunological tolerance," which 
enables organ grafting to succeed with fewer, or ideally no, toxic drugs, Id. at 184-85. 
This approach employs subcellular preparations of donor tissue antigens in the pre-
treatment of the prospective allograft recipient to encourage acceptance or prolong 
the survival of the subsequent transplant. Id. 
157. F. MooRE, supra note 7, at 214. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. The antisera, when mixed with blood cells of a corresponding type, cause 
them to clump or break. 
160. Id, 
161, Id. 
162. Id. at 215. 
163. Albert &: Terasaki, supra note 155, at 391. 
164. Id. at 399. 
165. F. MOORE, supra note 7, at 215. 
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possible. Implementation will depend .to a large measure on the time 
necessary ~o break down the traditional one doctor, one patient re-
lationship to the larger concepts of one dead patient to many other 
doctors and waiting patients even thousands of miles away.1°0 
The second serious side effect of the scarcity of human body parts 
is the enormous problem of allocating the few parts that are available 
among the many possible recip~ents. The selection of recipients raises 
profound ethical and moral questions, because nonselection may 
mean death.167 There are a number of possible methods-;--for ex-
ample, ability to pay; first come, first served; lottery, or random 
selection; rules, based on medical and/or social-worth criteria, estab-
lished prior to the actual selection; case-by-case evaluation by the 
.doctor ·who has the available organ; and a combination of the above. 
· Where the use of the organ is essential to the survival of one of the 
patients and not to the survival of the others, medical need may also 
be a factor. 
The selection procedure may vary according to the organ in-
volved. For example, the kidney can be viably sustained outside the 
body for a much longer period of time than the heart, and thus the 
range of possible recipients may be wider for the kidney. However, 
certain profilems will arise no matter which selection ptocedure is 
adopted. They may be illustrated by discussion of the procedures 
now used in allocating dialysis machines.168 
The selection process used in hospitals and medical centers is 
typically divided into tw-o major subprocess'es.169 The first involves a 
fairly rigid set of exclusionary criteria. The criteria may be related 
to the hospital's function, as in the case of veterans' hospitals,170 uni-
166. F. MooRE, supra note 7, at 217, quoting Dr. Terasaki. One of the major prob• 
!ems operating to limit further experimentation and success with lung transplants, for 
example, is that "[t]oo few suitable lungs are available through cadaver sources to 
allow significant selection of the optimal donor by histocompatibility typing methods." 
Blumenstock & Veith, Lungs, in TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 6, at 569, 584. One pair 
of authors states that the prospective donor pool for the matching of a cadaver 
organ to a potential recipient must be increased to over 1,000 (for one recipient}, 
Albert & Terasaki, supra note 155, at 399. 
167. See note 141 supra (kidney failure), and N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1968, § I, at 1, 
col. 1 (late city ed.) (heart disease). "In the past three years, 120 suitable patients have 
been considered for chronic haemodialysis (by the Royal Free Hospital in London), 
but only 21 patients have been treated because of limitation of space and equipment, 
The 21 patients are all alive, whereas of the remaining 99, only I is sutviving and he 
was rejected only a month ago." Shaldon, Comty & Baellod, Letter to the Editor, 2 
LANCET 1182, 1183 (1965). See also Alexander, They Decide Who Lives, Who Dies: 
Medical Miracle and a Moral Burden of a Small Committee, in LIFE, Nov. 9, 1962, at 
102; Woodruff, Transplantation: The Clinica,l Problem, in Ennes, supra note 67, at 5, 
13. 
168. For a discussion of heart recipient selection, see Fourth Heart Transplant 
Raises Question of Patient Selection, 203 J.A.M.A. 21 (1968). 
169. Note, supra note 141. 
170. "[T]reatment at VA hospitals is limited to veterans suffering from service• 
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versity hospitals,171 and hospitals funded by the state.172 Age restric-
tions may be imposed by funding contracts,173 legislation,174 or the 
doctors who implement the program.175 As discussed above, psycho-
logical testing of the patient and his family is often performed to 
select out those patients who will not be able to bear the emotional 
strain of the treatment.176 A few hospitals select out those who are 
unable to pay.177 Some hospitals have highly formalized exclusionary 
procedures, including mandatory and detailed assessments by psy-
chologists and sociologists, while others rely on informal evaluations 
by doctors.178 
If these procedures do not sufficiently reduce the size of the 
recipient pool, a final selection procedure is used, based on the 
decisions of "social-worth" committees composed of laymen or doc-
tors;179 the principle of first-come, first-served;186 or random chance.181 
The scarcity forces those who allocate organs to make second-stage 
choices among potential recipients who are essentially similar for 
medical purposes on the basis of fortuitous or arbitrary criteria. 
connected disabilities and veterans with non-service-connected disabilities who are 
'unable to defray the expenses of necessary hospital care.' " Id. at 640. 
171. "University hospitals, except in cases of emergency, frequently admit patients 
by referral only •••• The more usual practice ••. uses medical interest as a rule of 
selection preference •••• Thus .•• 'a patient having an -extra medical dividend [an 
interesting case] would have an advantage •.. .'" Id. at 642-43 (bracketed insertion in 
original). -
172. "When state funding is used to provide a scarce resource, access to the re-
source may be limited to state residents even though access to the hospital's general 
care facilities is unrestricted. Thus the Seattle Artificial Kidney Center treats only 
Washington State residents." Id. at 642. 
173. "The Mayo Clinic, the Miami Artificial Kidney Center and Charity Hospital 
in New Orleans all operate home dialysis training facilities funded by the Public 
Health Service and their contracts with the PHS providing for the selection of patients • 
between the ages of 15 and 55 years are fairly typical." Id. at 643. 
174. "Illinois, by statute, provides funds to hospitals for dialysis of Illinois 
residents through the state Department of Public Health on the condition that these 
funds are used for treatment of patients under the age of 50. Id. at 643-44. 
175. "Most hospitals which are not under legislative or contractual strictures 
nevertheless exclude patients because of age." Id. at 644. See also De Wardener, Some 
Ethical and Economic Problems Associated with Intermittent Haemodialysis, in 
ETHICS, supra note 67, at 104, 107-08. 
176. See Simmons &: Simmons, supra note 139, at 376-78. 
177. Note, supra note 141, at 653. 
178. Id. at 654. 
179. See id. at 658 (laymen); Schreiner, Problems of Ethics in Relation to Haemo• 
dialysis and~ransplantation, in Ernrcs, supra note 67, at 127-28 (doctors). The 
trend is to favor the first-come, first-served approach, Note, supra note 141, at 660, as 
a consequence of the public outcry generated by Life Magazine's article on the "social 
worth" layman's committee of the Seattle Artificial Kidney Center. Schreiner, supra, 
at 128. Allowance for extreme cases of high social worth are made, however. Note, 
supra, at 660. 
180. Note, supra note 141, at 659-60. 
181. Id. at 660. Only one hospital used this process. 
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For example, a social-worth committee may approve one candidate 
over another because he is a Boy Scout troop leader,182 and the first-
come, first-served system may make a patient's survival depend on 
whether his kidney fails on the first or second day of the month. 
If the scarcity is relieved, the large-scale decision of whether to 
allocate human and fiscal resources to the development of the trans-
plant science or to other social goals must still be made.183 However, 
the decision can then be based on an accurate social cost-benefit 
analysis, free of the constraints of a severe shortage of organs. 
III. ALTERNATIVES 
A. Redefining Priorities 
Arguably, present public health priorities are distorted, and the 
shortage of body parts is illusory. Implicit in the call for an increase 
in the supply of human body parts is an assumption that the wide-
spread performance of transplants is desirable. However, the cost 
of transplants may outweigh their value. A heart transplant, for 
example, may cost up to 50,000 dollars.184 The cost of a kidney trans-
plant is estimated at from 18,500 to 20,720 dollars, depending on the 
size of the transplant center.185 There are also significant hidden 
costs; transplants divert doctors, medical and research facilities, 
funds, and research time from other medical problems.180 
Some physicians fear that enormous sums of money are being 
spent on transplantation to the detriment of other health needs, 
particularly the basic health needs and adequate nutrition of the 
poor.187 The heart transplant's high cost and low success rate has 
made it a principal target of these critics.188 Also, there is evidence 
182. Sanders &: Dukeminier, supra note 73, at 377. 
183. See section IIIA infra. 
184. N.Y. Times, June 23, 1968, § 1, at 48, cols. 1, 3 (late city ed.). It is estimated 
that this cost will remain high, even if up to 10,000 transplants are undertaken per year 
(in contrast to the present number of about 100). One author finds the average cost to 
be 18,700 dollars among six centers, but charges as high as 102,500 dollars have been 
reported. Simmons &: Simmons, supra note 139, at 367. 
185. Simmons&: Simmons, supra note 139, at 367. 
186. "The problems of funding organ transplantation must be seen in the 
larger context of a general scarcity of resources in medicine, a shortage of physicians, 
particularly outside the urban areas, rapidly rising hospital costs and patient bills, 
and discussions of national health insurance and reorganization of medical care." 
Simmons &: Simmons, supra note 139, at 367. See also D. LESouRD, M. Fooa &: D. 
JOHNSTON, supra note 130, at 40, for figures on the research and training costs of 
developing a kidney transplant program at a medical center. 
187. Simmons &: Simmons, supra note 139, at 367. 
188. See Fox, A Sociological Perspective on Organ Transplantation and Hemodialy• 
sis, 169 N.Y. ACAD. Scr. ANNUAL 406 (1970); Lear, A Realistic Look at Heart Transplants, 
SATURDAY R.Ev., March 2, 1968, at 49. Some critics were more philosophical. "It appears 
that man's ultimate hope for temporal immortality by perpetual replacement of out-
worn parts signifies a perverse rejection of bis creaturebood, a waning faith in personal 
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that certain preventive medical programs are more cost-effective than 
transplants in reducing fatalities for specific diseases, such as kidney 
failure. The costs and benefits of two preventative programs-strepto-
coccus screening and bacteriuria screening-and of kidney dialysis 
have been compared to the costs and benefits of kidney transplants.189 
For every dollar spent, dialysis returned $.65 of benefit for home 
units190 and $.28 of benefit for center units;191 kidney transplants 
returned from $.63 to $1.74 of benefit;192 streptococcus screening 
returned from $14.60 to $130.00 of benefit;193 and bacteriuria screen-
ing returned from $7.50 to $65.00 of benefit.194 It has also been 
suggested, based on a projection of increasing success with preventa-
tive techniques, that the need for transplantation as a remedial mea-
sure will gradually be reduced because diseases will be stopped at 
earlier stages.195 
However, the promise of the transplant prograID:_ should not be so 
hastily rejected. First, transplantation procedures are still highly 
experimental for most organs, including the heart, and the success 
of the project cannot be evaluated until the work has been more 
significantly advanced.196 Second, transplantation research has ad-
vanced medical knowledge in general, . contributing to the solution 
to other problems.197 Third, when society, has the technology to 
provide life-saving treatment to a dying individual, it is difficult to 
refuse treatment on the basis of cost figures: "There are few who 
complain of the costs involved in the search for and rescue of ship-
spiritual immortality! and a desperate grasp for man-made eternity." Are· Heart 
Transplants Moral?, Cmusr!ANITY TODAY, Feb. 16, 1968, at 24, 26. 
189. D. LESoURD, M. FOGEL &: D. JoHNSION, supra note 130, at 2. 
190. Id. at 88. The authors attempted to assess benefits in dollar figures ex-
clusively. Since some benefits defy such quantification, the limits of the study should 
be recognized. 
191. Id. at 90. 
192, Id. at 92-94. 
193, Id, at 80-81. 
194. Id, at 85. 
195. "With an advancing state of knowledge and with the passage of time, pro-
portions of optimal mix for a total program for the solution or amelioration of the 
kidney problem will follow ••• a gradually increasing emphasis on successful preven-
tion and effective treatment of the various primary kidney diseases_ with_ progressively 
lesser needs for the saving of lives due to end-stage kidney disease." U.S. PUBLIC 
HEALTH SERVICE, DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, &: WELFARE, supra note 129, at 36-37. 
196, The immense expenditure of effort on cancer and atherosclerosis is cited as an 
.example of the time required to tackle major medical problems. See R. CAI.NE, supra 
note 140, at 97. See also Report, supra note 6. 
197. Scientists have very recently .reported that tests used by doctors in organ 
transplantation may have therapeutic value for a wide variety of diseases unrelated 
to organ tra~splantation. N.Y. Times, March 2, 1972, § 1, at 25, col. 1 (late city ed.). · 
For example, tissue typing has helped to solve SOl!le of the mysteries of Hodgkin's 
giseas~. Id, 
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wrecked sailors; planes and helicopters are used routinely. Why 
then should not a similar effort be made for those in an equally des-
perate plight with fatal disease involving a transplantable organ?"108 
B. Increased Publicity 
It is possible that the Uniform Act has not eased the organ 
shortage199 because public knowledge of the Act is still very limited, 
and the Act simply needs to be publicized. Seventy per cent of those 
surveyed in a 1968 Gallup poll were willing to donate their organs 
for transplantation.200 If the Act is sufficiently publicized, the argu-
ment goes, these people will sign donor cards, and the scarcity will 
be alleviated. 
Professor Dukeminier has suggested three possible reasons for 
the Act's failure to encourage donations, all of which would exist 
despite increased publicity. First, there may be a reluctance to think 
about one's own death. Dukeminier noted that many people die 
without making wills and suggested that "[ o ]ne of the primary rea-
sons that people do not make wills of their property is that they 
cannot face death . . . . Because of these psychological inhibitions, 
a highly publicized campaign for organ donations has little chance 
of easing the shortage of organs."201 This analogy may be inaccurate. 
Those who do not make wills may not be avoiding thoughts of death, 
but may simply feel that state intestacy laws are adequate to govern 
the disposition of their property. In contrast, life insurance is ac-
cepted by many people as a means of protecting their families after 
their death. 
Dukeminier's second reason for the Act's failure is that most 
donations must come from a decedent's next of kin,202 and it is 
difficult to approach a grieving family to ask for the decedent's 
organs. Third, he points out that it is also difficult to ask for the 
consent of the dying patient,203 because the request may destroy the 
patient's hope for survival. These last two considerations may deter 
requests for organs at the source's death, but the emphasis of the Act 
is on the use of donor cards by living individuals, a procedure that 
should not be discouraged by either of these considerations. 
More probably, the paucity of anatomical gifts is due simply to 
inertia; donors fail to take the steps required by the Act because they 
198. R. CAI.NE, supra note 140, at 97-98. 
199. See text accompanying notes 129-47 supra. Some of the leading draftsmen of 
the Act were optimistic that the Act's implementation would result in an increase in 
cadaver organ donations. See Sadler, Sadler &: Stason, Transplantation and the Law: 
Progress Toward Uniformity, 282 NEW ENG. J. l\lED. 717, 722 (1970). 
200. N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1968, § A, at 18, col. 3 (late dty ed.). Little difference was 
found among members of the Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant religions. 
201. Dukeminier, supra note 26, at 830. 
202. Id. at 830-31. See Simmons &: Simmons, supra note 139, at 370. 
203. Dukeminier, supra note 26, at 831. 
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have no incentive other than the satisfaction of being charitable. 
Another very significant factor may be the spfritual and emotional 
attachment of the human to his body. Some religions dictate methods 
of cadaver disposition;204 and many people have dif!i~~lty divorcing 
their memory of the live individual from the dead . body.205 Some 
have a very real fear that, once a donor card has been signed, physi-
cians who desi_re organs will cause death. even though recovery is 
possible, if not probable.206 
Although it is difficult to measure public awareness of the Uni-
form Act, it would seem that widespread publicity would not be 
enough to end the organ shortage. Numerous efforts to publicize 
the Act have been undertaken by the Kidney Foundation and by 
individual doctors.207 However, there are simply not enough dona-
tions to supply the country's human body part needs. The time has 
come to admit that the Act, standing alone, is not an adequate 
solution. 
C. The Use of Autopsy Laws 
All the states and the District of Columbia authorize autopsies 
under certain circumstances208 because the public is judged to have 
an interest in ascertaining the cause of death. Autopsies are normally 
performed by a coroner wheµ death may have been caused by homi-
cide, suicide, or other violent means.209 In most states the decedent 
is allowed to contract for a postmortem examination in insurance 
contracts, 210 and many states also allow the decedent or his next of 
kin to consent to an autopsy.211 -
204. See text accompanying note 278 infra. . 
205. See text accompanying notes 277, 279-80, 414 infra. 
206. See, e.g., Tucker's Admin. v. Lower, Civ. No. 2831 (Richmond [Va.] Ct. Law 
&: Eq., May 25, 1972) (brother of transplant donor sued transplant surgeons, claiming 
donor was alive when heart and kidneys were removed because certain vital signs 
were normal). 
207. Dukeminier, supra note 26, at 820. The evidence is not all negative. In Minne-
sota, 10,500 individuals responded. to a recent donor campaign and volunteered the~r 
organs in the event of death. Simmons &: Simmons, supra note 139, at 370. 
208. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH &: SAFETY CODE §§ 7113-14 (West Supp. 1974); CAL. INS. 
CoDE §§ 10339, 10350.10 (West 1972): IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-1904 (Supp. 1973): MAs,s. 
ANN. LAws ch. 38, § 6 (1966). An autopsy is "[t]he dissection of a dead body for the 
purpose of inquiring into the cause of death." BLAcK's LA,.,. DICTIONARY 170 (4th ed. 
1951). But see Wasmuth &: Stewart, supra note 3, at 458 (emphasis added): "An autopsy 
is a postmortem examination of the body of _the deceased for the purpose of scientific 
interest in determining the cause of death and other information that may be ob• 
tained that might aid medical science." 
209. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 313.11-.16 (Page 1951); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1238 
(1956); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 2iy-10 to -14 (Supp. 1972); P. JACKSON, THE LAW OF 
CADAVERS 171 (2d ed. 1950). 
210. See, e.g., Clay v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 53 F.2d 689,_ 691 (8th Cir. 1931); Standard 
Accident Ins. Co. v. Rossi, 35 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1929); Schmiedeke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
30 F. Supp. 640, 641 (N.D. Tex. 1940). . 
211. CAL. HEALTH &: SAFETY CODE § 7113 (West Supp. 1973); CoNN, GEN. STAT. ANN. 
~ 19-143 (Supp. 1973); P. JACKSON, supra note 209, at 171. 
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Saine commentators have said that, when an autopsy is authorized 
by statute or by the consent of the person entitled to bury the body, 
there is a "logical implication that there is given to the doctors .•. 
'permission . . . to conduct such examination in the approved and 
usual manner practiced by their profession.' "212 They note that it 
has been "customary to remove from a body during a post-mortem 
organs and specimens for the purposes of pathological and histologi-
cal examination and preservation,"213 and conclude that "[p ]ersons 
performing such autopsies might well remove tissue" for use in 
transplantation procedures.214 
This conclusion has been contested by most subsequent com-
mentary on the ground that courts are unwilling to extend the scope 
of autopsies by implication.215 Only the removal of tissue for micro-
scopic examination has customarily been allowed, and it is usually 
mandatory that all tissue be reinserted in the cadaver when it is 
returned to those who have the right and the duty of burial.216 
However, six states have, at one time or another, enacted legisla-
tion allowing the removal of tissues and organs by physicians and 
coroners performing autopsies.217 Four of the six218 explicitly allowed 
a
1 
physician operating with the consent of the decedent or his next 
of kin to remove organs for transplantation. Three of the statutes 
were repealed when the states adopted some form of the Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act. Only the statutes in Hawaii, Virginia, and 
Maryland remain.219 
These three states provide for nonconsensual removal of organs 
during autopsies.220 Maryland medical examiners may remove organs 
212. Vestal, Taber &: Shoemaker, supra note 53, at 292, quoting Winkler v. Hawkes 
&: Ackley, 126 Iowa 474, 477, 102 N.W. 418, 419 (1905). 
213. Vestal, Taber &: Shoemaker, supra note 53, at 292. 
214. Id. at 292-93. 
215. Sadler & Sadler, Transplantation and the Law: The Need for Organized 
Sensitivity, 57 GEo. L.J. 5, 13-14 (1968) ("It has been suggested that permission for 
an autopsy, in effect, authorizes the removal of tissue for scientific use •••• The public 
is not adequately aware of the nonreplacement practices regarding autopsies, and 
cannot be assumed to have intended such a broad authorization."); Sidemen &: Rosen• 
field, supra note 25; Wasmuth &: Stewart, supra note 3, at 458·61; Comment, Dead 
Bodies-Autopsies-Authority To Use Parts Removed in Treatment of the Living, 33 
. N.C. L. REv. 653, 655 (1955). 
216. See Gray v. Southern Pac. Co., 21 Cal. App. 2d 240, 241, 68 P.2d 1011, 
1015 (1937): Palenzke v. Bruning, 98 Ill. App. 644, 651 (1870); In re Disinterment of 
Body of Jarvis, 244 Iowa 1025, 58 N.W .2d 24 (1953). 
217. Ch. 933, § 2, [1957] Cal. Stat. 2144 (repealed 1968); HAWAII REv. STAT, §§ '715-14, 
· 453-15 (1968); MD. ANN. CoDE art. 43, § 147A (Supp. 1973); NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-1341 
(1971); Ch. 293, [1963] Nev. Laws 533 (repealed 1969); VA. CODE ANN, § 19.1-46,l 
(Supp. 1973). 
218. California, Hawaii, Nebraska, and Nevada. 
219. See note 217 supra. 
220. _HAWAII REv. STAT.§ 715-14 (1968); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 147A (Supp. 1973); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-46.l (Supp. 1973). See also Note, Organ Transplantation a11d 
the Donation: A Proposal for Legislation, 10 WM. &: MARY L. REV. 975 (1969). 
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for transplantation when a decedent "who may provide a suitable 
organ for the transplant is under their jurisdiction," "[n ]o known 
objection by the next of kin is foreseen," and "[a] reasonable, un-
successful search has been made . . . to contact the next of kin."221 
The medical examiners of Virginia are also empowered to provide 
a suitable organ "where a decedent comes under their jurisdiction 
.•. [ and] there is insufficient time to contact the next of kin . -.. and 
[there· is] no known objection by the next of kin."222 In Hawaii 
the coroner's physician or the medical examiner of any county "may 
perform . . . an autopsy to determine the cause of death up,on the 
remains of any body which is brought into or found within the state 
and which appears to have come to death under any of the circum-
stances set forth in section 715-3 . . . [ and] shall have the right to 
retain tissues, including fetal material, of the body removed at the 
time of autopsy to be used for necessary or advisable scientific investi-
gation, including research, teaching, and therapeutic purposes."223 
The Hawaii statute does not require notification of next of kin. 
Under each statute the critical question is the extent of the medi-
cal examiner's "jurisdiction." In Virginia, the medical examiner is 
empowered to "take charge of [the] dead body"224 when he is notified 
of the "death of any person from violence, or suddenly whtn in 
apparent health, or when unattended by a physician, or in prison, 
or in any suspicious, unusual or unnatural manner."225 The medical 
examiners of Maryland take charge of bodies when an individual 
dies "as a result of violence, or by suicide, or by casualty, or sud-, 
denly when in apparent health or when unattended by a physician, 
or in any suspicious or unusual manner."226 In Hawaii, the-coroner, 
assumes jurisdiction over "the death of any person within his juris• 
diction as the result of violence, or as the result of any accident, or 
by suicide, or suddenly when in apparent health, or when unattended, 
by a physician, or in prison, or- in a suspicious or unusual manner, 
or within twenty-four hours after admission to a hospital or insti-
tution."227 
The solution adopted by these states has two serious_ flaws. First, 
if the consent requirement found in most anatomical gift statute_s 
is to be removed in some cases, it should be removed in all. The 
statutes in effect provide that only those individuals who happen to 
die under the specified circumstances-circumstances completely un-
related to the transplant situation (for example, death by murder 
221. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 147A (Supp. 1973). 
222. VA. CoDE ANN. § 19.1-46.1 (Supp. 1973). 
223. HAw~1 REv. STAT. §§ 715-14 (1968). 
224. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-42 (1960). 
225. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-41 (1960). 
226. Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 22, § 6 (1973). 
227. HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 715-3 (1968). 
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or suicide)--can be used as sources without the consent of the next 
of kin. · , 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, these laws invite serious • 
a1?use because the medical examiners are given much discretion in 
determining which deaths fall within the statutory specifications and 
are thus subject to their jurisdiction. Two inappropriate pressures 
may weigh on the examiners' judgment: (1) If the organs are to be 
used in transplants, they often must be removed from the body very 
soon after- death. An examiner's decision to do an autopsy and 
remove the organs must thus be immediate, and he may make only 
a hurried effort to locate the next of kin. The Hawaii statute does 
not require any notification. (2) The serious scarcity of organs may 
cause the examiner to act to the very limits of his discretion in 
assumi~g jurisq.iction. A procedure formerly used merely to ascertain 
the cause of death is thus transformed into an organ-gathering pro• 
cedure. If the consent requirement is to be eliminated, it should be 
done openly and uniformly, regardless of manner of death. 
· Hawaii also has a statute that provides that an autopsy performed 
with the express consent of the next of kin "shall include consent 
to the retention by [the performing physician of body parts] ... for 
necessary or advisable scientific investigation, including research, 
teaching, and therapeutic purposes."228 Although the statute allows 
organ removal only in autopsies undertaken with consent, it leaves 
no option for individuals who desire to have an autopsy performed 
but do not want to allow organ removal. The possible extensions 
of ihxs scheme are troublesome. If, under an insurance contract or 
a workmen's compensation agreement, a person must consent to an 
autopsy upon his death where deemed necessary, he must also consent 
to donate his organs. Again, the consent requirement has indirectly 
been deprived of its force. 
A preferable alternative js the Nebraska statute, which is unique 
in allowing the next of kin to consent to an autopsy to establish 
cause of death without consenting to the removal of organs for 
transplantation.229 However, the statute conflicts with Nebraska's 
newly adopted version of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. Both 
permit valid anatomical gifts, but the autopsy statute does not 
clearly specify the duties of all parties and does not protect doctors 
and others acting in "good faith" under an apparently valid gift or 
authorization. The Uniform Act also· outlines formal procedures for 
making gifts that are ignored in the autopsy statute. The superiority 
of the Uniform Act, as well as the need for uniformity, requires the 
repeal of the autopsy statute. 
228. HAWAII REY. STAT. § 453-15 (1968). 
229. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-1341 (1971), 
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D. Routine Removal of Organs in the Absence -of Objection 
Professor Dukeminier and Doctor Sanders have proposed that 
legislation be enacted to make the removal of usable cadaver organs 
routine unless the decedent or his next of kin objects:230 "[B]y 
making the basic presumption one which favors life, and by thus 
putting the burden of objecting upon persons who would deny life 
to another, the policy of saving human life is given first priority, 
and the wishes of persons to preserve a corpse inviolate are also ac-
commodated. This me.thod would produce far more organs for 
transplantation than are produced by statutes permitting organ 
donation by the decedent."231 
However, the proposal leaves the individual only token control 
over the disposition of his body. As discussed above, Professor 
Dukeminier has argued that the Uniform Act is ineffective because 
individuals are unwilling to prepare for death; it is difficult to ap-
proach next of kin at the decedent's death; and it is difficult to ask 
a dying patient for his organs.232 If Professor Dukeminier is correct, 
the consent requirement in his proposal is illusory. The considera-
tions that he claims make the Uniform Act ineffective would, in 
many cases, ensure that the right to object will not be exercised by 
those who wish to do so. By putting the burden on the donor, Pro-
fessor Dukeminier is, in effect, advocating the compulsory removal 
of organs and tissues. The inclusion of a token right to object may , 
be merely an attempt to avoid the political and constitutional prob-
lems that a proposal of compulsory removal might raise. 
E. Compulsory Routine Removal 
Perhaps the societal objective of saving life should be paramount, 
and the rights of those entitled to bury the decedent's body should 
be circumscribed tq permit the state to remove organs or tissues, with 
or without the consent of the decedent or his next of kin. This would 
represent a dramatic extension of current policy. At present, burial 
rights are qualified only by autopsy laws, which enable a coroner to 
examine dead bodies without the consent of the decedent or the next 
of kin in certain circumstances,233 and by criminal laws234 and laws 
230. Sanders &: Dukeminier, supra note 73, at 410-14. 
231. "[I]n a recent questionnaire submitted to physicians, Dr. Robert Williams 
found that the Dukeminier-Sanders proposal was favored by seventy-one per cent of 
those responding." Dukeminier, supra note 26, at 837. 
232. Id. at 828-32. 
233. See text accompanying notes 208-29 supra. 
234. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 416-17 infra. The health of the community 
is used to justify regulations controlling burial practices. See, e.g., Carpenter v. 
Borough of Yeadon, 158 F. 766, 768 (3d Cir. 1908); Wyeth v. Board of Health, 200 
Mass. 474, 479, 86 N.E. 925, 927 (1909). 
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regulating the operation of cemeteries.235 
Compulsory removal may encounter constitutional difficulties. 
One author concludes that it would constitute a taking of the prop-
erty of the next of kin without compensation, in violation of the fifth 
and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.280 
However, Professor Dukeminier argues that before the decedent's 
death the right of the next of kin to bury the body is merely a con-
tingent right, similar to dower or the expectancy of an heir, and can 
be abolished by law.237 He also points out that under the common 
law the right to bury is only a quasi-property right, which has no 
commercial value, and thus cannot be "taken.''238 The first amend-
ment has also been cited as potentially prohibiting compulsory re-
moval, 239 because certain religious doctrines may be incompatible 
with the removal of organs from dead bodies.240 
· · The constitutional validity of compulsory removal is also critical 
,to the validity of propqsals-such as the Virginia and Maryland laws 
and the Dukeminier plan-that seriously disadvantage those who 
want to object to a gift on religious grounds. Such proposals, if 
found to be masked versions of the compulsory removal proposal, 
may also be constitutionally infirm. 
IV. AN OPEN MARKET IN HUMAN ORGANS 
. A. Proposed Transactions 
A final alternative to the present system is the development of 
a market for human body parts. A market system assumes that a 
sufficient number of individuals, enticed by financial rewards, will 
contract to sell their body parts so that the overall supply will be 
significantly increased. Optimally, the supply would be self-regulat-
ing; as the need for human tissues and organs increases the price of 
parts in short supply should rise, increasing the incentive to individ-
uals to sell those parts. 
23Q, See P. JACKSON, supra note 209, at 184-213. 
236. Note, Compulsory Removal of Cadaver Organs, 69 COLUM. L. REV, 693 (1969), 
'J;'he fifth amendment provides that private property shall not "be taken for public 
use, without just compensation." U.S. CoNsr. amend. V. While no similar provision 
appears··in~ me-fourteenth· amendment;-the- Supreme Court has- read into the due 
process clause a requirement that states may·appropriate property only if there is "a 
law authorizing it, and provision made for compensation," City of Cincinnati v 
Louisville &: Nash. R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 390, 400 (1912). In addition, taking of property 
without compensation might violate a state constitution. See, e.g., M1cu. CoNsr. art. 
X, § 2 ("Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation 
therefor being first made or secured in a manner prescribed by law."). 
237. Dukei;ninier, supra note 26, at 833. 
238. Id. at 834. See text accompanying note 429 infra. 
239. Dukeminier, supra note 26, at 835-37. 
240. See note 278 infra. 
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The market concept has several advantages over the previously 
discussed alternatives. First, it should significantly increase the sup-
ply of human body parts without sacrificing the individual's ability 
to control the disposition of his body. Under a market system, con-
sent to organ transfer would be paramount. Second, a market system 
would eliminate much doctor-patient and doctor-relative friction at 
the time of death,241 because the donor would be encouraged to con-
tract in advance for the sale of his organs. The previously executed 
contract would enable the transfer' to be accomplished at death with 
no further questioning of the· patient or his relatives. Even those 
who decide not to enter into a sales contract would benefit, for, if 
the scarcity problem is eliminated by organs provided by people 
who do contract, those who have not contracted would not be pres-
sured by agents of0 the needy. 
However, the implementation of the sales concept may encounter 
ethical objections. One of the major concerns may be that only the 
poor and powerless will sell their parts and only the white upper 
class will be able to purchase them. This criticism has been raised 
against the present donative system.242 It is feared that the ability to 
bury the body rather than have it carved up will become a luxury 
of the wealthy.243 
However, the growing organ shortage may make a market system 
inevitable. A Nobel Prize-winning physicist has warned that medical 
advances could put "intolerable economic pressures on transplant 
sources."244 Offers to sell organs have already appeared in newspa-
pers,245 and surreptitious sales have been noted.246 It is hard to cal-
241. See Dukeminier, supra note 26, at 829-31. 
242. Simmons &: Simmons, supra note 139, at 370. The first human heart transplant 
to prove successful for an ~tended period of time was Dr. C .. Barnard's allograft in 
Dr. P. Blaiberg. The donor was "Cape-colored." N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1968, § I, at I, 
col. 2 (late city ed.). South African officials deemphasized the racial question, and 
noted that the transplant would not affect the legal status of Dr. Blaiberg as a white. 
Id., July 26, 1971, § 1, at 9, col. I (late city ed.); id., May 11, 1971, § I, at 23, col. 8 
(late city ed.). 
243. R. Trri.1uss, THE GIFr RELATIONSHIP 102 (Vintage ed. 1971). A survey of P.aid 
blood donors has shown that "[a] disproportionately high proportion of blood donors 
were drawn from the lower occupation-income groups." Id. 
244. Lederberg, Biological Future of Man, in CIBA FOUNDATION SYMPOSIUM: MAN 
AND HIS FUTURE, supra note 3, at 263, 274. 
245. See Dukeminier, supra note 26, at 811. 
246. Discussion, in ETHICS, supra note 67, at 35, 37 (remarks of R. Caine). 
"There have been cases, and there will be many more, in which families for 
one reason or another have not wanted to donate a kidney to their afflicted rela-
tives and sought out somebody in need of money to give a kidney and be paid for 
it. There have also been cases where organs have been transplanted from an un-
related "volunteer" donor and this donor has later blackmailed the recipient or 
the recipient's family. This is a danger that is going to rise increasingly frequently 
if there is any suspicion that money is exchanged in ordinary cases of transplanta-
tion." · 
Id. The present legal status of organ sales is discussed in Part V, infra • . 
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culate how many sales are presently made, because remuneration 
need not take the form of a direct cash payment.247 One form of 
noncash transaction is donation to an organ bank; those who donate 
their or~s can obtain organs and tissues for their own use, if 
needed.248 If the current shortage continues, the difficulty of prevent-
ing a black market in organs could be formidable, 240 and such a 
market would be impossible to regulate for the protection of the 
poor. 
A second objection to the market system may be raised by those 
who disapprove on moral grounds of any system that encourages the 
sale of human body parts.25° Fears of "unsavoury trafficking" are 
brought to mind, and visions are conjured up of the trade made 
famous by the notorious Edinburg murders, Burke and Hare, who 
killed sixteen people and sold their bodies to medical institutions for 
dissection.251 However, it is not thought mercenary for one to buy 
life insurance, and the sale of body parts, perhaps with the proceeds 
to go to one's beneficiaries, has a benefit not found in life insurance: 
It provides life-saving organs for others. Nevertheless, subjecting 
body parts to the law of the market place does have some troubling 
implications. Will a debtor be able to put up his kidney as collateral 
for a loan? May a person be forced to sell a kidney in order to satisfy 
a money judgment? The organ market should be regulated to protect 
against such abuses. 
At least five kinds of sales transactions could take place in a 
market system: (l) A present contract for. the right to the body ( or to 
specific parts) upon the death of the seller, with remuneration to be 
paid upon death to named beneficiaries (or to the seller's estate). 
The remuneration is not determined until the body is actually avail-
able for use and its value ascertained. (2) A present contract for the 
247. Cf. Blood Money, TIME, Oct. I, 1973, at ll3 [E5), col. 3 (judge in Lexington, 
Ky., gave traffic violators option to pay fines in blood). 
248. See, e.g., R. TITMUss, supra note 243, at 82-84, 93. There arc a number of 
"family credit" blood donor systems in the United States, under which the eligible 
donor deposits one pint of blood (or some other fixed amount) each year in return for 
ensuring his and his family's yearly blood needs will be met. Id. at 82. 
249. Dr. T. Cooper has expressed concern about a possible "black market" in organs. 
N.Y. Times, May 25, 1969, § I, at 53, col. I (late city ed.). 
250. Consider the remarks of R. Titmuss on the commercialized blood market: 
[T]he commercialization of blood and donor relationships represses the expression 
of altruism, erodes the sense of community, lowers scientific standards, limits both 
personal and professional freedoms, sanctions the making of profits in hospitals and 
clinical laboratories, legalizes hostility between doctor and patient, subjects critical 
areas of medicine to the laws of the marketplace, places immense social costs on 
those least able to bear them-the poor, the sick and the inept-increases the dan• 
ger of unethical behavior in various sectors of medical science and practice, and re• 
sults in a situation in which proportionately more and more blood is supplied by 
the poor, the unskilled, the unemployed, Negroes and other low income groups 
and categories of exploited human populations of high blood yielders. 
R. TtTMuss, supra note 243, at 245-46. 
251. W. RoUGHEAD, KNAVE'S LOOKING-GLASS 291-326 (1935). 
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right to the body (or to specific parts) upon the death of the seller, 
with a definite remuneration guaranteed at death to a· named bene-
ficiary (or to the seller's estate). This requires the buyer to accept 'an 
element of risk with respect to the value of the parts for which he 
has contracted. (3) A present contract for the rights to the body ( or to 
specific parts) upon the death of the seller, with payment to be made 
at the time of contracting. The buyer is again required to accept the 
risk of the value of the seller's parts. Valuation will be difficult, but 
not impossible; actuarial tables could be used to estimate the value 
of the parts at the time of death for an individual with the character-
istics of the seller, and that future value could be discounted to 
present worth. (4) A present transfer of nonvital organs and 'tissues 
from a living seller for present remuneration. (5) A sale by the next 
of kin of the decedent's body parts after the decedent's death. 
The first and second proposals provide, in effect, no-premium life 
insurance policies. Remuneration is paid upon the death of the seller 
to designated beneficiaries. In the first proposal the amount paid will 
be uncertain, but it may have a bottom limit of the worth of the 
cadaver (or the part) for teaching purposes. In the second proposal, 
the beneficiaries receive a set amount. 
Since the first three proposals involve the sale of a future right to 
cadaver parts, the contract rights may be repurchased if the seller 
changes his mind. If scarcity is alleviated by the market system and 
the organ is of a normal type, the price of the contract right will not 
have changed. If the seller fears that the value of the contract will 
appreciate out of his price range, he can include a provision that will 
give him an option to repurchase under certain conditions and at a 
set price. · · · 
The fourth suggestion, that present payment be made for the 
present transfer of nonvital organs, has the disadvantage of permit-
ting an individual to subject himself to a health risk for a strictly 
financial return. As noted above, many doctors are hesitant to use 
living sources.252 The donor's-psychological benefit, which has been 
used to justify transplants from living sources, 253 is harder to accept 
when the major motive is clearly monetary. Living donors may be 
subject to significant family and self-imposed pressures, which make 
free consent improbable.254 The addition of a money incentive may 
also be coercive; if an individual's financial. need is great enough, his 
rational assessment of the effect of organ removal on his future health 
may be impossible. ·· 
The fifth alternative, the sale of a decedent's body by the next of 
kin, could be either subject to a decedent's right to object by express 
252. See text accompanying notes 81-82 supra. 
253. See text accompanying notes 88-91 supra. 
254. See text accompanying notes 88-123 supra. 
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statement before his death or allowed regardless of the decedent's 
wishes. Either approach may be unpalatable because sale by the next 
of kin offends the traditional concept of respect for the dead.255 The 
fifth alternative may even lead to the sale by expectant heirs of the 
rights to a source's body parts before he has died. The objection that 
the sales concept is too mercenary is of particular force here. More-
over, a failure to give the decedent an option to defeat the sale, 
violates his common law right to a decent burial. 256 
B. Organ Preservation-A Technological Limit 
on Market Structure 
The viable preservation of whole organs and tissues is an essential 
component of any transplantation program that does not rely exclu-
sively on living sources. An organ is deprived of normal oxygenation 
when it is removed from its physiological site at the death of the 
source.257 There follows, in rapid sequence, an exhaustion of the 
intracellular energy reserves, a slowdown or cessation of normal 
metabolic processes, and an accentuation of degenerative catabolic 
activities, all of which leads to progressive and ultimately irreversible 
damage.258 The problem is much more acute when whole organs, 
such as hearts or kidneys, are involved, but it is also present in the 
transplantation of tissues such as bone or skin.259 
Simple tissue-bits of bone, skin, and tendon-have been success-
fully preserved by freeze-drying.260 The long-term storage of corneas 
has been made possible by techniques such as freezing, freeze-drying, 
and dessication by glycerin.261 Most simple tissue grafts need not be, 
viable in order to function adequately in a transplant; they are merely 
used as a framework for reconstruction as the host slowly replaces 
the lost tissue.262 Freeze-dried skin grafts, for example, can serve as 
temporary biological dressings to cover burn wounds. The graft 
remains in place for several weeks or months, depending on the 
immune status of the patient, and is finally "sloughed.''263 
Long-term preservation of whole organs-such as the kidney, 
the liver, and the lung-has met with less success. The two most 
255. Sale of bodies may bring back memories of the notorious cadaver pilfering of 
the 19th century. See text accompanying notes 413-14- infra. 
256. See text accompanying notes 431-35 infra. 
257. Sell, Tissue and Organ Preservation, in TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 6, at 405; 
see also R. CALN.E, supra note 140, at 9; F. MooR.E, supra note 7, at 227-33. 
258. Sell, supra note 257, at 405. 
259. Id. at 413-14. 
260. Id. at 413. 
261. Harri.s & Rathbun, Ocular Tissues, in TRANSPLANTATION, sypra note 6, at_ 616.' 
262. Sell, supra note 257, at 413. 
263. Id. at 414. 
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promising approacheS-:-metabolic inhibition264 , and metabolic main-
tenance265-are still in the exploratory stages.266 Short-term whole · 
organ preservation is possible through simple cooling methods.267 
Kidneys removed up to one hour after death may be maintained for 
as long as fifty hours,268 but the heart must be reimplanted within 
one tq two hours.269 Liver storage is commonly possible only for a 
few hours,270 although successful storage for up to eight hours has 
been reported.271 Thus, the simple tissues market could be national-
ized, but the whole organ market will be geographically limited by 
the length of time that organ life can be sustained through short-term 
storage processes. 
Various nonstorage techniques may expand the market, however. 
Often a potential source may be maintained after death on respira• 
tory and circulatory machines that sustain his noninjured organs.272 
A significant amount of time can be added to organ life by the swift 
transport of either the recipient to the source or the source to the 
recipient, while the source is being artificially maintained. Even 
without artificial maintenance, the speed of modem transportation 
may extend·the radius of exchange. One kidney was flown across lhe 
Atlantic Ocean before it was successfully reimplanted.273 · 
A good deal of research is currently being undertaken on methods 
of organ preservation.274 However, although increases in shorMerm 
survival time are anticipated, long-term storage methods for whole 
organs are not expected in the near future.275 
264. Metabolic inhibition seeks to prevent the normal destruction processes from 
causing severe damage to the tissues during the period of preservation by means of 
freezing or chemical blockage of metabolic activities. Id. at 406. 
265. Metabolic maintenance attempts to sustain a nearly normal level of metabolic 
activity through perfusion with a carefully controlled fluid medium. Id. at 408. 
266. See id. at 405-12. 
267. Id.; R. CALNE, supra note 140, at 47-52; Kiser, Magnusson, Hewitt, Stewart &: 
Straffon, Experience with Preservation of Shipped-in Cadaver Kidneys, in CUNICAL 
TRANSPLANTATION 181 (D. Hume &: F. Rapaport ed. 1972). 
268. Summers, Kjellstrand &: Najarian, Technique, Complications, and Results, in 
TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 6, at 449. 
269. As of 1971, hearts were transplanted directly from the donor to the recipient 
without intermediate storage. Turner, Organ Storage, in HUMAN ORGAN SUPPORT AND 
REPLACEMENT 35, 49 a. Hardy ed. 1971). See Griepp, Stinson &: Shumway, supra note 6, 
at 540-41, for 15 cases with a maximum ischemic storage time of 85 minutes. 
·270. Turner, supra note 269, at 45. 
271. Id. at 46. 
272. C. LYONS, ORGAN TRANSPLANTS 50, 53 (1970): Cf. F. MOORE, supra note 7, at 211. 
273. N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1971, § 1, at 19, col. 7 (late city ed.). See also id., Aug. 15, 
1971, § I, at 50, col. 4 (late city ed.). · 
274. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1972, § 1, at 16, col. I (late city ed.); id., Aug. 6,. 
1972, § 2, at 50, col. 3 (late city ed.). 
275. R. CAI.NE, supra note 140. at 94-95. 
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C. Increasing the Supply 
The primary assumption behind the use of a market system is that 
the offer of financial remuneration will sufficiently increase the in-
centive to supply parts. Classic economic theory states that the supply 
of a good usually increases directly with its price.276 Theoretically, 
then, an appropriate price level will guarantee that the organs and 
tissues needed to satisfy existing medical demand will be supplied. 
The validity of that assumption is subject to serious qtiestion. 
First, the supply of human body parts may be highly inelastic-
people may not be willing to part with body parts at any price. Sec-
ond, supply .may not increase either because only those who would 
have donated will sell, or because those who would have donated will 
assume that the demand will be met by the sales of others and the 
number of sellers will not offset those lost donors. Third, the body 
parts that are sold may be medically less fit than those now donated. 
The first criticism is based on the emotional and spiritual impor-
tance given the dead body: "Our attitude towards a dead body very 
nearly resembles that of the savage. Most of us are greatly disturbed 
by the sight, or even the mere proximity, of a human cadaver. Skulls 
are commonly regarded with feelings of horror and repulsion . . . . 
Many people are averse to handling, and still more to wearing, 
clothes or trinkets which were worn or carried by the deceased."277 
Some religions have express mandates against the disfiguration of 
the dead body.278 Perhaps the most pervasive belief is that proper 
burial displays respect for the departed individual.270 This respect 
may be a remnant of primitive man's belief in a remaining spiritual 
presence in the cadaver: 
We behave at a funeral in such a way that the dead person may be 
favourably impressed by our conduct, and gratifi~d by perceiving 
our doleful demeanour. Hence we put on inconceivably. ugly clothes, 
and hire a most hideous equipage, in order that our friend may be 
carried to his grave in the correct manner. This we do, not to show 
respect to the dead body-for a dead body is a useless and horrible 
thing-but to show respect to something which we are inclined to 
think of as still associated with the body.2so 
The body may be so spiritually imbued that certain individuals will 
refuse to sell it at any price, and the main axiom of the market con-
cept fails. Even if some individuals are willing to sell their organs, 
276 •. See M. SPENCER, CONTEMPORARY EcONOllUCS 51 (1971). 
277, C. VULLIAMY, IMMORTAL MAN 176 (1926). 
278. Orthodox Jewish elements consider autopsies "abominations of the body.'' N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 2, 1972, § 1, at 34, col. 1 (late city ed.). For a discussion of the doctrinal basis 
for this view, see Lauterbach, The Jewish Attitude Toward Autopsy, 35 CENTRAL CON• 
FERENCE OF AMERICAN RABBIS YEAR BOOK 130, 132 (1925), 
279. See C. VULLIAMY, supra note 277, at 200-01. 
280. Id. 
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the spiritual aura surrounding the body may make the price of parts 
prohibitive. 
This argument affects only the disposition of cadavers and should 
not ordinarily affect the willingness of the living source to contribute 
his organs; nor should it affect the willingness of an individual to sell 
his own cadaver. Notable exceptions may be members of religious 
groups that dictate against either practice,281 but a 1968 Gallup poll 
indicated that the individual's willingness to donate is not signifi-
cantly affected by religious or sentimental attachments to his body.282 
Seventy per cent of those surveyed said that they would be willing to 
donate. Membership in a particular religion appeared to have little 
effect on the results. If an individual feels no spiritual compunction 
against donating his cadaver, he is likely to be willing to sell it for 
medical purposes. 
Survivors, regardless of religious belief, may be reluctant to profit 
from the death of their relatives. Gifts may therefore remain the 
preferred alternative when the body of a relative is involved. How-
ever, the sales concept permits the prospective donor to select from 
a wider range of charities. The proceeds of a sale could be donated 
for the support of a city library, for example, while a dead body 
could not be donated to such an institution under the Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act.283 
All of the problems assocfated with the spiritual or emotional 
significance of the cadaver should arise only if the sale is executed 
after death. Also, both the reverence for the dead body and the com-
punction against profiting from the death of relatives may be weak-
ening.284 The increasing importance of the human body as a repara-
tive medical tool should accelerate that process. 
The second argument against the ability of a market system to 
increase the supply of-cadaver organs is that those who will sell could 
all be induced to donate under a purely donative system, at less 
financial and social cost. Also, the market system will discourage some 
of those who would othenvise have donated, a loss that would not be 
offset by the gain in sellers. Richard M. Titmuss makes these argu-
ments in connection with the blood market. The blood provision' 
system of England and Wales is entirely donative.285 Statistics for 
both countries for the period from 1949 to 1968 indicate progressive 
and sustained growth in the number of blood donors, blood dona-
tions, and the supply of blood to hospitals.286 A 1968 study under-
taken in Sweden (where blood sources are paid) demonstrated that 
281. See note 278 supra. 
282. N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1968, § A, at 18, col. 3 (late city ed.). 
283. See text accompanying note 33 supra. 
284. C. VuLLIAllIY, supra note Z17, at 53-58. 
285. R. TlTll!USS, supra note 243, at 263-75. 
286. Id. at 44. 
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approximately seventy-two pc:r cent of the paid sources who answered 
said that they would give blood without a cash payment.287 I£ a vol-
untary donation system would adequately meet the medical demand 
for organs, tp.e final cost to the. patient receiving the organ could be 
significantly reduced. The saving would come from decreased trans-
action costs-that is, costs of procuring the organ in terms of paper 
work, manhours spent, and so forth-and from the decreased cost 
of the organ itself. For example, it is estimated that the cost of blood 
to a patient in England is five to fifteen times less than the cost of 
blood to a p~tient in the United States; arguably, the reason for the 
difference is that England, unlike the United States, has a voluntary 
system.288 • 
Titmuss also argues that "commercialization and profit in blood 
has been driving out the voluntary donor."289 He fears what he 
considers to be a much greater problem than an increase in costs-the 
overall decline of altruism in favor of materiality: 
We do not know and could never estimate in economic terms the 
social costs to American society of the decline in recent years in the 
voluntary giving of blood ... it is likely that a decline in the spirit 
of altruism in one sphere of human activities will be accompanied 
by similar changes in attitudes, motives and relationships in other 
spheres. The ethical issues raised by the use of prisoners for blood 
product trials and plasmapheresis programs . . . is one example. 
The gro,vth of. profit-making hospitals, geared to short stays, high 
turnover and "profitable" patients and which cannot foster a sense 
of community attachment is another example.290 
Even if Titmuss's objections concerning a blood market are cor-
rect, their applicability to the organ market is questionable. The 
"spirit of altruism" may be enough to encourage blood donations, 
but arguably a stronger incentive-money-is required to obtain 
body parts. Because blood can be regenerated, the health risk to the 
source is very small.291 If the donor of human body parts is living, 
however, the gift may create a substantial health risk.292 A majority 
of donated parts are taken from cadavers,293 and gifts of this sort are 
discouraged by the spiritual and emotional associations with the 
body. Indeed, the American blood supply system still depends on 
sales, in part because a donative system simply does not provide 
287. Id. at 186. Only 50 per cent, however, stated that they would donate blood as 
frequently as they now sell it. 
288. R. TITMUss, supra note 243, at 205. 
289. Id. at 198. 
290. Id. 
291. Id. at 25. If a donor is bled too freq&ently, iron deficiency anaemia develops. 
292. See note 73 supra. 
293. See text accompanying note 18 supra. 
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enough blood to supply those who need it.294 Even with a revised 
and widely accepted donation act, the American donative system for 
human body parts has also failed to meet demand. Rather than suffer 
acute shortages in the vain hope that altruism will eventually answer 
the need, it is time to look to other alternatives. 
The third major argument against a market system is that the 
quality of the organs sold will be poor. The risk that the organ will 
transmit disease is inherent in the transplantation process.295 A good 
deal depends on the truthfulness of the source during the medical 
examination and the taking of medical history. A monetary incen-
tive may lead to concealment by the source of past and present mala-
dies. This fear is borne out by data from the American blood market. 
The major hazard of infection from blood transfusion is serum hepa-
titus, and the best available scientific test can detect only twenty per 
cent of the blood samples that are infected.296 Paid donors of blood, 
especially poor donors, are less likely than voluntary donors to reveal 
a full medical history and to provide information about recent con-
tacts with infectious disease, recent inoculations, and personal 
habits that would disqualify them as donors.297 Significantly more 
hepatitis attacks have been reported among recipients of blood from 
paid donors.298 
The incentive to conceal medical history for monetary gain 
would also exist when organs and tissues are involved. In fact, the 
incentive may be greater. More money .will be involved, and trouble-
some medical history is arguably easier to conceal because it is often 
difficult to trace the cause of a transplant failure. 
The National Blood Bank Act proposed by Representative Vey-
sey would make the blood donor more accountable through the use 
of labeling and the imposition of criminal penalties on fraudulent 
294. Hearings on S. 2560 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (Statement of Mrs. Bernice 
Hemphill, Managing Director of Invin Memorial Blood Bank) (1964) [hereinafter Hear-
ings]. . 
295. See Panel Discussion on the Development of Cancer in Transplant Recipients, 
in CLINICAL TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 267, at 307. In Australia, kidneys with an 
unsuspected tumor were transplanted from a single donor to two patients. One de-
veloped the tumor and died. Id. 
Calne summarizes the procedures used to protect recipients from such transplanted 
diseases: "It is first necessary to confirm that the volunteer kidney donor is healthy. In 
particular he must not be suffering from any infectious or malignant condition and 
his blood pressure should be normal. His urine is then -examined for any abnormal 
constituents and his kidneys and urinary drainage tract are X-rayed after injection into 
a vein of radio-opaque material which is excreted by the kidneys." R. CALNE, supra 
note 140, at 53. 
296. Statement on Screening Donor Blood for Hepatitis-Associated Antigen (Nov. 19, 
1970), attached to letter from the American Hospital Association, January 1971 (on 
file at The University of Michigan Public Health Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan). 
297. Hearings, supra note 294, at 3, 30, 141, 154, 201. 
298. R. TITMUss, supra note 243, at 147-48. 
1226 Michigan Law Review [VoL 72:1182 
sources.299 A similar approach could be undertaken with respect to 
human body parts. More significantly, safeguards to ensure the dis-
covery of medical defects can be built into the organ market. Most 
blood is sold on an off-the-street basis.300 In contrast, the organ con-
tract will typically be made well in advance of the actual use of the 
organ and the time between sale and delivery may be used to verify 
the source's medical history. The source could be required under 
the sales contract to submit to periodic check-ups. In the rare case 
where a dying person attempts to sell his cadaver, the contract price 
may be valued downward to reflect the uncertainty of the condition 
of his parts, or such a sale could be prohibited. 
The lack of a time delay may be a problem under the fourth and 
fifth alternatives. In regard to the fourth, where a source sells his 
nonvital organs for immediate use, a contractual or statutory provi-
sion could require a time delay. At present, many physicians require 
a living donor to wait up to a year after the decision to donate before 
the organ is removed.301 No time delay is possible under the fifth 
alternative (sale of a decedent's organs by the next of kin), unless 
predeath sales are permitted. If the defective organ problem becomes 
serious, that alternative may be prohibited. 
In sum, the first three market alternatives, which involve the 
sale by a living person of his own cadaver, are the most promising. 
A 1963 survey of United States mortality data shows that if logistic 
and legal problems were removed, cadaver donors could have sup-
plied more than enough kidneys and livers to satisfy the demand.802 
D. The Allocation of Resources 
Even if a market system can supply enough organs to satisfy any 
given demand, the question of the allocation of the available organs 
must be faced. It is possible that, even if enough organs could be 
supplied to satisfy every request for a transplant, a comparison of 
299. H.R. 9912, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). 
300. See, e.g., II7 CONG. REc. 42828, 43613 (1971) (article from Chicago Tribune, 
Sept. 14, 1971, inserted in record by Representative Veysey). 
301. Fellner &: Marshall, supra note 108, at 2706. 
302. Couch, Supply and Demand in Kidney and Liver Transplantation: A Statistical 
Study, 4 TRANSPLANTATION 587 (1966). (This conclusion held true regarding kidneys in 
1970). See Belzer &: Kountz, Criteria for Selection of Cadaver Donors, in CLINICAL TRANS• 
PLANTATION, supra note 267, at 165 (footnote omitted): 
The ultimate goal of transplantation is to be able to successfully treat all patients 
with end.stage renal disease with a cadaver kidney, after the shortest possible wait-
ing time on dialysis. Logistically, this is now possible. If we include the additional 
kidneys required for retransplantation, about 10,000 kidneys arc needed each year 
to treat all the patients in the United States who need them. In 1969, 56,400 people 
died in the United States in automobile accidents, and another 58,600 people died 
from other accidents. Even if we exclude all other potential donors, such as pa-
tients dying from brain tumors or cerebrovascular accidents, each donor has two 
kidneys, and only 5% of the total number of potential donors would supply enough 
kidneys for all patients with end-stage renal disease. 
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cost-benefit ratios303 would indicate t]lat society would benefit more 
if its resources were not expended on some transplants. For instance, 
a ninety-year-old man suffering the infirmities of age may want to 
transplant as many new parts as possible into his body in order to 
minimally increase his life expectancy. A more profitable use of 
medical manpower and facilities may well be found.304 In other 
words, even if the organ shortage is :resolved,, the shortage of medical 
resources forces a choice between transplantation and other programs 
and between one recipient as opposed to another. This section will 
concern itself not with the substantive issue of to whom the organs 
),Vill go, but with the threshold issue of who should best make the 
allocation decisions if a market system is implemented. 
There are t:w'O possible methods of decision-making. under a 
ma;J<.et system for organs. First, the market system could be allowed 
to operate free of regulation, and the use of organs could be deter-
mined simply by competitive forces. Second, the legislature could 
govern the field by statutory regulation or the establishment of an 
administrative agency. 
In an open market the individual makes his selling and buying 
decisions freely.806 Reconciliation between buyers and sellers deter-
mines the quantities and the prices of the factors of production and 
the various goods and services.806 There is no explicit decision-making 
process; rather, there are continuous decisions, by many actors, that 
collectively determine how resources will be allocated'. 
303. The basic technique of public expenditure evaluation is known as cost-benefit 
analysis. One attempts to compare the sacrifices and the gains that will result from a 
specific proposal by valuing both in dollars. See R. HAVEMAN, THE EcoNOMICS OF THE 
PunLic SEcroR 149-51 (1970). For examples of cost-benefit analysis as used in comparing 
dialysis with kidney transplantation, see text accompanying notes 189-95 supra. 
304. Professor Dukeminier has expressed concem that an end to the organ shortage 
will lead to the increased use of costly transplant techniques at the expense of other 
medical procedures. Dukeminier, supra note 26, at 860-61. See notes 184-95 supra and 
accompanying text. However, D~keminier's assumption that all available organs will be 
used is not valid. Even under the present scarcity some medical institutions choose not 
to undertake certain allograft operations when they decide that their resources can be 
more effectively directed to other procedures. Thus, highly e.'-perimental procedures, 
such as heart transplants, are less frequently undertaken because of their high cost and 
low success in relation to other health treatment techniques. (For the years 1971-1972, 
cardiac transplantation was undertaken at only a few scattered centers, and in 1972 13 
of 17 transplants undertaken were done at a single institution. Report, supra note 6, at 
1211. Between Jan. 1, 1968, and April I, 1973, only 27 teams performed all the 186 bone 
marrow transplants undertaken. Id. at 1212. See also Berg, Heart Transplants Are Not 
Enough, LooK, April 16, 1968, at 92; Wall St. J., Nov. 25, 1968, at 12, col. 2.) The effect 
of removing the scarcity would be to allow the decision of whether to transplant to be 
made free of the artificial constraint of a shortage of organs. See text accompanying 
notes 129-44 supra. 
305. See R. HAVEMAN, supra note 303, at 17-23; M. SPENCER, supra note 276, at 44-56 
(1971); Fuchs, What Kind of System for Health Care?, in SOCIAL POLICY FOR HEALTH 
CARE 92, 93-95 (1969). 
306. See R. HAVEMAN, supra note 303, at 17-23; M. SPENCER, supra note 276, at 22. 
1228 Michigan Law Review [Vol. '12:1182 
At first glance, the idea of a freely functioning market is appeal-
ing, but in practice it may be unworkable. A serious shortcoming 
would be the market's selection of recipients. Only potential recip-
ients who are able to pay the price necessary to induce a potential 
supplier to sell his parts would be able to receive a transplant. This 
runs counter to the policy, expressed in the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs and the current national health insurance proposals, 301 
that medical care should not be available solely to the wealthy.808 
The second major difficulty in allowing the free market to make 
allocation decisions is the possibility that anticompetitive conditions 
may develop. If a few sellers control the supply, the reconciliation 
function of the market will be performed inefficiently-prices will 
be higher, output will be restricted, and monopolists will be able to 
reap abnormal profits over an extended period of time.800 Two as-
pects of an organs market may encourage such a monopoly. 
1 First, a registry system that lists the tissue, blood type, and medi-
cal condition of all recipients and donors must be established if 
compatible buyers and sellers are to be able to contact each other. 
At least one state has already established a registry system, 810 and at 
least one interstate system is now being planned.811 A single, regu-
lated, national registry system, however, would allow optimal donor-
recipient matching at the lowest total cost.812 It would supply the 
market more efficiently than two or more registries because cost per 
unit serviced may fall as the registry grows larger.813 However, 
307. There have been a number of proposals for national health insurance in the 
United States. See Appendix B, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CON• 
FERENCE ON NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 289 (R. Eilers &: s. Moyerman ed. 1971). It is 
widely assumed that some form of national health insurance will soon be adopted. The 
debate concerns -0nly the best form. Eilers, Introduction, in id. at 1, I. One of the 
major reasons for the proposals is to provide increased medical care for those presently 
unable to afford proper care. See M. PAULY, MEDICAL CARE AT PUBLIC EXPENSE: A STUDY 
IN APPLIED WELFARE ECONOMICS 52 (1971). 
308. New York Academy of Medicine, A Policy Statement on the Role of Govern• 
ment Tax Funds in Problems in Health Care, in SOCIAL POLICY FOR HEALTH CARE, 
supra note 305, at 4, 5: "The availability of health services, as a matter of human 
right, should be based on health need alone, not on a test of ability to pay. The full 
attainment of this goal requires the broadest possible participation in the systems of 
financing health services, if individual dignity and self-dependency are to be enhanced." 
309. See R. HAVEMAN, supra note 303, at 24; M. SPENCER, supra note 276, at 407-09. 
310. In 1972 New Jersey established the nation's first statewide computerized central 
registry of dialysis patients for chronic kidney disease sufferers. N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 
1972, § 1, at 116, col. 3 (late city ed.). 
3ll. New York and New Jersey are cooperating with each other to establish a re• 
gional program. Id., Nov. 23, 1973, § 1, at 37, col. 5 (late city ed.). In a large part of 
Europe, a system termed "Eurotransplant" transmits data on potential recipients once 
a month to many of the continent's large medical institutions. Rood, Freudenberg, van 
Leeuwen, Schippers, Zweerus &: Terpstra, Eurotransplant, 3 TRANSPLANTATlON PROCEED• 
·1NGS 933 (1971). 
312. See N.Y. Times, March 26, 1969, § I, at 58, col. 8 (late city ed.). 
313. The classic example is a public utility. See M. SPENCER, supra note 276, at 400, 
May 1974] Notes 1229 
without governmental regulation, a single registry could reap high 
profits while continuing to under-price and drive out smaller com-
petitors, because its large size keeps its production costs low.314 
The first three sales market alternatives discussed above-which 
involve the sale of a future right in cadaver parts-present a second 
factor that might encourage monopolistic practices. Organ contracts 
would be made well before the organ would be used and the identity 
of the recipient known. A "middle man" would take the form of 
organizations that would record organ contracts, find ready buyers, 
and provide immediate transfer to them. In the absence of regula-
tion, such organizations could exercise a high degree of market 
control. 
Leaving allocation decisions to the free market presents a third 
difficulty; in addition to the problems of ensuring accessibility to the 
poor and preventing monopoly: The good in question-a human 
body part-can be valued only by a person with medical expertise, 
and neither the seller nor the recipient is likely to have that exper-
tise. The recipient's doctor, who can expertly value the part, may 
have no direct incentive to find the lowest priced organ· available. 
The present status of the drug market illustrates the difficulties 
that may arise. The prescribing physician, on his own initiative, 
orders the drug for which the patient must pay. The buyer has no 
practical means of evaluating the range of prices and quality within 
the market, 315 and, even with such information, he can only purchase 
the drug specified on the prescription.316 Although chemically iden-
tical drugs may be sold under different names at widely varying 
prices, the physician has no direct incentive to prescribe the brand 
with the lowest price.817 Drug advertisements virtually never men-
tion prices, and physicians' reference manuals do not list competitive 
prices.818 Instead, brand names are repeatedly stressed.319 In practice, 
approximately eighty-eight per cent of all prescriptions are written 
in terms of brand name.320 Doctors, who are extremely busy ;ind 
314. R. HAVEMAN, supra note 303, at 24-25. . 
315. Steele, Prices and Profits in the Drug Industry, 20 NEW PHYSICIAN 146, 147 
(1971). 
316. Id. Indeed, since most pharmacists determine retail cost of a drug by adding 
to the drug's wholesale cost a fixed percentage of that price-usually 65 to 100 pei; 
cent-the method may serve as an incentive to a pharmacist to -dispense the more 
expensive brand of a prescribed drug. TASK FORCE ON PRESCRIPTION DRUGS, U.S. DEPI'. 
OF HEALrn, EDUCATION,&: WELFARE, FINAL REPORT 16 (1969) [hereinafter TASK_ FORCE]. 
317. Steele, Monopoly and Competition in the Ethical Drugs Market, 5 J. I.Aw 
&: ECON. 131, 133 (1962). 
318. Id. at 142. 
319. Id. at 142. "There is probably no other industry in existence where the dis-
paragement of the quality of lower priced products can so completely substitute for 
actual price competition." Id. 
320. Steele, supra note 317, at 146. Although this recent article implies that the 
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uniformly prosperous,321 tend to dismiss cost problems given any 
doubt as to the quality of a drug.322 
Commentators argue that this consumer helplessness is one of 
the major reasons for the large differences in price between trade 
name and generic name drug products.823 A physician must similarly 
be relied on to select parts for his patients in an organ and tissue 
market. 
Moreover, market imperfections could be particularly acute in 
an organ and tissue market, because the need for the product usually 
arises only when the potential recipient needs extreme therapeutic 
aid. Because the buyer needs the product desperately and immedi-
ately and because there are few comparable substitutes,824 his de-
mand will be relatively inelastic,825 limited only by his financial 
resources.320 An inelastic demand prompts producers to seek to raise 
prices. Some protection is afforded if the supply market remains price 
competitive; the buyer can protect himself by seeking the lowest 
priced product from among a large number of sellers. Yet, if selling 
power is concentrated or if consumer information is restricted, prices 
can rise far above actual marginal cost.327 
In light of these difficulties, some government involvement in the 
allocation process is necessary. At one extreme, the government could 
become the only purchaser and distributor of organs. Setting prices 
so as to induce the proper supply and distributing the parts received 
figures are approximately the same today, it should be noted that the "88 per cent" 
figure comes from a 1958 survey. 
321. Steele, supra note 315, at 153. 
322. See Squibb, Drug Prices-The Achilles Heel of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
20 NEW PHYSICIAN 172, 174-75 (1971). Although it is argued that the same standards 
of purity are endorsed with respect to all drug makers by thp Food and Drug Ad-
ministration and that smaller drug, companies are inspected more often by the FDA, 
it is to be noted that, for the total samples inspected, the small firms had irregu• 
larities in 7.4 per cent of the samples tested while the large firms had irregularities 
in only I.I per cent of the samples tested. Steele, supra note 317, at 145. Even with 
this disparity, price differentials of up to 2,000 per cent are hard to justify. See 
Squibb, supra, at 173, 175. 
323. See Squibb, supra note 322, at 173; Steele, supra note 315, at 147, "For ••• 63 
products, the use of low-cost chemical equivalents could have reduced the total 
acquisition cost to the retailer from nearly S74.9 million to $33.4 million, • • • or 55,3 
P.ercent at the wholesale level." TASK FORCE, supra note 316, at 36. 
324. See text accompanying notes 136-40 supra. 
325. The need, and therefore the willingness of the purchaser to buy, will not 
change significantly as the price rises or declines. 
326. This phenomenon has already arisen in the drug market. Steele, supra note 
317, at 133. See generally Comanor, The Drug Industry and Medical Research, The 
Economics of the Kefauver Committee Investigations, 39 J. Bus. 12 (1966); Comanor, 
Research and Competitive Product Differentiation in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
in the United States, 31 EcoN. 372 (1964); Steele, supra note 315. 
327. Marginal cost is the change in total overhead costs resulting from the pro-
duction of another unit. See M. SPENCER, supra note 276, at 695. 
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to suitable recipients would be exclusively a govem:rnental adminis-
trative function. Tax revenues or user charges adjusted to income 
could be used to finance agency expenditures, either directly or 
through a system of transfer payments. Cost efficiency would be en- ' 
forced by the budgetary bureaucracy, subject to supervision by Con-
gress through the annual mechanism of budget approval. The major 
problem with the system would be the high costs to the government 
and the danger of bureaucratic inefficiency. The United States has 
already assumed responsibility, including the employment of medi~al 
professionals and the provision of operating facilities, for certain 
types of illnesses, such as mental illness, tuberculosis, and Ieprosy.328 
Great Britain's National Health Service has expanded the role of the 
government to provide free medical and health services for all mem-
bers of the community.329 -
At the other extreme, the government could allow maximum de-
velopment of private enterprise while imposing certain allocation 
patterns through regulation. Thus, a national registry syste:rn could 
be privately established but regulated as to the price charged for the 
listing service, in the nature of a public utility. Efficiency would be 
maintained by a governmental regulatory commission. Rates set by 
such commissions are typically based on the full (average-cost) cost 
pricing theory,330 under which the price allowed is equal to the sum 
of fixed and variable costs plus a normal profit. Prices set in this 
fashion can usually provid~ a fair rate of return on private invest-
ment.831 
Even minimum government regulation of organ allocation would 
doubtless concern itself with the bargaining position of the poor, 
probably necessitating a system of government transfer payments. 
The major problem with the institution of wide-scale transfer pay-
ments in a market setting is that unless the program is correctly 
designed the recipients will lose their incentive to seek out the low-
est priced units, causing severe inflationary pressures.332 In an at-
tempt to deal with such pressures, the payments may be c~anneled 
328. Burns, The Role of Govemmen.t in Health Services, in SOCIAL POLICY FOR 
HEALTH CARE, supra note 305, at 55. 
329. Id. See generally A. LINDSEY, SOCIAUZED MEDICINE IN ENGLAND A,ND WA:US: 
THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE, 1948-1961 (1962). 
330. See Milliman, Beneficiary Charges-Toward a Unified Theory, in PUBLIC 
PRICES FOR PUBLIC PRODUCTS 27, 32-34 (S. Mushkin ed. 1972). 
331. Id. at 32-34. 
332. It has been demonstrated that an individual, when provided with more ex-
tensive insurance against expenditures for health care, will make significantly more 
use of the available medical facilities and doctors. See H. KLARMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF 
HEALTH 32 (1965); Pauly, The Economics of Moral Ha:t.ard: Comment, 58 AM. EcoN. 
REV. 531; 533-34 (1968). The inflationary tendencies in the costs of medical care and 
doctpr salaries is usually explained in large part by the tremendous increase in demand 
for those facilities caused by increasing insurance coverage. See S. HARRIS, THE · 
ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN M£DICINE 66 (1964). 
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either to an intermediate supplier-the hospital-or to the potential 
recipient. If funds are routed to the hospitals, the funding body-the 
state or federal legislature-may or may not defer the institution's 
decisions with regard to resource allocation. Deference has three dis-
advantages: (1) There is evidence that doctors themselves are not 
always pleased with their present allocative authority.833 (2) Some 
aspects of the allocation decision are essentially nonmedical and 
should be debated and resolved in a public forum. (3) If the govern-
ment decides to bear the cost of transplant operations, hospitals may 
be reluctant to refuse a transplant to any potential recipient, and 
federal and state tax money may be spent on questionable cases. The 
last consideration is the most troublesome, for physicians may not 
have the time or incentive to be cost-conscious. These problems may 
be alleviated by conditioning the grants on compliance with govern-
mental guidelines that require the institutions to select out those 
cases that, in the opinion of the legislature, will waste medical re-
sources, or by placing monetary limits on grants to institutions in 
order to encourage efficiency. 
- Several alternatives to routing transfer payments to the hospital 
must also be considered. First, the payments could be made directly 
to the organ recipients. Direct payment could include a copayment 
scheme under which the government bears a certain percentage of 
the cost, or could take the form of a block payment.834 Both schemes 
are compatible with an efficient organ market because both prompt 
~e consumer to obtain the needed organ at the lowest possible price. 
In contrast, a scheme whereby the government simply pays 100 per 
cent of all transplant costs could lead to gross inefficiencies-the 
market would indeed be open to the poor but the lack of an incen-
tive to economize would lead to ballooning prices.880 Perhaps the 
prices could be controlled by administrative inspection of individual 
purchases and nonpayment of unreasonable expenditures. A similar 
scheme was approved in October 1972, when Congress extended to 
almost all persons Medicare protection against the costs of kidney 
transplants necessitated by chronic renal disease.836 Although the Act 
contemplates payment only for the medical services required, and 
333. See Hayes &: Gunnells, supra note 105; Nolen, Transplants: The Doctor As 
Executioner, 45 MED. EcoN., May 13, 1968, at 203; Shatin, Medical Ethics in a 
Changing World, MED. WoIU.D NEWs, May 20, 1966, at 63; Organ-Transplant Ethics: 
Let M.D.'s Decide!, 45 MED. EcoN., May 13, 1968, at 215. 
334. A block payment is a lump sum payment that would not vary with the cost 
of the organ. 
335. A lack of incentive to· economize pervades the provisions for whole blood 
paymehts under the Hospital Insurance :Benefits provisions of the Social Security Act. 
A qualifying patient is reimbursed for the entire cost of whole blood furnished as 
part of inpatient hospital services or posthospital care. The patient must only bear 
the cost of the first three pints. Inpatient Hospital Services, 20 C.F.R. § 405.123 (1973). 
336. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 426(e)•(g) (Supp. 1974). See 38 Fed. Reg, 17210 (1973). 
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not for the cost of the kidneys ·themselves, its attempts at price regu: 
. Iation are informative. Subsection (g) provides: · 
The Secretary is authorized to limit reiinbursement · under Medi-
care for kidney transplant and dialysis to kidney disease treatment 
centers which meet such requirements as he may by regulation pre-
scribe: Provided, that such requirements must include at least 
requirements for a minimal utilization rate for covered procedures 
and for a medical review board to screen the appropriateness of 
patients for the proposed treatment procedures.337 
"Requirements for a minimum utilization rate" apparentiy means 
that limits must be placed on the cost of transplant operations and a. 
minimum standard of performance established.338 Under the final 
regulations, reimbursement will be allowed only for "reasonable 
charges"; costs above the initial guidelines are to be reimbursed 
"only upon appropriate justifications."339 The penalty for cost_ in-
efficiency is thus disallowance of the· transfer payment aJ?.d, possibly, 
a revocation of the medical center's authorization as a transplant 
center.340 
Government participation in the allocation process could also 
take the form of broad legislation that· deals with transplantation 
costs only as part of the larger problem of distributing all health 
care. One scheme would be the government subsidy of group pre-
payment plans,341 which provide medical care for a set yearly fee 
that represents the individual's share of the total estimated ·health 
care costs of all the participants. The incentive· to economize is 
preserved because the plans' solvency dep!=!nds on holding down costs,. 
including transplant costs. Competition for participants ·among vari-
ous plans would keep the annual fee at a minimum. 
A more probable alternative is national health care legislation. 
Several proposals have recently been debated before the United States 
Congress.342 The three bills that have received the most attention 
are the Comprehensive Health Insurance Act, the Nixon administra-
337. 42 U.S.C.A. § 426(g) (Supp. 1974). 
338. See 38 Fed. Reg. 17210 (1973). 
339. 38 Fed. Reg. 17212 (1973). 
340. The interim regulations direct that payment for transplantation will be 
elrected only if the transplant center has consistently and productively undertaken 
kidney transplants before the Act's operation. 38 Fed. Reg. 17210 (1973). 
341. Under a group prepaid plan, the consumer contributes an annual sum to a 
medical institution, which uses the total contributions to service · completely the 
health needs of the subscribers. See generally Donabedian, An Evaluation. of Prepaid 
Group Practice, 6 INQUIRY, Sept. 1969, at 3; Klarman, Effect of Prepaid Group Practice 
on Hospital Use, 78 PUB. HEALTH REP., ;Nov. 1963, at 955; Note, The Role of Prepa·id 
Group Practice in Relieving the Medical Care· Crisis, 84 HARV. L. REv. 887 (1971). 
342. The Comprehensive Health Insurance Act of 1974, S. 2970, H.R. 12684, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Health Security Act, S. 3, H.R. 22, 23, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1973); Health Care Insurance Act of 1973, S. 444, H.R .• 2222, 93d. Cong;, 1st Sess. 
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tion. bill sponsored by Senator Packwood, Representative Schneelie, 
and Representative Mills; the Health Security Act, sponsored by 
Senator Kennedy and Representative Griffiths; and the National 
Health Insurance Program, sponsored by Senator Kennedy and Rep-
resentative Mills. The last bill, a compromise between the first two 
bills, has boosted hopes for major action on health insurance in the 
ninety-third Congress.343 The effect that each bill would have on the 
funding of transplant operations and, by analogy, on the funding of 
purchases of human body parts, illustrates current legislative thought 
on the proper degree of governmental regulation in the transplant 
area. In generaJ, the allocation provisions of all three bills are very 
loose; they would allow an administrative agency to establish exten-
sive regulatory criteria. The original Kennedy bill344 would establish 
funding for a complete system of hospital and medical care without 
a deductible amount requiring contributions from the patient. How-
ever, a "Health Security Board," set up in the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare,345 would have the authority to exclude 
"from-covered services medical or surgical procedures (and services 
incident thereto) which it finds both (1) are essentially experimental 
in character, and (2) because of cost or because of shortage of quali-
fied personnel or facilities cannot practicably be furnished on a 
nationwide basis."346 This provision would clearly apply to certain 
transplant procedures, such as heart transplants; however, the extent 
of the Board's authority to specify classes of individuals to be ex-
cluded from participating in specified transplant operations is un-
certain. The language suggests that the Board has authority only to 
accept a given procedure for all patients or to exempt it completely. 
Another section would allow the Board to allocate funding for each 
region by classes and subclasses of services.347 In defining these sub-
classes, the Board may be empowered to establish criteria for the 
inclusion of patients within a transplantation program. The section 
that provides that institutions be paid for "approved" operating costs 
(section 83) may also allow a significant amount of Board regulation 
of budgetary allocations by individual medical institutions. As a 
whole, the basic control structure under the original Kennedy bill 
(1973}; Catastrophic Health Insurance and Medical Assistance Reform Act, S. 2513, 
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); National Health Care Services Reorganization and Financ .. 
ing Act, H.R. I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); National Health Care Act of 1973, S. 1100, 
H.R. 5200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Comprehensive National Health Insurance Act 
of 1974, S. 3286, H.R. 13870, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). 
343. Kennedy.Mills Health Insurance Plan Introduced, 32 CONGRESSIONAL Q. Wr.EKLY 
REP., April 6, 1974, at 892. 
344. Health Security Act, s. 3, H.R. 22, 23, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). 
345. Health Sec'!lrity Act, S. 3, H.R. 22, 23, § 12I(a), 93d Cong., 1st Sess, (1973). 
346. ~ealth Security Act, S. 3, H.R. 22, 23, § 28(e), 93d Cong., 1st Sess, (1973). 
347. Health Security Act, S. 3, H.R. 22, 23, § 65, 93d Cong., 1st Sess, (1973), 
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is administrative, but there is no prohibition of administrative defer-
ence to hospital decision-making with regard to the allocation of 
money for transplantation purposes. 
The original Nixon administration proposal,348 in addition to 
providing federal assistance for the poor and for Medicare 'recipients, 
would require employers to provide standard comprehensive em-
ployee benefit plans. The plans must include payment for certain 
inpatient hospital services, but payment will not be made for "kidney 
dialysis or transplantation items and services, unless provided by a 
kidney dialysis center or transplantation center or facility which 
meets such requirements as the Secretary may by regulation pro-
vide . . . ."349 Some encouragement of price consciousness on the 
part of the patient is built into the proposal; there is a maximum 
deductible of 450 dollars per family and a 25 per cent copayment 
requirement for amounts exceeding 450 dollars. 
The compromise bill, the National Health Insurance Program,350 
would establish a program with standard benefits for all citizens 
except those eligible for Medicare. Transplant centers are. required 
to submit to agency regulation.801 The 25 per cent copayment feature 
of the original administration bill is eliminated, except as to drugs, 
but a 300 dollar maximum deductible per family is included.352 The 
cost of a transplant operation will typically be much greater than 300 
dollars, so that the patient's incentive for price consciousness was 
effectively eliminated by the removal of the copayment provision. 
A degree of prospective budgetary control over medical institutions 
is also provided. 
The most efficient system of resource allocation will probably 
be a combination of the operation of market forces ·with inputs from 
· medical and governmental institutions. To the extent that the 
government is involved, constitutional problems may arise under the 
fifth and fourteenth amendments. In particular, government defini-
tion of groups of patients who are eligible for transfer payments must 
respect the Supreme Court's decisions on unconstitutional classifica-
tions. Classifications on the basis of race,353 ancestry,354 or alienage355 
348. Comprehensive Health Insurance Act, S. 2970, H.R. 12684, 93d Co~g., 2d Sess. 
(1974). 
349. Comprehensive Health Insurance Act, S. 2970, H.R. 12684, .§ 184l(a)(2)(K), 
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). 
350. Comprehensive National Health Insurance Act of 1974, S. 3286, H.R. 13870, 
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). 
351. Comprehensive National Health Insurance Act, S. 3286, H.R. 138'70, 
§ 20ll(a)(2)(K), 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). 
352. The deductible amount decreases with family income; a family of four with 
income under $14,800 pays nothing. 
353. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
354. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1947). 
355. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
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have been held to be "suspect" and thus improper unless justified 
by a compelling state interest. Nonsuspect classifications must only 
be rationally related to a permissible statutory purpose.31;o Medical 
criteria, which would be nonsuspect, should easily meet this test.307 
The classifications would not have to be made with "mathematical 
precision"358 and would bear a presumption of validity.360 Whatever 
the classification, however, it may run afoul of the recently developed 
doctrine that a statutory classification cannot impose a conclusive 
presumption that all individuals of a statutory class possess the 
characteristics that cause the class to be burdened when certain 
individuals in the class do not in fact possess those characteristics.300 
For example, patients over a statutory age limit for transplants may 
contend that their life expectancy is longer than that specified by 
actuaries' tables and that the use of such tables violates their right to 
due process. If the courts accept that contention, they may require 
that individuals be given an opportunity to rebut the presumption. 
It is unlikely that legislatures or administrative agencies will 
restrict the exercise of medical expertise by promulgating highly 
explicit statutory criteria for the selection of recipients; a good 
deal of discretion will probably be left to the medical institutions.301 
Arguably, the serious consequences of excluding a patient from 
treatment require a hearing, self-representation by the patient, and 
other due process safeguards362 where federal funds are involved. 
However, many medical decisions have serious consequences, and 
356. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961). 
357. In welfare cases, for example, the Supreme Court has applied the minimum 
rationality standa,rd, exhibiting extreme deference to the legislative judgment. Jeffer-
son v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (unequal reductions in federal welfare programs); 
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) (reduction in social security benefits for • 
recipients of workmen's compensation); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) 
(AFDC benefit ceiling based on family size). 
· 358. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). 
359. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-80 (1911). 
360. See generally Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or 
Due Protection?, 72 MrcH. L. R.Ev. 800 (1974). 
361. For example, most states followed the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act's ambiv-
alent death criteria. See note 59 supra and accompanying text. 
The argument of those who oppose any codification of death standards-that it 
would unduly restrict medical research-applies with equal force to other state re• 
strictions on medical judgment. See Hearing on Death with Dignity Before the Senate 
Special Committee on the Aging, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 54, 63 (1972) (Statement of H. 
Beecher); Stason, The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 23 Bus. LAw. 919, 928 (1968); 
Sadler, Sadler 8: Stason, The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act-A Model for Reform, 
206 J.A.M.A. 2501, 2504 (1968); Note to § '1 of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, in 
HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 192. 
362. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (due process requires notice 
and hearing prior to termination of welfare payments); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 
395 U.S. 337 (1969) (due process requires a hearing for prejudgment garnishment); 
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) (notice and hearing required prior to re• 
moval of child from parent's custody). 
May 1974] Notes 1237 
courts, perhaps because of a deference to decisions that require sci-
entific expertise and that are often made in emergencies, have been 
reluctant to interfere.363 • 
V. THE LAw AND THE SALE OF Bony PARTS 
This section surveys the legal problems encountered in an at-
tempted sale of parts by a living source, in an attempted sale by an 
ind.ividual of his own cadaver parts, and in an attempted sale of 
cadaver parts by survivors entrusted with the right and duty of 
burial. In all three situations, the ambiguity of the present law and 
the threat of legal sanction, if allowed to continue, may discourage 
sales. 
A. The Living Source as Seller 
The sale of organs from a living. source has occasionally been 
attempted,364 apparently without giving rise to criminal prosecution. 
However, the attempted sale or donation of a vital organ would run 
afoul of state criminal sanctions against suicide.365 In most states 
the doctor in such a case would be guilty of murder, even if he acted 
at the request of the source.366 The buyer may also be liable for 
soliciting another to commit suicide or murder.367 
The sale of a nonvital organ by a living source is not prohibited 
by any state.368 Thus, nonvital bodily substances are routinely ex-
tracted and sold. For example, approximately one-half of the 
8,000,000 units of blood collected in the United States from 1965 to 
1967 were obtained by sale.369 Payment is also routinely ma_de for 
urine, skin, and samples of other bodily fluids.370 However, the possi-
363. For example, a physician is not normally liable for damages caused by a 
bona fide error in judgment if he uses normal care, skill, and knowledge in his 
diagnosis. See Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 475, 234 P.2d 34, 40 (1951); Hopper 
v. McCord, 115 Ga. App. IO, 11, 153 S.E.2d 646, · 647 (1967); Willard v. Hutson, 234 
Ore. 148, 160, 378 P.2d 966, 972 (1963). 
364. See Dukeminier, suP,ra note 26, at 811. , 
365. See, e.g., State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473, 121 S.E.2d 854- (1961). Six states make 
attempted suicide a crime. See Note, Criminal Law-Attempted Suicide, 40 N.C. L. 
REv. 323, 326 (1962). 
366. Cf. State v. Fransua, 510 P .2d 106, 1Q7 (N.M. App. 1973); Turner v. State, 
119 Tenn. 663, 108 S.W. 1139 (1908). 
367. See McMahan v. State, 168 Ala. 70, 53 S. 89 (1910); Commonwealth v. Bowen, 
13 Mass. 356 (1816). Cf. State v. Jones, 86 S.C. 17, 67 S.E. 160 (1910). A number of 
states treat inducing the suicide of another as a form of manslaughter or as a 
separate crime, rather than as murder. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-56 
(1958); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.15 (McKinney 1967). See also ALI MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 210.5(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). 
368. See Dukeminier, supra note 26, at 850. 
369. R. TlTMUSS, supra note 243, at 96. 
370. For example, at The University of Michigan medical research laboratories 
money is offered for various "services." D. E. Cohen · pays for sweat for use in his 
experiment on Plasma-Renin Mineralocorticoid Secretion, Sweat Sodium and Potas• 
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bility of civil or criminal liability should not be overlooked. A doctor 
who removes a nonvital organ for sale may be liable for assault and 
battery,871 traditionally defined as the unwarranted and unjustifiable 
infliction of bodily injury or an offensive touching. Consent is 
generally a defense to an assault and battery action, 372 but it may be 
ineffective in the transplant context because the "touching" to which 
the source consents is not for his medical benefit and indeed may 
cause him serious harm.373 
Section 2.11 of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code 
illustrates the danger that the source's consent may be ineffective: 
(2) Consent to Bodily Harm. When conduct is charged to constitute 
an offense because it causes or threatens bodily harm, consent to 
such conduct or to the infliction of such harm is a defense if: 
(a) the bodily harm consented to or threatened by the conduct 
consented to is not serious .... 374 
sium Concentration in Normal '·west African Blacks, American Blacks, and Cau• 
casians. Dr. J. Boorhees offered to buy skin samples for 35 dollars each for his 
e.xperiments on psoriosis. See 24 RESEARCH NEWS, Nov.-Dec. 1973, at 4 (University of 
Michigan, Office of Research Administration). 
371. ·while the two terms refer to separate legal concepts, in most criminal cases 
assault and battery exist together, thus the terms have here been meshed into a 
single concept. See Moreland v. State, 125 Ark. 24, 188 S.W. I (1916); Kirland v. State, 
43 Ind. 146 (1873); State v. Maier, 13 N.J. 235, 99 A.2d 21 (1953). In civil cases the 
distinction has been more clearly maintained. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 
100, § 10, at 37-38. 
372. See Vanactor v. State, 113 Ind. 276, 15 N.E. 341 (1888); Taylor v. State, 214 Md, 
156, 133 A.2d 414 (1957); Thibault v. Laumiere, 318 Mass. 72, 60 N.E.2d 349 (1945); 
Puttkammer, Consent in Criminal Assault, 19 ILL. L. REv. 617 (1925). 
373. Two other e.xceptions that vitiate the consent defense should be noted. First, 
consent is not a defense where the offensive act is prohibited by law. For example, 
some states hold that actors in mutual combat, because they are breaching the peace, 
are both criminally liable for assault and battery, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Coll• 
berg, 119 Mass. 350 (1876); cf. Champer v. State, 14 Ohio St. 437 (1863), and that one 
actor can be held liable to the other in a civil suit. See, e.g., Brown v. Patterson, 214 
Ala. 351, 108 S. 16 (1926); Morris v. Miller, 83 Neb. 218, 119 N.W. 458 (1909); Colley v. 
McClendon, 85 Okla. 293, 206 P. 207 (1922). Contra, Galbraith v. Fleming, 60 Mich. 
403, 407, 27 N.W. 581, 583 (1886). This exception is inapplicable because the remo\"al 
of an organ for sale by the owner is not clearly prohibited under present law, unless it 
is considered to be a criminal mayhem, which is unlikely. See text accompanying notes 
383-89 infra. 
Second, consent is no defense to sexual assault charges, because the act is a crime 
against the public generally, not just against the person assaulted. See Commonwealth 
v. Collberg, 119 Mass. 350 (1876); Taylor v. State, 214 Md. 156, 133 A.2d 414 (1957); 
The King v. Donovan, [1934] 2 K.B. 498 (C.A.). Even if this exception is extended 
beyond charges of sexual assault to encompass any crime against the public, it is 
nqt likely to encompass organ sales. The donation of an organ from a living source 
has been widely accepted, see text accompanying notes 75-76 supra, and, in the absence 
of an express legislative prohibition, the receipt of compensation would not seem to 
be a modification that would so affect the public sensibilities that the sale should be 
classified with grievous sexual assaults. See Taylor v, State, 214 Md. 156, 133 A.2d 
414 (1957). 
374. ALI MODEL PENAL Con.E § 2.11(2)(a) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). Under 
"Simple Assault," the Code notes: "Simple assault is a misdemeanor unless committed 
in a fight or scuflle entered into by mutual consent, in which case it is a petty mis• 
demeanor." Id. § 211.1(1). 
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Read literally, the Model Penal Code may raise barriers to sales by 
living sources. It defines "serious bodily injury" as bodily injury 
that includes "permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or im-
pairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.''375 This 
definition would encompass the removal of an organ and would thus 
remove transplant operations from the protection that consent would 
afford under section 2.11(2)(a). · 
However, a doctor may be protected from liability by two other 
provisions. Section 2.12, "De Minimis Infractions," permits a court 
to dismiss a prosecution when the defendant's act is "within a cus-
tomary license or tolerance"376 or "presents such other extenuations 
that it cannot reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the legislature 
in forbidding the offense."377 The former provision would not be 
helpful because organ sales are, at present, relatively uncommon. 
However, the latter provision could be used if, as is likely, it can be 
demonstrated that the legislature did not intend to reach organ and 
tissue sales. The doctor may also be protected under section 
3.08(4)(a), which exempts a defendant from liability when "[t]he 
force is used for the purpose of administering a recognized form of 
treatment which the actor believes to be ada,pted to promoting_ the 
physical or mental health of the patient.''378 However, "treatment" 
may refer only ·to the effect on the source. One dictionary defines _ 
"to treat" a patient as "to care for" or "to seek [a] cure or relief" for 
him,879 and the removal of an organ does not fall within those cate-
gories with respect to the source. But the term "tr~atment" could 
be read more broadly. Transplant operations _are "recognized forms 
of treatment" when the recipients are considered, and the removal 
of an organ from the source could be considered one phase of that 
overall process. The "promotion of health"
1 
provision, however, 
refers only to the health of the "patient." When the "patient" is the 
seller of an organ, his most obvious benefit is merely financial.880 But, 
as demonstrated above, 381 donative transactions have been permitted 
on the ground that the donor receives spiritual and psychological 
benefit from his sacrifice, typically to aid-a member of his family. 
That benefit, which may be construed as promoting the patient's 
"mental health," would arguably also exist where the organ is sold, 
for another person will still be aided by the seller's decision.882 The 
375. Id. § 210.0(3). 
376. Id. § 2.12(1). 
377. Id. § 2.12(2). 
378. Id. § 3.08(4)(a). 
379. WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL D1crioNARY 2699 (2d ed. 1960). 
380. Cf. State v. Bass, 255 N.C. 42, 120 S.E.2d 580 (1961) (physician convicted of 
being an accessory to mayhem for anes~etizing a patient's hand so that the patient 
could cut off his fingers in order to recover on an · insurance policy). 
381. See section II(B) supra; note 389 infra. 
382. See text accompanying note 120 supra. 
1240 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 72:1182 
fact that the seller receives a financial reward is merely an additional 
factor; it need not cancel the spiritual or psychological enjoyment 
that the source would otherwise receive. In any case, the drafters 
of the Code apparently did not consider the transplant !iituation. A 
legislative modification specifically addressed to the problem would 
be appropriate: 
Another possible legal barrier to organ sales is the crime 0£ 
mayhem. Where still in fo!ce, it may pose problems for the doctor 
who removes the organ. Mayhem is differently defined by state 
statutes,383 but it typically refers to a willful, malicious,884 and 
permanent:385 disfigurement or disablement of the body, accompanied 
by a breaking of the skin.886 Some cases have rejected consent as a 
defense to mayhem,387 but they involved sado-masochistic practices 
that clearly served no socially useful purpose.888 The principle should 
not be extended to organ transplants, which do have significant 
social benefits.389 
The case for allowing sales of organs from living sources is weak-
est where a parent attempts to sell the organ of his child. Courts are 
solicitous of the child's rights even in donation cases where the 
383. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE § 203 (West 1970) (one who unlawfully and 
maliciously deprives "a human being of a member of his body, or disables, disfigures, 
or renders it useless, or cuts or disables the tongue, or puts out an eye, or slits the 
nose, ear, or lip" is guilty of mayhem). See generally 53 AM. JuR. 2d, Mayhem and 
Related Offenses §§ 1-5 (1940). 
384. See, e.g., Key v. State, 71 Tex. Crim. 642, 161 S.W. 121 (1913); Bowers v. 
State, 24 Te.x. App. 542, 7 S.W. 247 (1888). 
385. See, e.g., State v. Foster, 156 La. 891, 101 S. 255 (1924); State v. Raulie, 40 
N.M. !HS, 59 P.2d 359 (1936). 
386. See, e.g., State v. Gibson, 67 W. Va. 548, 68 S.E. 295 (1910), See generally 
Annot., 58 A.L.R. 1320 (1929). 
387. See, e.g., State v. Bass, 255 N.C. 42, 120 S.E.2d 580 (1961); The King V, 
Donovan, [1943] 2 K.B. 498 (C.A.); 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES •127b. 
388. See Dukeminier, supra note 26, at 853. See, e.g., State v. Bass, 255 N.C. 42, 120 
S.E.2d 580 (1961), discussed in note 380 supra. Cf. Jessin v. County of Shasta, 274 
Cal. App. 737, 747, 79 Cal. Rptr. 359, 365 (1969). The court held that a vasectomy 
did not constitute mayhem because it had minor effect and was performed with a 
lack of malice. The commentators had been divided on the question of whether 
voluntary sterilization constituted mayhem or battery. See Note, Sterilization: A 
Continuing Controversy, 1 U. SAN FRAN. L. REv. 159 (1966); Note, Elective Sterilization, 
113 U. PA. L. REv. 415 (1965). 
389. See Beecher, Scarce Resources and Medical Advancement, 98 DAEDALUS 275, 
304 (1969): "Any maiming of a patient should be for his benefit. • ·• • The donor 
loses a kidney, but has spiritual gain in bis sacrifice"; Schreiner, Problems of Ethics 
in Relation to Haemodialysis and Transplantation, in ETHICS, supra note 67, at 126, 
130-31 (1966): "Man obviously has the. right to maim himself; he can amputate bis 
leg or cut off an infected area if it is for the good of his whole organism. If giving 
a kidney is for his spiritual or psychiatric good, and this is recognized as part of 
the ·total person, ••• the particular mutilation becomes quite permissible under the 
extension of the principle of physical totality to the totality of a spiritual person," 
See also section IIB supra. 
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recipient is a relative.890 When donation has been allowed, it has 
been justified on the ground of the pyschological benefit to the source 
due to the continued existence of his sibling or on the ground that 
the benefit to the recipient outweighs the medical risk to the donor, 
and thus the family as a whole is benefited. Neither rationale is 
present when a minor's organ is sold to a stranger, and such sales 
should not be allowed. 
B. The Sale of Cadaver Parts 
The history of cadaver disposition has undoubtedly been greatly 
influenced by the superstitions that surround the dead body. In 
England, from the time of the Norman Conquest until the nine-
teenth century,891 the right of disposition of a body was solely within 
ecclesiastical cognizance,892 perhaps because of the church's concern 
for the prevention of sacrilege: "The Church took the body to itself. 
It held that a corpse was appropriated by it, by divine service and 
consecrated burial. The spirit departed to the realms of the super-
natural; the body was held by the divine agent to await resurrec-
tion."393 Others have suggested that the authority to dispose of 
corpses was a necessary outgrowth of the church's exclusive ownership 
of burial grounds and its exercise of probate jurisdiction.39i What-:-
ever the source of their jurisdiction, the ecclesiastical courts handled 
all controversies respecting interment and disinterment of corpses, 
including the regulation of the place and type of burial.395 The 
common law courts upheld the right of every person-except the 
felon, the heretic, and the suicide-to be buried without fee in 
the consecrated ground of his parish churchyard396 and protected 
390. See text accompanying notes 83-97 supra. 
391. By an ordinance of William the Conqueror, the temporal and spiritual juris-
dictions were severed and control of churchyards and burials was absorbed by the 
ecclesiastical authorities. Taylor, Right of Sepulture, 53 AM. L. REv. 359, 359 (1919). 
392. The term "dead body" is synonymous with the word "corpse," and does not 
include the remains of a human body that has long since decomposed. See, e.g., 
Carter v. City of Zanesville, 59 Ohio St. 170, 178, 52 N.E. 126, 127 (1898); 1 R. BURN, 
ECCLl:SIAsrICAL LAW 261 (9th ed. 1842); 1 R. PHILLIMORE, ECCLESIASTICAL LAW 857 
(1873). 
393. P. JACKSON, supra note 209, at 126. 
394. R. BURN, supra note 392, at 271; Law of Burial, 4 .Brad. Surr. App. at 503, 
519 (1857) (note taken from the report of Referee Samuel B.~Ruggles in In re Beek-
man Street (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1856)) [hereinafter Beekman Street Report]. 
395. To sense the scope of this jurisdiction consider the following rulings: Traitors 
who died after sentencing but before execution were still entitled to a Christian 
burial, 1 R. PHILLIMORE, supra note 392, at 856-57; a corpse could be interred within 
an iron casket but the parish had the right to demand a higher burial fee, Gilbert 
v. Buzzard &: Boyer, 161 Eng. Rep: 1342 (Consist. Ct. 1820); the church controlled 
the content of the inscription of tombstones, Breeks v. Woolfrey, 163 Eng. Rep. 304 
(Arches Ct. 1838). ' 
396. Kemp v. Wickes, 161 Eng. Rep. 1320 (Arches Ct, 1809). 
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the tangible memorials of the deceased, 391 but they could not affect the 
"mode of burial" or the disposition and right of control of the body. 
Thus, although it was larceny to take the winding sheet from a dead 
body, 398 it was not a felony to steal the body itself.300 In the latter 
part of the seventeenth century the common law courts began to 
assert criminal jurisdiction over religious offenses,400 but, in deference 
to the ecclesiastical tribunals, they continued to hold that no civil 
action in favor of the spouse or the next of kin could be maintained 
against one who has appropriated or defacea the body. 
Lord Coke noted, in 1797, under the title "Of Buildings" in his 
third Institute, that 
[i]t is to be ob[s]erved, that in every [s]epulcher, that hath a monu-
ment, two things are to be con[s]idered, viz. the monument, and the 
[s]epulture or buriall of the dead. The buriall of the Cadaver (that 
is caro data vermibus ["flesh given to worms"] is nullius in bonis, 
and belongs to eccle[s]ia[s]tical cogni[z]ance, but as to the monument, 
action is given ... at the common law for defacing thereof.401 
This quotation has been read as indicating something more than 
mere deference to ecclesiastical authority. Most English cases, even 
after the decline of the ecclesiastical courts, once cited Coke ap-
provingly for the proposition that no one has a property right in a 
dead body.402 The survivors had no right of replevin for a body taken 
from them, 403 nor could they maintain a trespass action for an un-
397. Beekman Street Report, supra note 394, at 519: "The tomb-stone, the armorial 
escutcheons-even the coat and pennons, and ensigns of honor, whether attached to 
the church ·edifice or elsewhere-were raised, as 'heir-looms,' to the dignity of inherit• 
able estates, and descended from heir to heir, who could hold even the parson liable 
of taking them down or defacing them." See also Haynes' Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1889 
(K.B. 1614). 
398. Haynes' Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1389 (K.B. 1614). 
399. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMl\lENTARIES •236: "[B]ut stealing the corpse itself, which 
has no owner (though a matter of great indecency) is no felony • • • ."; 2 E. EAST, 
PLEAS oF THE CROWN 652 (1806) (Dr. Handyside's case). 
400. See Taylor's Case, 86 Eng. Rep. 189 (K.B. 1676) (prosecution for uttering 
blasphemous expressions). In Rex v. Lynn, 100 Eng. Rep. 394 (K.B. 1788), the defendant 
was convicted of entering a burying ground, taking a coffin from tl1e earth, and 
dissecting the corpse. The defense had argued that only the ecclesiastical court had 
jurisdiction: "The Court said that common decency required that the practice should 
be put a stop to. That the offence was cognizable in a Criminal Court, as being 
highly indecent, and contra bonos mores; at the bare idea alone of which nature 
revolted." 100 Eng. Rep. at 395; 4 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 59 n.24 a. Wendell 
ed. 1854). (note by W. N. Welsby to 21st London ed. 1844). 
401. 3 E. COKE, INsrITurES •203. 
402. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 20 Ch. D. 659 (1881); Foster v. Dodd, L.R. 
3 Q.B. 67 (1867); The King v. Lynn, 100 Eng. Rep. 394 (K.B. 1788). But see The 
Queen v. Fox, 114 Eng. Rep. 95 (Q.B. 1841). 
403. See Dust to Dust, 9 SoL. J. 3 (1864). The article notes two cases, one involving 
tlle body of a sister who died in a "house of ill-fame at Pimlico," and another in• 
volving that of a husband who died in a brothel near Waterloo, where the surviving 
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authorized mutilation or dissection of the body. Lord Coke's state-
ment has been severely criticized with regard to its etymological 
interpretation of the word "cadaver"404 and its lack of historical 
justification.405 Its use to support the proposition that no one has 
property rights in a corpse has also been c;riticized: 
But even the dictum itself, if closely examined, will not be found 
to assert, that no individual can have any legal interest in a corpse. 
It does not at all assert that the corpse, but only that the "buriall" 
is "nullius in bonis," and this assertion was legally true in England,-
where it was made, for the peculiar reason above stated-that the 
temporal office of burial had been brought ·within the exclusive legal 
cognizance of the Church, who could and would enforce all neces-
sary rules for the proper sepulture and custody of the body, thus 
rendering an individual action in that respect unnecessary.406 
Further doubt is casteon the accuracy of Coke's statement as of 
the time it was made when it is noted that, until the case of Jones v. 
Ashburnham,401 a corpse could be arrested by a creditor for a debt 
due from the deceased.408 However, Burn, in his treatise on ecclesias-
tical law, argues that no support for this procedure can be found in 
the Roman law and that the justification for such an arrest was 
derived from a misapplication of the technical language of the writ 
of execution.409 The writ directs the sheriff to have the "body of the 
brother and wife were unable. to retrieve the bodies for burial. "The remarkable 
thing is, that the state of the law respecting dead bodies should give opportunity 
for the outrage against decency, of withholding thus from the persons whose legal 
or natural duty it is to provide for their burial. These brothel-keepers and the like 
would be deterred by fear of the law from avowedly detaining the hat or umbrella 
of the deceased, or, if they did, the police magistrate would well know how to give 
redress against them; but when they refuse to give up the body, which in common· 
speech, but not in the language of the law of property, is the body of the deceased, 
neither the common law nor the statute law affords any direct remedy.'' Id. 
404. Referee Samuel B. Ruggles took issue with Coke's construction of the Latin 
noun cadaver from caro data vermibus ["flesh given to worms'1: "[W]e may possibly 
question both the wisdom and the etymology of this verbal conceit, this fantastic 
and imaginery gift, or outstanding grant to the worms. • • • In Latin, it was a 
'cadaver,' only because it was something fallen (d cadendo), even as the remains of 
fallen cities, in the letter of Sulpicius to Cicero . • • , are denominated 'cadavera 
oppidorum.'" Beekman Street Report, supra note 394, at 520. 
405. "In the English jurisprudence, a corpse was not ·given or granted to the 
worms, but it was taken and appropriated by the Church." Beekman Street Report, 
supra note 394, at 520; Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 472, 480 (1952): "But while this excursion 
into etymology brought Coke into ridicule, it seems never to have occurred to anyone 
that his law might have been as bad ll!i his Latin.'' 
406. Beekman Street Report, supra note 394, at 521. 
407. 102 Eng. Rep. 905 (K.B. 1804). 
408. In 1700 the body of the poet Dryden was arrested from his funeral train 
on the way to burial, and in 1784 the body of Sir Barnard Turner was arrested 
from a funeral procession for the nonpayment of his debts. Guernsey, Ownership of 
a Corpse Before Burial, 4 Redf. Surr. App. at 527, 532 (N.Y. 1881). 
409. R. BURN, supra note 392, at 258b. 
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debtor" at Westminster on the day of payment "in order to satisfy 
the plaintiff for his debt"410 and does not specify whether the body 
need be living. Accordingly, Bum adopts Coke's position that there 
was never authority in the common law for such an arrest. 
Whether Lord Coke declared the law for what it was, whether 
he fashioned it into what it became, or whether his use of the term 
nullius in bonis was simply misinterpreted is now of little or no 
consequence. Generations of judges and legal writers have copied 
and recopied Coke's epigram as authority for the doctrine that there 
are no property rights in a corpse.411 
The harsh criticism of the heavy influence that the Coke state-
ment has had on the courts of later years412 may be unfair. The 
epigram was probably widely adopted because it suited the sentiment 
of the times. An accelerating trade in bodies for the purpose of dis-
section-the "resurrection trade"413-had · led to grave robbing, 
which, coupled with the holding of corpses for payment of the de-
cedent's debts, deeply offended the moral sensibilities of the English 
population.414 Coke's statement could be used to prohibit the sale of 
corpses, and the law could thus be adapted to conform to public 
mores. 
Lord Coke did not leave corpses or the rights of the next of kin 
wholly without protection. At the time he wrote, ecclesiastical courts 
could and did prevent unwarranted molestation.41i: Even the com-
mon law courts, although refusing to recognize private rights in the 
body, imposed criminal sanctions for certain acts concerning corpses. 
Interference with another's right to bury' a dead body was made a 
coinmon law crime in the early nineteenth century-not as stealing 
or damaging property belonging to another, but as an offense against 
410. Id. 
411. Beekman Street Report, supra note 394, at 521. 
412. "What is amazing is that so many generations of judges were so short on 
ingeniousness that in telling emotionally convulsed suppliants that disturbance of 
their loved ones' bones wrought them no injury, they could do no better than to 
make ipse dixit reference to Coke's nibble by the wayside." Annot,, 21 A.L.R.2d 
472, 481 (1952). 
418. See Note, supra note 21, at 41. 
414. That sensibilities are still easily aroused is evidenced by New York doctors' 
comments when questioned about their cadaver shortage for teaching. They were 
very careful to stress that they were not buying bodies but only paying for their 
transportation from other parts of the country. N.Y. Times, June 25, 1972, § 1, at 1, 
col. 2 (late city ed.). Cf. C. POLSON, R. BRIITAJN &: T. MARSHALL, THE DISPOSAL OF THE 
DEAD 4-5 (1953). See also Colbert &: Kirtley v. Shepard, 89 Va. 401, 16 S.E. 246 (1892). 
The court lashed out at real estate agents who undertook to profit from the presence 
of th_e' grave of, Washington's mother on land they were seeking to sell. 
415. "The carcase that is hurried belongeth to no one, but is subject to ecclesias-
tical cognizance, if abused or removed." 1 R. BURN, supra note 392, at 271a. 
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public decency.416 It was also made a crime_ for a person who had 
the duty of burial to sell the body for purposes of dissection.417 
The absence of an ecclesiastical jurisdiction in America left a 
gap with respect to the law of corpses. Because the American system 
rejects the spiritual control of temporal aff~rs, American courts never 
considered themselves bound by ecclesiastical decisions.418 Moreover, 
the English precedents in the area of interments could not have been 
of much aid even if they had been respected. In England there was 
ordinarily only one proper place to inter a corpse-the churchyard 
of the decedent's parish.419 In the United States, there is more choice 
as to burial place and method, in part because of the variety of 
religions practiced by American citizens. The only limits placed 
on burial procedures are those of decency and sanitation.420 
The course of American law in this area was set by the report of 
Referee Samuel B. Ruggles in In re Beekman Street.421 The City 
of New York, in order to widen a street, condemned part of an 
eighteenth century burial ground in which one Moses Sherwood 
had been buried for over half a century. His daughter claimed com-
pensation for the disturbance of her father's remains;· Although no 
English court would have awarded recovery,422 Ruggles concluded 
that the daughter should be indemnified for the cost of removing 
and reinterring the body. Relying in part on his interpretation of 
Roman law, Ruggles outlined the entire breadth of rights in the 
area: 
I. That neither a corpse, nor its burial, is legally subject, in any 
way, to ecclesiastical cognizance, nor to sacerdotal power of any kind. 
2. That the right to bury a corpse and to preserve.its remains, 
is a legal right, which the courts of law will recognize and protect. 
3. That such a right, in the absence of any testamentary disposi-
tion, belongs exclusively to the next of kin. 
4. That the right to protect the remains includes the right to 
preserve them by separate burial, to select the place of sepulture, and 
to change it at pleasure. _ 
5. That if the place of burial be taken for publi~ use, the next 
416. See, e.g., The Queen v. Scott, 114 Eng. Rep. 9'7 (Q.B. 1842); The King v. Lynn, 
100 Eng. Rep. 394 (K.B. 1'788); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 400, at 65 n.24 (note by 
W. N. Welsby to 21st London ed. 1844). 
41'7. See, e.g., The King v. Cundrick, I'll Eng. Rep. 900 (K~. 1822); The King v. 
Lynn, 100 Eng. Rep. 394 (K.B. 1'788). 
418. See, e.g., Darey v. Presbyterian Hosp., 202 N.Y. 259, 95 N.E. 695 (1911); Medical 
College v. Rushing, 1 Ga. App. 468, 5'7 S.E. 1083 (190'7). _ 
419. P. JACKSON, supra note 209, at 24, See Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 4'72, 4'78 (1952). 
420. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Board of Health, 200 Mass. 4'74, 86 N.E. 925 (1909); Page 
v. Symonds, 63 N.H. 1'7 (1883). 
421. See Beekman Street Report, supra note 394; Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 4'72, 482 
(1952). -
422. See note 415 supra. 
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of kin may claim to be indemnified for the expense of removing and 
suitably reinterring their remains.423 
Although Ruggles's use of Roman law was questionable,424 and all 
but the last point was dictum, his points were adopted by other 
courts,425 perhaps because they provided needed flexibility and 
certainty. The influence of Lord Coke's dictum was still apparent in 
the fact that Ruggles made no reference to commercial property 
rights in a dead body, and later cases held that no such "commercial'· 
rights existed.426 
There has been considerable debate on the proper characteriza-
. tion of the right to burial. Some courts consider it to be a family 
relational interest-the interest that a close relative has in the treat• 
ment of the body of a deceased relative.427 Other courts hold that it 
is simply a property right.428 The most common view is that the right 
to bury the body has "quasi-property" qualities for limited pur• 
poses.429 The person who possesses the right is not the owner of the 
body; he holds it in trust for those who may have an interest in its 
disposition because of family relationship or friendship.430 
I. The Sale of One's Own Cadaver Parts 
An individual's right to a "decent" burial is generally recog• 
nized.431 This right, coupled with the right of the public to a sanitary 
423. Beekman Street Report, supra note 394, at 519. 
424. The opinion was sharply criticized for its scholarship in Guernsey, TIie 
Ownersliip of a Corpse Before Burial, 10 CENT. L.J. 303, 304 (1880): "He asserted 
[the right of burial and compensation] in an obiter opinion which is full of error 
of law and fac~, and will mislead those who look no further into the subject, in 
which report he censores Lord Coke and an unbroken line of numerous common 
law decisions •••• " 
425. See cases cited in note 429 infra. 
426. Weld v. Walker, 130 Mass. 422 (1880); Sacred Heart of Jesus Polish Natl, 
Catholic Church v. Soklowski, 159 Minn. 331, 199 N.W. 81 (1924); Keyes v. Southern 
R.R., 147 N.C. 394, 61 S.E. 278 (1908). 
427. See Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849 (1912); Green, Relational 
Interest, 29 ILL. L. R.Ev. 460, 485 (1934); W. PROSSER, supra note 100, § 12, at 58-59: 
In these cases the courts have talked of a somewhat dubious "property right" 
to the body, usually in the next of kin, which did not exist while the decedent 
was living, cannot be conveyed, can only be used for the one purpose of burial, 
and not only has no pecuniary value but is a source of liability for funeral 
expenses. It seems reasonably. obvious that such "property" is something evolved 
out of thin air to meet the occasion, and that it is in reality the personal feelings 
of the survivors which are being protected, under a fiction likely to deceive no 
one but a lawyer. 
428. See, e.g., Reniham v. Wright, 125 Ind. 536, 25 N.E. 822 (1890). 
429. See, e.g., Donnell v. Sloak, 123 Cal. 285, 55 P. 906 (1899); Pettigrew v. Petti• 
grew, 207 Pa. 313, 56 A. 878 (1904); Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227 (1872). 
430. See, e.g., Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 21 Ala. App. 5, 105 S. 
161, cert. denied, 213 Ala. 413, 105 S. 168 (1925); Teasley v. Thompson, 204 Ark. 959, 
165 S.W .2d 940 (1942); Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, IO R.I. 227 (1872). 
431. Anderson v. Acheson, 132 Iowa 744, 110 N.W. 335 (1907); Holland v. Metalious, 
105 N.H. 290, 198 A.2d 654 (1964); Patterson v. Patterson, 59 N.Y. 574 (1875). 
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and inoffensive disposition of the dead, 482 is enforced by a common 
law433 and, in some states, statutory434 right and duty of specified in-
dividuals to bury the dead. The right to a decent burial, however, 
does not entitle the decedent to specify the manner in which he is 
to be buried.485 
Nevertheless, the deceased' s preferences may be given , great 
weight as qualifications on the survivors' right to bury the corpse in 
the same way that that right is qualified by the desires of other 
friends and family.436 The limited right of the decedent to determine 
the disposition of his remains under this theory is a personal right, 
not a property right.437 The disposition is thus not included in the 
probate estate,438 and the decedent's wishes do not carry the legal 
weight normally attached to testamentary dispositions:189 The de-
cedent's directions will normally be honored in court, but they have 
been defeated by strong objections from close relatives, especially 
from the surviving spouse.440 
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act added new statutory force 
to an individual's wish to donate his body to a medical school or to 
another for medical research or transplantation.441 The gift, if prop-
erly made and witnessed, can be revoked only by the donor hini-
self.442 However, it is not clear that the Act aids the person who seeks 
remuneration for his organs, for the Act is phrased entirely in terms 
of gifts.443 Interpreted literally, it does not reach the sale of body 
parts. 
432. See, e.g., Memorial Gardens Assn. v. Smith, 16 Ill. 2d 116, 156 N.E.2d 587, 
appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 31 (1959); In Te Reinhardt, 202 Misc. 424, 114 N.Y.S.2d 208 
(Kings County Surr. Ct. 1952). 
433. See, e.g., In Te Reinhardt, 202 Misc. 424, 114 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Kings County Surr. 
Ct. 1952); In Te Kraemer's Estate, 183 Misc. 101, 46 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Bronx County 
Surr. Ct. 1944). , 
434. See, e.g., In Te Cornitius' Estate, 154 Cal. App. 2d 422, 316 P.2d 438 (1957); 
Phillips v. Home Undertakers, 192 Okla. 597, 138 P.2d 550 (1943). 
435. The right is mainly concerned with assuring a sanitary and decent burial 
and not with the particular mode or manner of burial. See Seaton v. Commonwealth, 
149 Ky. 498, 149 S.W. 871 (1912). 
436. See Sacred Heart of Jesus Polish Natl. Catholic Church v. Soklowski, 159 Minn. 
331, 199 N.W. 81 (1924). See generally Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 747 (1966). . 
437. Guerin v. Cassidy, 38 N.J. Super. 454, 119 A.2d 780 (1955). See also Fischer's 
Estate v. Fischer, 1 Ill. App. 2d 528, 117 N.E.2d 855 (1954); Fidelity Union Trust Co. 
v. Heller, 16 N.J. Super. 285, 84 A.2d 485 (1951). 
438. Fischer's Estate v. Fischer, 1 Ill. App. 2d 528, 117 N.E.2d 885 (1954). 
439. See, e.g., Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Heller, 16 N.J. Super. 285, 84 A.2d 485 
(1951). 
440. See Sacred Heart of Jesus Polish Natl. Catholic Church v. Soklowski, 159 Minn. 
331, 199 N.W. 81 (1924). See generally Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 747 (1966). 
441. See text accompanying note 33 suprn. 
442. See text accompanying notes 38-42 supra. 
443. For example, section 2(a) provides that any individual of sourid mind and 
18 years of age or more may give all or any part of his body for any -purposes specified 
in section 3, the gift to take effect upon death. 
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E. Blythe Stason, the chairman of the committee that drafted the 
Act, noted that it was intended neither to encourage nor to prohibit 
sales: "It is possible, of course, that abuses may occur if payment 
should customarily be demanded; but every payment is not neces-
sarily unethical . . . . On the other hand drafting a statutory pro-
vision to preclude payment will not be easy. Until the matter of 
payment becomes a problem of some dimensions, the matter should 
be left to the decency of intelligent human beings."444 This comment 
is of little help. Did Stason mean that the Act does not cover any 
aspect of a transfer for which remuneration was received, thereby 
leaving the entire transaction to other statutory and common law 
protections? Or is the Act to govern the effect of the transfer of an 
organ (that is, its finality and irrevocability) regardless of remunera-
tion, while leaving the enforcement of the remunerative aspect of 
the contract to other legal propositions? 
Only Delaware expressly prohibits remuneration to sources.44G 
Arguably, other states would have been more explicit in enacting 
their versions of the Uniform Act if they wanted to prohibit organ 
sales. They may have felt that the "gift" language of the Act did not 
extend to sales, 446 but there is no language that would bar sales. If 
sales are neither covered nor expressly prohibited, a source can con-
ceivably make a contract to donate his body to a specific individual 
under the Act and can receive compensation for making that contract. 
The alternative is that the_ common law provisions ·on cadaver dis-
position govern and the body cannot be sold. 
Perhaps an indication of legislative intent can be found in those 
state statutes-either versions of the Uniform Act447 or the implied 
warranty sections of article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code448-
that define the transfer of blood and other human tissues, including 
organs, as services (rather than sales), whether or not any remunera-
tion is paid. These provisions may imply that a sales transaction is 
444. Stason, supra note 2i?, at 928. 
445. See note 56 supra. 
446. Six states had expressly prohibited payment for donations under their pre• 
Uniform Act anatomical donation statutes. Law of Aug. 1, 1968, ch. 429, § 1, [1967] 
Del. Laws 1773, 1773 (repealed 1970); Law of May 20, 1967, ch. 94, § 1 [1967] Hawaii 
Laws 91, 91 (repealed 1969); Law of April 24, 1961, ch.· 315, § 1, Md. Laws 397, 398 
(repealed 1968); Act of June 12, 1967, ch. 353, [1967] Mass. Acts 202, 202 (repealed 
1971): Act of April 9, 1963, ch. 293, § 11, [1963] Nev. Stats. 531, 532 (repealed 1969); 
Law of April 22, 1964, ch. 702, § 1, [1964] N.Y. Laws 1827, 1828 (repealed 1970), Only 
Delaware added a similar provision to its version of the U.A.G.A. See DEL, ConE ANN, 
tit. 24, § 1783(£) (Supp. 1970). If it can be assumed that these legislatures' opinions on 
the question of remuneration had not changed, five of the six states believed that the 
Act's language excluded sales. The Delaware legislature apparently read the language 
as at least ambiguous. 
447, See note 488 infra, 
448. See note -488 infra. 
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permitted by state law. If so, the sale of the body or its parts cannot 
be defeated by the next of kin as it could be at common law. 
Even if the transfer cannot be defeated by third parties, however, 
it is not necessarily enforceable. Under the Uniform Act, donations 
are revocable at the will of the donor.449 If the Act extends revoca-
bility to organ sales contracts, the contracts may be invalid in light 
of the basic principle that a contract cannot be revocable at the whim 
of a party.450 However, it is the transfer·that is revocable under the 
Act, not the contract. If the transfer is revoked, the contract is 
breached. The provisions in the Uniform Act simply mean that a 
revocation would not be a violation of that Act; the breaching party 
would still be liable for damages under contract law. ' 
A contract to transfer an organ can best be analogized to a con-
tract to make a will. A will is revocable by the testator,451 yet courts 
have enforced contracts to make wilJ.s in actions for anticipated and 
actual breach.452 If the testator writes a will that differs from the will 
he promised to inake (or if he dies intestate) and fails to devise the 
property in question to the plaintiff, his estate is liable in damages.453 
In some cases a constructive trust in favor of the plaintiff has been 
imposed upon the beneficiary of the property.454 The will itself is 
not invalidated. It is probated, and the property is disposed of under 
its terms. The contract action is entirely separate. 
A contract by the decedent to transfer his body parts could simi-
larly lead to a damage action against his estate if he revokes. Assuming 
that a market system has alleviated the organ scarcity, a damage 
recovery should allow the buyer to find a replacement. The courts 
may allow a suit for specific performance against those who have the 
right to dispose of the body, but the time constraints imposed by 
present transplant technology455 will make the suit useless if the 
organ was purchased for transplant purposes. However, the courts 
may entertain an action in equity before the seller's death if there has 
449. See text accompanying notes 35-42 supra. 
450. See RFsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 79 (1932). 
451. See, e.g., Innis v. Michigan Trust Co., 238 Mich. 282, 213 N.W. 85 (1927). 
452. As early as 1682 the validity of a contract to leave property at the death of the 
promisor was accepted without question. See Goilmere v. Battison, 23 Eng. Rep. 301 
(Ch. 1682). See also Roy v. Pos, 183 Cal. 359, 191 P. 542 (1920); Farrington v. Richard• 
son, 153 Fla. 907, 16 S,2d 158 (1944). 
453. Ordinarily the measure of damages will be the value of the thing promised. 
See, e.g., Strakosch v. Connecticut Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 96 Conn. 471, 114 A. 660 
(1921). 
454. Fred v. Asbury, 105 Ark. 494, 152 S.W. 155 (1912); Keefe v. Keefe, 19 Cal. 
App. 310, 125 P. 929 (1912). Specific performance will be decreed where the promisee's 
performance is of such a nature as to make its valuation in money difficult or im-
possible. See, e.g., Oles v. Wilson, 57 Colo. 246, 141 P. 489 (1914). 
455. See text accompanying notes 257-75 supra, 
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been an anticipatory breach and no suitable substitute will be avail-
able in the market. 
If the Uniform Act is held to exclude any transfer accompanied 
by remuneration, it is unlikely that the courts will enforce the sale 
· by an individual of his cadaver parts because of the established 
·common law rule that a dead body is not property in a "commercial 
sense."41i6 The courts may be very reluctant to modify that rule, for 
placing a value on the body for sales purposes opens the door to 
other commercial practices that the public may still find ab~orrent, 
such as holding the body as security for funeral costs.407 
However, the use of body parts for allografts was not one of the 
·considerations motivating the formulation of the common law doc-
trine. Rather, the doctrine was motivated and sustained by deference 
to ecclesiastical control over burial ceremonies408 and abhorrence of 
body-snatching for pecuniary motives.409 With the elimination of 
ecclesiastical authority and the growth of the transplant science, the 
doctrine has become outmoded, and its continued use may stifle a 
valuable method of obtaining needed human parts. 
A modification of the doctrine that may provide a useful analogy 
has already occurred in the autopsy area. Courts have held that an 
individual may contract with an insurance company for the perfor-
mance of an autopsy to determine the circumstances of his death.400 
Thus, the individual may, for essentially pecuniary purposes, bestow 
a right to the possession of his cadaver. However, the insurance 
contract, unlike the sale contract, does not result in the placing of a 
direct monetary value on the cadaver; such a valuation flies directly 
in the face of the doctrine that there are no commercial rights in a 
dead body. 
In any case, the ability of the courts alone to ensure that the 
sales system is not misused is doubtful, for many of the problems 
involved are not the subjects of legal expertise. Express legislation 
allowing the sale of human body parts and detailing the proper 
operation of the sales system would be preferable to judicial formula-
tion. 
2. The Sale by Those Holding the Right to Burial 
The right and duty of burial ordinarily belongs to the surviving 
spouse,461 except in those situations in which the spouses have 
456. See text accompanying note 426 supra. 
457. See Jefferson County Burial Soc. v. Scott, 218 Ala. 354, 118 S. 644 (1928); 
Crawford v. Larson, 216 Minn. 417, 13 N.W.2d 137 (1944). 
458. See text accompanying notes 391-400 supra. 
459. See text accompanying note 413 supra. 
460. See, e.g., Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Rossi, 35 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1929); 
Schmiedeke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 30 F. Supp. 640 (N.D. Tex. 1940), 
46!, See, e.g., Fischer's Estate v. Fischer, 1 Ill. App. 2d 528, 117 N.E.2d 855 (1954); 
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separated462 or the right is waived.463 If the right of burial is not as-
sumed by the spouse it passes to the next of kin, in the order of their 
relation to the decedent unless there are special circumstances of in-
timacy or close association.464 The right of burial includes the power 
to determine the time, manner, and place of burial,465 but it is quali-
fied by the interests of the rest of the family and of friends. The right 
is said to be a sacred trust for the benefit of all who may have an in-
terest in the remains.466 Interference with the right, by mutilation or 
withholding of the body, is an actionable ,vrong,467 and the violator 
may be liable for damages.468 
The Uniform Act adds a new aspect to the rights of the spouse 
and the next of kin, allowing them to donate the decedent's cadaver 
for !D,edical research and therapy in the absence of an express ob-
jection by the decedent.46~ The Act establishes a priority ranking 
among the decedent's relatives to determine who can make a final 
donation decision.470 Again, for the reasons discussed above,471 it is 
Haney v. Stamper, 277 Ky. I, 125 S.W.2d 761 (1939); Pulsifer v. Douglass, 94 Me. 556, 
48 A. 118 (1901). 
462. See, e.g., Feller v. Universal Funeral Chapel, Inc., 124 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Sup. Ct. 
1953); In re Forrisi, 170 Misc. 649, 10 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. 1939). , 
463. See, e.g., Teasly v. Thompson, 204 Ark. 959, 165 S.W .2d 940 (1942); Hackett 
v. Hackett, 18 R.I. 155, 26 A. 42 (1893). . 
464. Sheehan v. Commercial Travelers' Mut. Accident Assn., 283 Mass. 543, 186 
N.E. 627 (1933); Holland v. Metalious, 105 N.Y. 290, 198 A.2d 654 (1964); Finley v. 
Atlantic Transp. Co., 220 N.Y. 249, 115 N.E. 715 (1917); Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 
Pa. 313, 56 A. 878 (1904); Love v. Aetna Cas. 8: Sur. Co., 99 S.W .2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1936). Some states specify the order by statute. See Enos v. Snyder, 131 Cal. 68, 63 
P. 170 (1900); Phillips v. Home Undertakers, 192 Okla. 597, 128 P.2d 550 (1943). 
465. See, e.g., Haney v. Stamper, 277 Ky. 1, 125 S.W.2d 761 (1939); Fischer's Estate 
v. Fischer, I Ill. App. 2d 528, 117 N.E.2d 855 (1954). 
466. See, e.g., Southern Life 8: Health Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 21 Ala. App. 5, 105 S. 
161, cert. denied, 213 Ala. 413, 105 S. 168 (1925). 
467. See, e.g., Kyles v. Southern R.R., 147 N.C. 394, 6 S.E. 278 (1908); Finley v. 
Atlantic Transp. Co., 220 N.Y. 249, 115 N.E. 715 (1917). 
468. See, e.g., cases cited in note 467 supra. In many jurisdictions, an exception to 
the usual rule that there can be no recovery for mental suffering or anguish where 
no physical injury is inflicted and no pecuniary loss sustained permits a person with 
a right of burial to recover for mental anguish if the interference is willful or in 
reckless disregard of the right of the relative. See, e.g., Wright v. Hollywood Ceme-
tery Corp., 112 Ga. 884, 38 S.E. 94 (1901); Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 
238 (1891). In some cases wantonness or willfulness need not be shown to enable the 
recovery of damages for mental suffering if the suffering is causally linked to the in-
terference. See, e.g., Coty v. Baughman, 50 S.D. 372, 210 N.W. 348 (1926). 
469. See text· accompanying notes 43-44 supra. 
470. See note 44 supra. The Act establishes the following order of priority: 
(I) the spouse, 
(2) an adult son or daughter, 
(3) either parent, 
(4) an adult brother or sister, 
(5) a guardian of the person of the decedent at the time of his death, 
(6) any other person authorized or under obligation to dispose of the body. 
UN!FOR:I[ ANATOMICAL GIFT Acr § 21(b). 
471. -See text accompanying notes 443-46 supra. 
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not clear whether the individual entitled to donate the body can also 
sell it. If the Act does permit sales, they should be enforceable. In 
contrast to contracts made by the decedent donor, contracts by the 
next of kin are not revocable. 
If the Act is held not to apply to sales by relatives, three aspects 
of the right to burial may create difficulty. First, the right has 
consistently been narrowly construed to encompass only limited 
discretion as to time, place, and manner of burial.472 It is doubtful 
that courts will allow it to be expanded to enable its possessor to 
benefit financially, especially in light of the common law maxim that 
there is no commercial property right in a dead body.478 Second, the 
possessor of the right to burial is commonly said to be holding a 
trust for friends and relatives of the decedent who have an emotional 
interest in the disposition of the body.474 If others object to the sale 
of the decedent's cadaver, the seller's rights as trustee may be 
successfully defeated.475 Third, the decedent is entitled to a decent 
burial,476 and the attempted sale of his cadaver without statutory 
authorization may be a violation of that right. 
One problem that may have to be faced whether or not the 
Uniform Act applies is the possible commission of the common law 
crime of selling a body for the purpose of dissection. It has been 
held in England and in the United States that an individual charged 
·with the burial of a dead body is criminally liable if he attempts to 
sell it.477 However, the'most recent American case was apparently 
decided in 1990,418 and the present status of the crime is question-
able. Even if the crime still exists, most of the previous cases can be 
472. See Rauhe v. Langeland Memorial Chapel, Inc., 44 Mich. App. 371, 205 
N.W .2d 313 (1973). 
473. See text accompanying note 306 supra. 
474. "(T]he right to possession and disposition [of a dead body] is in a sense a 
trust to be exercised for all having affection for the deceased and an interest in seeing 
the body decently interred." Southern Life &: Health Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 21 Ala. App. 
5, IO, 105 S. 161, 166, cert. denied, 213 Ala. 413, 105 S. 168 (1925). See also Teasley v. 
Thompson, 204 Ark. 959, 962, 165 S.W.2d 940, 942 (1942). 
475. For example, the power of a spouse to control the disposition of the decedent's 
remains has been removed when normal marital relationships were not maintained. 
See, e.g., Feller v. Universal Funeral Chapel, Inc., 124 N.Y.S. 546 (Sup. Ct. 1953). See 
generally 2 A. SCOTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 107 (3d ed. 1967) (trust law doctrines 
regarding removal of trustees). 
476. See text accompanying notes 431, 433-34 supra, 
477. E.g., Thompson v. State, 105 Tenn. 177, 58 S.W. 213 (1900); The Queen v. 
Feist, 27 L.J. Mag. Cas. 164 (1858); Young's Case (K.B. 1785), noted in Rex v. Lynn, 
100 Eng. Rep. 394, 395 (K.B. 1788), and 4 J. WENTWORTH, A CoMPLETE SYSTEM OF 
PLEADING 219-22 (1799), 
478. Thomps~n v. State, 105 Tenn. 177, 58 S.W. 213 (1900). But cf. Detroit Free 
Press, April 13, 1974, at 9-A, col. 5-8, reporting the indictment of four Boston doctors 
under an obscure Massachusetts law forbid!ling the carrying away of human bodies 
or remains for the purpose of dissection. The doctors had been involved in a federally 
supported experiment seeking to combat infection in tlie unborn fetus. 
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distinguished from the sale of bodies for transplant purposes. For the 
most part, the accused were undertakers, jailors, and others who 
failed to bury bodies entrusted· to them.479 The cases are tinctured 
with fraud; the offenders were typically under specific instructions 
to bury the body. Nevertheless, statutory clarification is necessary 
if spouses or next of kin are to sell body parts of a decedent without 
fear of civil or criminal liability. 
VI. OTHER LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 
A. Products Liability 
Richard M. Titmuss has charged that the increase in malpractice 
and negligence suits in the United States is attributable to the 
"gr~wth of commercial practices in certain sectors of medical care and 
the increasing application of the laws of the marketplace."480 The 
result, he says, is to pass on to the public increased costs resulting 
from malpractice insurance481 and defensive medical practices.482 Tit-
muss refers specifically to the blood market, but it is clear that he 
would as fervently deplore the establishment of a market in other 
human body parts.488 
This argument has emotive appeal, but it is not persuasive. First, 
Titmuss's assumptions that an increase in negligence and malpractice 
claims is harmful and due to the growth of commercial practices are 
unsupported. Titmuss's fears would be justified if there were some 
evidence that the increase is due merely to a desire to harass physi-
cians .that is facilitated and encouraged by the sales concept, but there 
is no such evidence. The increase in malpractice litigation may 
arise instead from an emerging belief that maltreated individuals, 
and p~rhaps simply unlucky individuals, should have the cost of their 
maltreatment or misfortune spread among other patients by means 
of increased insurance costs that are passed along as increased medical 
bills, rather than being forced to bear their loss alone. Another 
possible explanation of the increase is that doctors are performing 
479. See cases cited in note 477 supra. 
480. R. Tmrus.s, supr~ note 243, at 170. 
481. Id. at 169. A policy in the middle range of coverage for a general surgeon 
in New York in 1968 cost approximately 1,165 dollars a year, and for general practice 
the cost was around 350 dollars. High risk surgeons may pay up to 15,000 dollars a 
year. The cost of insurance rose approximately 50 per cent in 1968. Id. at 167. 
482. " '. • • [P]hysicia~s today are practising more legal medicine and probably 
relying less on their judgment. They order batteries of tests that might not be neces-
sary. They order X-rays that ·might not be necesary; call for consultations, and only 
do this to protect themselves.'" Id. at 169, quoting J. King, American Mutual Liabil-
ity Insurance Co., A.M.A. NEws, Nov. 18, 1968. 
483. "If blood· is. considered in theory, in law, and is treated in practice as a 
trading commodity then ultimately human hearts, kidntys, eyes, and other organs of 
the body may also come to be treated as commoditi~ to be bought and sold in the 
• marketplace." Id. at 158. · 
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inadequately, and a better educated public is increasingly seeking 
compensation when poor treatment is given. 
Moreover, Titmuss's argument:484 that the creation of a market 
for blood and organs inevitably leads to more malpractice and negli• 
gence suits is also questionable. It suggests that under the market 
system the blood or organ transferred becomes a "product" and thus 
subject to claims based on warranty, negligence, and tort theories of 
strict products liability. He argues that under the donative system 
the transfer of blood is provided as a service.485 This characterization, 
he suggests, has two positive effects: Patients are less likely to sue for 
defects, and, when they do sue, the supplier is liable only for negli-
gence and cannot be reached under theories of product liability or 
breach of warranty.486 The weakness of the argument is that pur-
chased blood and organs are as easily classified "services" as donated 
blood and organs. Damages arising from an_ injury or death allegedly 
caused by a purchased blood transfusion have been sought under the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The relevant provisions are sec-
tion 2-314, which establishes an implied warranty of "fitness for the 
ordinary purposes for which ... goods are used," and section 2-315, 
which establishes an implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose for which the seller knows the goods are bought. The plaintiffs 
have contended that, because a charge is made for the blood admin-
istered, the transfusion constitutes a sale and the implied warranties 
of article 2 apply. However, in the majority of the cases the courts 
have refused to apply the warranties on the ground that a blood 
transfusion is predominantly a service and is ~~s not reached under 
article 2, despite the charge for the blood used.487 In addition, several 
484. See R. TITMuss, supra note 243, at 158-72. 
485. Note, however, the following: "Recent court decisions in the United States, 
argued Professor Randall, 'have tended to shift more and more of what had pre• 
viously been considered as "services" into the category of commodity transactions.' 
This trend, and the activities of lawyers bent on legalizing more and more service 
relationships, have contributed to dramatic increases in the number and cost of mal• 
practice and negligence suits in the whole field of medical care as well as in the case 
of blood transfusions.'' Id. at 165. · 
486. R. TrrMuss, supra note 243, at 158-72. 
487. Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D.C. Colo. 1964); Whitehurst 
v. American Natl. Red Cross, I Ariz. App. 326, 402 P.2d 584 (1965); Lovett v. Emory 
Univ., Inc., 116 Ga. App. 277, 156 S.E.2d 923 (1967): Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War 
Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W .2d 805 (1965); Baptista v. 
St. Barnabas- Medical Center, 109 N.J. Super. 217, 262 A.2d 902, affd., 57 N.J, 167, 
270 A.2d 409 (1970); Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 
(1954); Goelz v. J. K. &: Susie L. Wadley Research Institute&: Blood Bank, 350 S.W.2d 
573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Dibble v. Dr. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 12 
Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961); Gile v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 
774, 296 P .2d 662 (1956); Koenig v. Milwaukee 'Blood Center Inc., 123 Wis. 2d 324, 
127 N.W .2d 50 (1964). But see Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 
443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970) (dictum); Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp., 439 Pa. 501, 
267 A.2d 867 (1970). A few cases recognizing the general inapplicability of the 
doctrine of implied warranty have carved an exception for blood banks. Community 
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states have expressly provided 'that a blood transfusion is to be 
deemed a service and not a salef88 
Damages for death or injury resulting from blood transfusions 
have also been sought on the basis of strict liability in tort. That 
concept has been codified in section 4O2A of the Second Restatem.ent 
of Torts, which provides, in part, that the buyer of "any product 
in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user 
or consumer" can recover from the seller for physical damage to his 
person or property ·without regard to notice, disclaimer, or the ex-
istence of warranty.489 The courts have split on the applicability of 
this principle to blood transfusions. To date, three cases have allowed 
recovery490 and three have denied recovery.491 Again, the critical 
question is whether a transfusion is a sale or a service. The concept of 
strict liability has not normally been applied to the rendering of pro-
fessional services,492 and those cases that have allowed recovery have 
found that the defendant hospital or blood bank was engaged in a 
sale.498 An express statutory determination that blood transfusions 
are services should thus bar this form of action and actions for 
breach of warranty.494 
Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 S.2d 115 (Fla. 1967); Hoder v. Sayet, 196 S.2d 205 
(Fla. App. 1967); Carter v. Inter-Faith Hosp., 60 Misc. 2d 733, 304 N.Y.2d 97 (1969) 
(dictum). 
488. Some states so provide in their' versions of the UCC. Alabama's version is 
typical: 
Procuring, furnishing, donating, processing, distributing, or using human 
whole blood, plasma, blood products, blood derivatives, and other human tissues 
such as corneas, bones or organs !or the purpose of injecting, transfusing, or trans-
planting any of them in the human body is declared for all purposes to be the 
rendition of a service' by every person participating therein and whether any 
remuneration is paid therefor is declared not to be a sale of such whole blood, 
plasma, blood products, blood derivatives, or other human tissues. 
ALA, CoDE tit. 7A, § 2-314(4) (Supp. 1971). See also MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 106, § 2-316 
(1965): S.D. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 57-4-33.1 (Supp. 1973). Other states so provide in 
their versions of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH &: SAFErY 
CODE § 7155.6 (West 1970); MISS. CODE ANN. ch. 41, § 41-41-1 (1972). 
489. R.l:sTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 402A (1965). See State ex rel. Western Seed 
Prod. Corp. v. Campbell, 250 Ore. 262, 442 P.2d 215 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 
1093 (1969). 
490. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memoriai Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 
(1970): Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 121 N.J. Super. 299, 296 A.2d 668 (1972): Reilly v. 
King County Cent. Blood Bank, 6 Wash. App. 172,492 P.2d 246 (1971). 
491. McDaniel v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., 469 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1972); Balkowitsch 
v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 
(1965); Baptista v. St. Barnabas Medical Center, 109 N.J. Super. 217, 262 A.2d 902, 
afjd., 57 N.J. 167, 270 A.2d 409 (1970). _ 
492. See, e.g., Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 270 
Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965): Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 
539, affd. sub nom. Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (1967). See 
generally Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1425 (1970). 
493. See cases cited in note 490 supra. 
494. The Sixth Circuit so held in McDaniel v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., 469 F.2d 
230 (1973). It is estimated that 25 legislatures have such provisions. See Cunningham 
1256 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 72:1182 
In conclusion, a majority of jurisdictions consider blood transfu-
sions to involve a service, rather than a sale of a product,401i even 
though there is an open market in blood and even though paying 
donors provide over fifty per cent496 of the blood supply in the United 
States. The same characterization can be applied to human body parts 
bought and sold in a market. 
B. Tax Consequences 
_ The five market proposals discussed above407 have different in-
come and estate tax consequences. The basic question for income tax 
purposes is whether the proceeds are part of the gross income of the 
seller or his beneficiaries. Under section 61(a) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code (Code), "except as otherwise provided ... gross income 
means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not 
limited to)" fifteen specified items. Among those items are "compen-
sation for services, including fees, commissions, and similar items" 
and "gains derived from dealings in property.''498 Section 61 is sup• 
plemented by extensive defining Regulations499 and Code provi-
sions, 500 but the Supreme Court has held that Congress intended to 
reach all gains except those specifically excluded.u01 
v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 443, 453, 266 N.E.2d 897, 902 (1970). 
A negligence action is available whether the transfusion is determined to be a 
service or a sale. Mississippi Baptist Hosp. v, Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 S.2d 142 
(1951); Necolayff v. Genesee Hosp., 270 App. Div. 648, 61 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1946), affd., 
296 N.Y. 936, 73 N.E.2d 117 (1947). The standard in a negligence action involving a 
transplant should be the same as that applied by most courts to other medical 
practices: The defendant should have exercised that degree of care and skill usually 
exercised by persons acting in a similar capacity in the same general geographic area. 
Finley v. United States, 314 F. Supp. 905, 911 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Johnson v. Myers, 
118 Ga. App. 773, 774, 165 S.E.2d 739, 742 (1968). 
495. The present refusal of many courts to classify blood transfusions as sales is 
_ due in part to the inability of present technology to detect hepatitis, the most com• 
mon defect in transferred blood. See Comment, Serum Hepatitis Through Blood 
Transfusions: A Wrong Without a Remedy?, 24 Sw. L.J. 305, 307-08 (1970). The human 
organ transplant is an even more complicated and risky procedure, because of tissue 
typing and immunological problems, see text accompanying notes 149-65 supra, and 
should be similarly classified. However, the identification of transplants with trans• 
fusions should not be rigidly maintained. There is some indication that great gains 
in hepatitis detection will be made in the near future, Comment, supra, at 807-08, 
in which case the courts may decide that warranty and strict liability theories can 
be appropriately applied to transfusions. The status of organ transplants should not· 
be simultaneously modified. Transplants should remain subject only to negllgence 
standards until similar technological advances, which significantly improve their 
predictability, have been made. 
496. R. TITMUss, supra note 243, at 96. 
497. See section V supra. 
498. !NT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 6l(a). 
499. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.61-1 to -15 (1957), as amended (1974). 
500. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 71-124 (sections 71-83 primarily list items spccifi• 
cally included in gross income, while sections 101-24 list items specifically excluded 
from gross income). 
501.· See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429-30 (1954): Com• 
missioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 407 (1947). 
" 
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The easiest case is presented by proposals three and four, which 
call for a present payment to the seller- for an organ to be extracted 
from either the living seller (under the fourth proposal) or from 
his cadaver (under the third). The proceeds, all or in part, will be 
included in the seller's gross income as either "compensation for 
services" or "gains derived from dealings in property" within the 
meaning of section 6l(a). 
Howexer, the calculation of the amount of the proceeds that will 
be included and the determination of whether that amount is to be 
taxed as ordinary income or as capital gains are more difficult ques-
tions. As in the products liability area, the answers turn on the char-
acterization of the transaction as a service or as a sale of property. 
The characterization of a blood transfusion, an analogous problem, 
has left the states divided.502 Many states have treated the transfer of 
blood as a service, and recent state legislation tends not to distinguish 
the sale of blood from the sale of organs.508 However, the characteri-
zation of an interest under state law is not binding for federal tax 
purposes. 504 There has been one Revenue Ruling on the subject; it 
denied a charitable deduction on the ground that a blood donation 
constitutes a personal service, rather than a contribution of prop-
erty. 605 The ruling may indicate that the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) will classify blood transfusions as services for all tax purposes, 
but it is not clear whether it will apply this characterization to the 
transfer of other body parts. There are some significant differences 
benveen the two cases; for instance, blood can easily be regenerated, 
and most body parts cannot. · 
If the transfer of a human body part for compensation is consid-
ered to be a service, the entire amount of the proceeds is included in 
gross income under section 6l(a).506 Any costs incurred by the tax-
payer in making the sale agreement or in the actual removal of the 
organ should be deductible under section 212 as expenses for the 
production of income.507 
502. See text accompanying notes 485-94 supr(l. 
503. See text accompanying note 488 supra. 
504. See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 457 (1967) ("Where the 
federal estate tax liability turns upon the character of a property interest held and 
transferred by the decedent under state law, federal authorities are not bound by the 
determination made of such property interest b_y a state trial court.''). 
505. Rev, Rul. 162, 1953-2 CuM. BULL, 127. 
506. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(a)(l) (1957). 
507. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212: "In the case of an individual, there shall be 
allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred 
during the taxable year-(1) for the production, or collection of income ••• .'' A single 
sale of an organ or body probably will not qualify as a "trade or business" under 
section 162(a), which allows deductions for business expenses incurred in connection 
with a "trade or business.'' It has been stated that the carrying on of a trade or 
business requires extensive activity over a substantial :period of time during which the 
taxpayer holds himself out as selling goods or services. McDowell v. Ribicoff, 292 
F.2d 174 (3d Cir,}, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919 (1961). See also Rev. Rul. 58-6, 1958-1 
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If, instead, such transfers are considered to be sales of property,508 
only a part-of the proceeds may be included in gross income; calcu-
lation of the amount of that part will be very difficult. Only gains 
derived from dealings in property, not the entire proceeds, are con-
sidered income. 500 The gain is defined as the sum of any money re-
ceived and the fair market value of any property or services received 
from the sale, minus the adjusted basis of the property sold.n1o The 
adjusted basis is typically the initial cost of the property, adjusted 
upward for any expenditure properly chargeable to capital account 
and downward for depreciation allowed or allowable as a deduction 
in computing taxable income.511 The concept of "basis," however, is 
more useful for land or machinery than for organs and bodies, where_ 
it becomes virtually incalculable. Most likely, the initial cost of a 
taxpayer's body will be set at zero. Perhaps expenditures for health 
care,512 food, clothing, and shelter can be said to be "chargeable to 
capital account." One author has suggested that the Commissioner 
and the courts will not reach this conclusion; in support, he points 
out that section 262 explicitly disallows deductions for personal, 
living, or family expenses. 513 Such expenditures can also be charac-
terized as repair or maintenance expenses and, therefore, not ex-
penditures for capital improvement.nu As such, they could not be 
used to increase the taxpayer's basis of zero,n1n and all of the proceeds 
from the sale of the taxpayer's body parts would be gain. 
If the sale of body parts is construed as a sale of property rather 
Cui.r. Buu.. 322, which provides conditions to be met in qualifying as a trade or 
business. 
508. The common law of cadaver disposition in the United States is typically 
interpreted to hold that there are no commercial property rights in a dead body. 
Only a "quasi-right" of burial is vested in the surviving spouse or the next of kin • 
.See text accompanying note 426 supra. This discussion, therefore, assumes that these 
common law concepts have been overturned or modified and that the sale of human 
body parts has been legalized. 
509. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 6l(a)(3). 
510. !NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 100l(a), (b). 
511. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 1016(a)(l), (2), 
512. Specifically, those expenditures not within a taxpayer's current deduction 
allowances. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 213(a), (b). 
·513, Note, Tax Consequences of Transfers of Bodily Parts, 73 COLUM, L. R.Ev. 
842, 854-55 (1973). The author recommends enactment of a statute to provide that 
anatomical parts have zero bases. Id. at 865. 
514. Treas. Reg. § l.167(a)-ll(d)(2) (1971). See Midland Empire Packing Co. v. 
Comm~ssioner, 14 T.C. 635, 640 (1950), quoting Illinois Merchants Trust Co., 4 D.T.A. 
103, 106 (1926) ("A repair is an expenditure for the purpose of keeping the property 
in an ordinarily efficient operating condition. It does not add to the value of the 
property, .n_o!," does it appreciably prolong its life. It merely keeps the property in an 
operating condition over its probable useful life for the uses for which it was ac-
quired.'). 
515. Cf. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 1016(a)(l). The expenditures are not "properly 
chargeable to capital account.'' 
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than services, the proceeds would be characterized capital gains 
(gains from the sale of a capital asset, as defined in section 1221)616 
and subject to a lower rate of taxation.617 Income from services, in 
contrast, is treated as ordinary income. 
The tax issues arising under the first and second proposals are 
more complicated. Both involve the taxpayer's sale of a right to pos-
session of his organs upon his death, but under the first proposal, the 
remuneration to be paid to selected beneficiaries is not determined 
until after death and is dependent upon the actual value of the body 
at that time. Under the second proposal, the amount is fixed. Again, 
the characterization of the transfer as a service or as a sale of property 
may be critical to the tax consequenc_es. 
If the service characterization is adopted, the proceeds will prob-
ably be considered "income in respect of a decedent." Under section 
69l(a), income items that qualify for such tax treatment are taxed to 
the recipient in the year of actual receipt. In order to preserve the 
tax consequences that would have occurred had the decedent re- . 
ceived the income during his life, section 69l(a)(3) characterizes the 
income-for example, as capital gains or ordinary income-by refer-
ence to the decedent's status, and section 691(b) gives the benefici-
aries a right to the deductions or credits to which the decedent would 
have· been entitled had he lived. · 
Little guidance is provided by either the Code618 or the Regula-
tions619 with regard to what income is properly classified as "income 
in respect of a decedent." Section 691 is most frequently used in sit-
uations involving payment for personal services of the decedent.620 
A common example is the payment to the decedent's estate or sur-
vivors of back wages that were not included in decedent's tax return 
because he used the cash method of reporting.621 The seller of an 
organ under the first two proposals has arguably provided a ser-
vice during his life-the completion of a valid anatomical dona-
tion form-for which remuneration is due.622 Since the_ rights to 
516. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 1221, defines "capital asset" as "property held by 
the ta.xpayer" (excluding five classifications of property, none of which is relevant 
here). 
517. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1201-02. 
518. See INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 691. 
519. See Treas. Reg. § l.69l(a)-l(b) (1957) ("In general, the term 'income in re-
spect of a decedent' refers to those amounts to which a decedent was entitled as 
gross income but which were not properly includible in computing his taxable in-
come for the taxable year ending with the date of his death or for a previous taxaole 
year under the method of accounting employed by the decedent.'). 
520. See Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2(b), examples (1), (2) (1957); Rev. Rul. 65-217, 
1965-2 CUM. BULL. 214, 217. 
521. See Treas. Reg. § 1.69l(a)-2(b), example (1) (1957). 
522. A complication could ensue if the laws of the· state prohibit .present payment 
for future cadaver sales. Then the decedent would have had not a right to the pay-
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that remuneration are held ·hy his beneficiaries, the proceeds are 
subject to taxation under section 691. Several cases have held that 
remuneration for services rendered by a decedent, payable to his 
widow after his death pursuant to a contract benveen the decedent 
and his employer, is "income in respect of a decedent" within 
section 691.523 The transfer of an organ would seem to be analogous. 
If under federal tax law the sale of cadaver parts is determined to 
be the sale of property, section 691 is not so clearly applicable. Two 
tests may be gleaned from the court decisions. The first test, which 
looks to economic activities occurring before death, originated in the 
Ninth Circuit's decision in Commissioner v. Linde.624 Under that 
test, if the decedent has taken all the necessary steps to arrange the 
sale and has left nothing for the beneficiary to do, the income re-
ceived from the sale is "income in respect of a decedent." Under the 
second test, adopted by the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, 6211 the activities 
performed by the decedent must actually have given rise to a right 
to the income: 
Although it is pertinent to inquire whether the income received 
after death was attributable to activities and economic efforts of the 
decedent in his lifetime, these activities and efforts must give rise to 
a right to that income. And the right is to be distinguished from the 
activity which creates the right. Absent such a right, no matter liow 
great the activities or efforts, there would be no taxable income under 
§ 691.526 
An examp~e in the Regulations accepts the Ninth Circuit's position.627 
The individual who contracts to sell his cadaver organs with pay-
ment to be ma.de after his death has met the Linde test in the sense 
that he has performed all the activities necessary to finalize the sale, 
but the seller, prior to his death, may not have the right to income 
that is required by the second test. Courts using the "right to in-
come" test seem concerned with the certainty of the consummation 
_of the sale ~saction and of receipt of the proceeds, rather than on 
the certainty that the contract has been formulated. 628 
ment but only the right to name the beneficiaries. For the effect of such a distinction 
in another area see Teschner v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 1003 (1962). 
523. See Collins v. United States, 318 .F. Supp. 382 (C.D. Cal. 1970), affd., 448 F.2d 
787 (9th Cir. 1971); Miller v, United States, 19 Am. Fed. Tax R,2d 830 (W,D. Tex. 
1967), afjd,, 389 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1958); Bernard v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 256 
(S.D.N,Y. 1963). 
524. 213 F.2d ·1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 871 (1954). 
525. Keck v. Commissioner, 415 -F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1969); Trust Co. v. Ross, 392 
F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968). 
526. Trust Co. v. Ross, 392 F.2d 694, 695 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 
(1968). 
527. See Tr~. Reg. § l.69l(a)-2(b), example (5)(2) (1957). 
528. See, e.g.,- Keck v. Commissioner, 415 F.2d 531, 534 (6th Cir. 1969); Trust Co. 
v. Ross, -392 F.2d 694, 696 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968). 
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. .Under the first proposal, the amount received depends upon• the 
ultimate condition of the cadaver. The beneficiaries will receive noth-
ing if the body or its parts are not usable. The risk that particular 
parts will have no value is rather large. For example, it has _been 
estimated that only one in ten cadaver hearts is fit for use.529 The risk 
of nonpayment is higher when death occurs relatively far from a med-
ical facility. For these reasons, the beneficiaries' right to receive pro-
ceeds under the first proposal may be too uncertain to qualify under 
the "right to income" test. The second proposal, because of its fixed 
payment scheme, does not have these difficulties and should meet 
either test. 
If transfers under the first proposal are considered to be sales of 
property that do not fall within section 691 a very different tax result 
may be reached. Arguably, the basis of the cadaver should then be 
stepped up, under section 1014(b)(9), to the amount of its fair market 
value at the time of the decedent's death. The sale of the cadaver 
parts at that time, presumably at their market value, would not re-
sult in any gain to the estate or to the beneficiaries. To fall ·within 
section 1014(b)(9), however, the entire amount of the proceeds must 
be included in the decedent's gross estate. The crucial test, then, may 
be the application of the estate tax provisions. Section 2036 dictates 
that a retained life estate in transferred property subjects the value 
of that property to the estate tax. A sale under the first proposal is 
similar to a transfer ·with a retained life estate in that the seller keeps 
his organs until his death and the buyer acquires ari interest that 
cannot be exercised until that time. 
Another analysis that could be advanced with regard to the first 
two proposals, whether they are characterized as the provision of a 
service or the sale of property, is that the contracting seller, in effect, 
presently realizes the discounted value of the future proceeds and 
reinvests his'present remuneration with the buyer. This analysis may 
be persuasive if the contract or a statute requires the buyer to set 
aside funds to ensure payment upon the cadaver's future delivery, 
and if it is also legal to sell a cadaver for present payment and future 
delivery (proposal three). Legislative requirements regarding the safe-
keeping of funds received in prepayment schemes are not unknown. 
For exampJe, soIIl_e sJat~ staJµt~s _requir~ _unclert~e~ ~ho contract 
while the customer is alive to provide burial services to put the pay-
ment in escrow or in some other safekeeping arrangement.530 
• '529~ Kutner: Due Process of Human Transplants: A Proposal, 24 U. MIAMI L. 
:REY. 782, 786 (1970). . 
530. Such statutes o~ten require that money collected on burial insurance contracts 
be deposited in bank accounts in trust for the benefit of the "policyholders," so that 
during the insured's life little or none of the funds are available to the contractor 
for operating expenses or profit. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111½, §§ 73.101-.108 
(1973); TEK. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art: 548b, §§ 1-lOa (1959), as amended, TEX. REv. 
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 548b, §§ 1-l0a (Supp. 1972). 
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If this analysis is _accepted, the seller realizes the full amount of 
the discounted value of the proceeds as income-ordinary incomell81 
if the sale is characterized as the provision of a service, and capital 
gain532 if the body is considered to be property with a zero basis. 
The buyer, as trustee of the proceeds, could be said to reinvest them 
in the remainder interest in the body. The beneficiaries, for whom 
this i:_emainder interest is held, would receive a stepped-up basis for 
their property interest in the cadaver under section 1014(b)(9); the 
sale would, consequently, result in no gain, for the basis of the body 
would equal its fair market value at death. The major requirement 
of section 1014(b)(9), that the property be included in the decedent's 
gross estate, would again be satisfied under section 2036. 
The fifth proposal would allow the next of kin to sell the body 
parts of a decedent. If the transfer of the body part is considered to 
be a service, the entire amount of the proceeds received will be taxed 
as ordinary income. If the transfer is considered to be a sale of prop-
erty, sections 1014(a) and (b)(l) may permit the seller to enjoy a 
stepped-up basis equal to the fair market value of the cadaver parts 
at death and, therefore, realize little or no gain on the sale. The 
critical question in this regard is whether the cadaver passes to the 
seller by descent, so as to permit the cadaver to be considered an 
"inheritance" within the meaning of section 1014(b). If section 1014 
is not applicable the body may have a zero basis, and the entire pro-
ceeds will be taxable. 
Placing a value on the b9dy by means of a market system may also 
affect the availability of charitable deductions for anatomical dona-
tions. No deduction will be allowed if the provision of human body 
parts is considered to be a service, for the donation of a service does 
not qualify for a charitable deduction.533 But, if a gift of body parts 
is considered to be a donation of property, contributions to certain 
specified institutions will qualify for a charitable deduction under 
section 170,534 if the donation is an inter vivos gift of a nonvital 
organ, or as a deduction for estate tax purposes, if it is effective upon 
the death of the donor.535 
One commentator has concluded that, if the human body is given 
an economic value, existing statutes require that that value be in-
531. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6l(a)(l). 
532. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 62(3), 1201, 1202. 
533. See Treas. Reg. § l.170-2(a)(2) (1958); Rev, Rul. 162, 1953-2 Cmr. BULL. 127, 
Legislation has been introduced that would allow charitable deductions for blood 
donations. See Note, supra note 513, at 857-58 n.104, citing H.R. 853, 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1971). An IRS ruling has specifically disallowed the deductions on the ground 
that donations are provisions of services. Rev. Rul. 162, 1953-2 CUM. BULL. 127. 
534. See Note, supra note 513, at 857-58 • 
. . --535. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2055(a)(2). 
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eluded in the gross estate of all decedents for estate tax purposes.1536 
The consequent need to determine the value of cadavers would, he 
asserts, require that every cadaver be given an autopsy immediately 
upon death,537 a process that would waste medical resources and in-
cur costs in excess of the tax returned. If the transfer of body parts is 
characterized as a service, the problem should not arise. If no sale or 
donation is undertaken, no service has been provided, no right to in-
come has accrued, and there is no "property" to include in the gross 
estate. If the decedent performs the acts necessary to accomplish a 
proper donation and thus does perform a service, he has created a 
right to income to be received after his death. The provision con-
cerning income in respect of a decedent would then be applicable, 1538 
and the proceeds would be included in the gross estate of the de-
cedent for tax purposes.539 However, the person required to pay in-
come tax on the proceeds could deduct a part of the estate tax 
attributable to the inclusion of section 6~1 items in the gross estate 
of the decedent.540 
Even if the cadaver is characterized as property, it is arguable that 
its value cannot be included in the gross estate unless its parts are 
actually offered for medical use. That is, the body is property in a 
very limited sense: Under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, and, 
one may assume, under any comparable statute, it may be used solely 
for medical research, therapy, and transplantation, and consequently 
it has a value for only those purposes.541 Where the body is not used 
for the specific purposes allowed by statute it has no property value 
and, according to the common law, exists only to be buried by those 
vested with the right and duty of burial. In other words, the cadaver 
is given value only by the use to which it is put. 
A transfer without remuneration will, under the a~ove analysis, 
also result in the inclusion of the value of the cadaver in the dece-
dent's gross estate. This increase may be neutralized by a deduction 
for a charitable donation if the cadaver is given to a charitable orga-
nization under section 2055(a)(2) of the Code. if the donation is 
considered to be a service, its value would not normally be included 
in the gross estate for estate tax purposes, 542 nor would the donation 
give rise to a charitable deductioIJ.. 
536. Note, supra note 513, at 862. 
537. Id. at 863. 
538. See text accompanying notes 522-23 supra. 
539. Rev. Rul. 67-242, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 227. 
540. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 69l(c). 
541. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act is specific in the use permitted to be 
made of cadaver donations. See notes 33-34 supra and accompanying text. 
542. Services cannot be considered "property" within the terms of sections 2031, 
2033-35, or 2037 of the Code. 
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· Gift tax consequences may arise where the organ owner donates 
a nonvital organ during his lifetime.548 Again, the characterization of 
the transfer is determinative. The tax would apply if the transfer is 
deemed a sale of property,544 but would not apply if it is deemed a 
service. 646 
New tax legislation may be necessary if a market in organs be-
comes a reality: It is very unlikely that the drafters of the existing 
provisions contemplated such a development. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The goal of increasing the supply of human body parts for use in 
transplantation procedures and research, if accepted as a priority, 
may be reached by two basic routes. One is the enactment of a stat-
ute that either deters or prohibits objections to the removal of the 
cadaver parts of a recently deceased individual. Examples of this 
approach are found in the Virginia, Hawaii, and Maryland medical 
examiner statutes,646 and in the Dukeminier proposal.M7 The other 
basic route is the legalization and encouragement of sales of human 
body parts. The advantage of the market approach lies in its con-
tinued reliance on individual consent. The individual's ability to 
provide for or prohibit the use of his own or his relatives' cadaver 
parts remains protected, but the incentive to transfer is increased. 
The importance of retaining individual choice in the emotionally 
an.d often religiously charged area of the treatment of bodies may be 
significant enough to outweigh the convenience provided by statutes 
that limit ability to withhold consent. It is at least great enough to 
call Ior a full investigation of the practical potential of the market 
system. 
543. See INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 250l(a), 25U(a), 2512(b); Note, supra note !illJ, 
at 859. 
544. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 250l(a), 25ll(a), 2512(b). 
545. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 250l(a); Rev, Rul. 56-4'12, 1956-2 CuM. BULL, 21, 
546. See text accompanying notes 220-28 supra. 
547. See text accompanying notes 230-32 supra. 
